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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2507 
HARRY W. SANDERS, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
LUCIUS NEWSOME, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND 
ST!PER8EDE.A8. 
:ro the Honorable Chief Justice {1/Yl,d Justices of the Sitpreme 
Court of .Appeals of Vfrginia: 
.JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT: 
Harry W. Sanders (hereinafter referred to as defendant) 
respectfully represents that he is aggrieved by a judgment 
for $3,500.00 rendered against him in behalf of Lucius New-
some (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) in the Law 
ancl Equity Court of the City of Richmond on the fourteenth 
da.y of April, 1941. Appended to this petition, as a part 
thereof, is a cert.med transcript of the record, together with 
duly authenticated certificates signed by the Judge of said 
Court on the 5th dav of June, 1941. 
A copy of this petition ha.s been delivered to counsel for 
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the plaintiff, as shown by the sig;ned aclmowledgment of said 
counsel at the end hereof. Wherever italics or other emphasis 
appear hereinafter, it has been supplied by counsel for de-
fendant, unless otherwise stated. 
CHARACTER OF THE CASE: 
EveryQne is familiar with the biblical parable of the '' good 
Samaritan;" relating· the commendable conduct of a Samari-
tan traveler who, upon finding a Jew badly injured, lying 
in the roadway in front of him, stopped and picked up the 
Jew and took him to the nearest hospice for treatment. ,Vhat 
a gross injustice would have been perpetrated upon that 
'' g·ood Samaritan'' if, upon arrival at the hospice, the in-
jured Jew had accused his benefactor of being responsible 
for his injuries; and how utterly unjust it would have heen 
if the injured J cw later liad sued and recovered heavy dam-
ages from the '' good Samaritan''! 
·That is exactly what has happened in this case! 
Defendant, driving his automobile at night in Rieh-
mond, saw plaintiff lying crumpled up in the middle of the 
street crossing. Defendant made an immediate stop; got out 
and with the assistance of another motorist placed plaintiff 
in defendant's automobile; then took the plaintiff to the hos-
pital. After g·etting plaintiff to hospital, defendant received 
as '' thanks and appreciation" the amazing· accusation by 
plaintiff that, he, the defendant, was responsible for plain-
tiff's injuries. Defendant immediately had police officers 
called to the hospital. After interviewing both plaintiff and 
defendant, and also examining defendant's automobile a.t the 
hospital and finding no dents, scratches, broken places or 
abrasions thereon, the police officers evidently discredited the 
plaintiff's accusation, for they officially reported that plain-
tiff had been injured by an unknown hit and run driver, and 
had later been f)icked up and broug·ht to the hospital by de-
fendant. No charges of any kind were lodged against the 
defendant, either by the officers or iby the plaintiff. However, 
plaintiff subsequently broug-ht this action a.g·ainst defendant 
and recovered verdict and judgment for $3,500.00. 
Although four witnesses. including defendant, were in posi-
tion to have seen plaintiff if he had actuallv been struck hv 
defendant's car while walkin~ across the intersection as lie 
claimed. not a single one of these witnesses corroborated 
nlaintiff 's claim. The Yerdict and j.udgment was based 
largely upon plaintiff's testimony alone; much of it contra-
dictory and in11erently incredible. 
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Thus we have a. case of a modern '' good Samaritan'' whose 
humanitarian conduct is rewarded by an amazing accusa.tion 
followed by leg·al a.ction mulcting the '' g·ood Samaritan'' with 
heavy damages for injuries for which he was in no wise re-
sponsible. 
HISTORY OF THE CASE: 
Plaintiff brought action in the form of notice of motion 
for judgment, in the Law a.nd Equity Court of the City of 
Richmond, (herei~after referred to as the Court) asking 
$10,000.00 damages from the def eudant, on account of per-
sonal injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff, 
a pedestrian, by reason of alleged neg·ligence of defendant, 
a motorist. 
3• '*Plaintiff alleged that while he was crossing west-
wardly a street intersection on the night of November 
23, 1939, he was neg·ligently struck and injured by an auto-
mobile operated eastwa.rdly by defendant and making a left 
turn northwardlv at the same intersection. 
Defendant file cl a plea of general issue. 
The case was tried on J a.nuary 9, 1941, and the jury after 
considering the case over night brought in a verdict on the 
next day, January lO, 1941, for the plaintiff in the amount 
of $.3,500.00. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence and again at con-
clusion of all testimonv, defendant moved the Court to strike 
the plaintiff's evidence but the Court overruled both of these 
motions, and defendant excepted. 
During the trial, Lt. Bosquet, of the Richmond Police Force, 
a witness for plaintiff~ was permitted by the Court, over ob~ 
jection of the defendant, to testify that after several days' 
investigation subsequent to the accident, be had reported as 
his opinion that plaintiff lmd been struck by a car operated 
by defendant. To the aclmission of tllis '' opinion testimony,'' 
defenclant excepted. 
Over objection of defendant, in which dbjection the specific 
reasons were clearlv indicatecl, tl1e Court gave a right-of-way 
instruction, and to this action defenclant excepted. 
THE ISSUES INVOLVED: 
The issues involved in this case are: 
1-Whether the judgment of the trial court should be re-
ver~ed and final judgment rendered for defendant upon the 
ground that: 
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(a) the evidence did not justify a finding that defendant 
injured plaintiff; 
( 1b) under the evidence, plaintiff wa.s guilty of contribu-
tory negligence; or 
( c) the evidence did not justify a finding that defendant 
'was guilty of causal negligence; or 
2-Whether the judgment of the trial court should be re-
versed and a new trial granted because of prejudicial error 
committed against defendant by 
(a) admitting· and refusing· to strike out '' opinion testi-
mony" on one of the vital points which the jury had to de-
cide; 
(b) g·iving a rig·ht-of-way instruction which was unwar-
ranted by law and misleading· in language and effect. 
4* *FACTS OF THE CASE: 
Viewed as on a demurrer to the evidence, the facts are as 
follows: 
The accident (whatever it was) occurred about ten o'clock 
on the night of November 23, 1940, at the intersection of 2nd 
Street a.nd Franklin Street in R.ichmond, Virginia. 
The plaintiff, a. tall man of la.rge frame and considerable 
weight, sixty-six years of ag·e, with no apparent occupation, 
with a. rather extensive hospital record,-two hospital con-
finements having· been within three months of the alleged a~ 
cident,-subject to occasional losses of consciousness of vary-
ingo lengths of time-suffering from what he claimed the doc-
tors called "-apoplexy "-started out to walk several blocks 
alone late at night on a fog·gy, rainy, night to a. drug store to 
get some medicine. Walking· wcstwardly on Franklin Street 
lie started across the Second Street intersection as soon as the 
traffic light turned ~reen for him. Wben he started across, the 
only traffic in sig·ht consisted of (1) a car down in the next 
block on 1Second Street com1ng north toward the intersection 
of Franklin Street, and (2) one or two other cars standing 
diag·onally opposite the plaintiff on Franklin Street a.t the 
west sid~ of the Second Street intersection, headed ea.st. 
Plaintiff claimed that after be had gotten half-way across 
ihe intersection he saw an automobile alreadv in the intersee-
tion and making a left turn toward him. Thei1, in spite of this 
immediate impending danger, plaintiff diverted bis lookout 
~nd attention to the. opposite ¢lirection and did not again 
Ree the car that struck him unt'il it wa.s in the act of hitting 
hlm. ~ 
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Some time after plaintiff had. started across the intersec-
tion, the car coming north on Second Street pulled up and 
stopped upon reaching F'ranklin Street on account of the 
traffic light being red against it; this car ( occupied by ,J. J. 
Berry and his son, J. A. Berry) stood at the southeast corner 
of Second and Franklin Streets facing north on Second Street 
praetica.lly the entire time that the traffic. light was green for 
east and west traffic and red for north and south traffic. 
5* When the Berry c.ar reached •the intersection, the other 
car ( or possibly the other two cars) which the plaintiff 
saw standing a.t the southwest intersection, facing east on 
Franklin Street, were no longer in sight; the evidence being 
silent as to the route or routes which they took. During the 
traffic light interval while the Berrys' car was standing at 
the intersection, its lights shone north directly on the cross-
walk across which the plaintiff had walked; the Berrys wiped 
off their windshield, but neither one saw the plaintiff walk-
ing across the intersection nor did they see any other traffic 
at the intersection until the traffic light interval had just 
about expired. Just before the traffic light interval expired 
and just before the Berry car started up again and crossed 
Franklin Street, the defendant's car came east on Franklin 
Street ( from a visit in the middle of the block between Sec-
ond Street and First Street), entered the intersection on the 
green light and partially completed a left turn to go north 
on Second Street and then made a. very sudden stop. 
Defendant first saw plaintiff when defendant's car was 
just about ten feet from plaintiff, who was then sitting or 
iying crumpled up on the street, slightly to the left of the 
middle of .Second Street and several feet to the left of de-
fendant's car. Defendant instantly applied his brakes and 
the car made practically a perfect stop with no skidding, in 
fact stopping within a foot or two from the time the stop 
was started, 
(Defendant insisted that his car did not strike plaintiff 
and that only time plaintiff came in contact with defendant's 
car was after the suddeu stop when defendant @:ot out and, 
in helping to lift plaintiff off the street, leaned plaintiff over 
on left front fender of defendant's car.) 
Neither of the occupants of the Berry car saw the plaintiff 
at any time until after driving- their car across Franklin 
Street. following the defendant's sudden stop when they saw 
defendant trying to lift plaintiff upon his feet.. 
· The speed of defendant's car as it came down Franklin 
Street and started its left turn into Seeond Street was vari-
mrnly estimated. Berry, Jr., estimated the speed of the car 
:at '' twenty, twenty-five -miles an l10ur ''-" as it came to the 
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interse~tion." Berry, 8r., estimated it as ''maybe *fi.f-
6~ teen to· twenty miles an hour;'' but both of these wit-
nesses also testified to a practically perfect stop, indi-
cating that defendant's car must have been going very slowly. 
(Both defendant and passenger (Miss Morrison) driving 
with him testified that he was driving slowly, about ten or 
twelve miles an hour an<l that the car was still in second 
gear.) The plaintiff himself in his testimony made no charge 
whatever that defendant's ear was traveling at any exces-
sive speed. 
With the assistance of Berry, Jr., defendant placed plain-
tiff in defendant's car to take defendant to the hospital after 
learning· from plaintiff that his leg was injured. Defendant 
asked plaintiff what was the matter with him but could get 
no satisfactory response except that his leg was hurt. No 
explanation was offered or given by any one at the scene, 
and plaintiff made no aecusation whatever a.t the scene ( to 
the defendant, to his companion, or to either of the Berrys )--
not even intimating that he had any thought or idea that de-
fendant's car had struck him. 
Defendant and his passenger drove plaintiff to Retreat for 
the Sick Hospital but could not get him admitted unless de-
fendant would become responsible for the bill, and this the 
Defendant declined to do, explaining to the hospital authori-
ties that he was merely acting as a ''g·ood Samaritan". De-
fendant then drove plaintiff around for quite a while en-
deavoring to find some hospital that plaintiff especially de-
sired but finally ended up at Memorial Hospital. Defendant 
l1ad wanted to take plaintiff to Memorial Hospital at the very 
first. but plaintiff had a.t first refused and after the I1our of 
driving· a.round town to and past various hospitals, had then 
consented. 
During the driving around town, the defendant got im-
patient and asked plaintiff to make up his mind where he 
wanted to go, and stated tha.t l1e was only doing the plaintiff 
a favor to which plaintiff responded that defendant "be-
longed" to take him to a hospital. 
After getting- plaintiff into Memorial Hospital and learn-
ing that plaintiff was ac.cusing him, defendant l1ad police of-
ficers called for. These police officers talked to the plain-
tiff and then ca.refullv examined defendant's car which had 
remained standin~· ri~·ht in front of Memorial Hospital 
7* "to determine *whetlier it had been in a collision." De-
fendant's car was a 1939 iFord Coach with headlig·hts in 
the fenders. Examination iby the officers showed no dents, 
breaks, scratches, or abrasions either in headlights or fen-
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ders. The only thing found by these officers was that the 
rain drops collecting ov-er the rest of the car from rain earlier 
in the evening had apparently been brushed off of the left 
front fender. Defendant explained to officers at the time that 
this had been caused by plaintiff and defendant resting o~ 
and rubbing against that fender in the course of g·etting the 
plaintiff up on his feet and then carrying him around into 
defendant's car. 
These investigating officers that nig·bt, after talking with 
plaintiff and with defendant and examining defendant's car 
as aforesaid, turned in a report that plaintiff had been struck 
by hit-and-run driver and had been picked up and brought 
to the hospital :by defendant who came to scene after the 
accident. Lieutenant Bosquet, another officer, made further 
investigation for the next few days after the accident, and at 
the conclusion thereof the Lieutenant clmng·ed the classifica-
tion from llit-and-run to "accidental injury," and also added 
on his report "struck by car driven by Ha.rry Sanders" (the 
defendant). 
Although law and regulations require criminal complaints 
by officers in any case of injury due to any traffic or other 
law violations, no charge was ever filed against defendant 
either by original investigating officers or by Lieutenant 
Bosquet. 
Plaintiff was sixty-six years old at the time of injury, liv-
ing alone apparently without any dependents or employment. 
Evidence showed no employment or earning capacity, but on 
the contrary showed that his condition of '' a.poplexy spells'' 
and hospital experience would have made it impossible for 
him to engage in any gainful employment. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ER,ROR: 
(1) The Court erred in overruling defendant's motion to 
strike the plaintiff's evidence ; 
(2) The Court erred in overruling defendant's motion to 
set aside the jury's verdict; 
(3) The Court erred in granting plaintiff's right-of-
g• way *instruction (Instruction #2-A) ; 
( 4) The Court erred in permitting Lt. Bosquet to 
state his opinion that plaintiff had been struck bv defend-
ant's car, and further erred in refusing to strike out this 
'' opinion testimony.'' 
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PRINCIPAL POINTS OF ARGUMENT SUPPORTING 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ER,ROR #1 AND #2. 
The arguments supporting· the first two Assignments of 
Error ma.y well be made jointly. The principal points sup-
porting these assig11ments are as follows: 
1-Evidence was insufficient to support finding that de-
fendant's car st.ruck and injured plaintiff. 
2-Pla.intiff 's attempted identification of defendant's car 
as the car that hit him was merely opinion testimony, was 
contrary to some of his other testimony, a.ncl was obviously 
a mere conclusion of plaintiff's mind arrived at some time 
afterward. -
3-Attitude of plaintiff and defendant while Berrys were 
present at scene was more consistent with defendant's in-
nocence than with any guilt. 
4-At most, evidence shows merely that plaintiff may pos-
sibly have been struck by defendant's car, ibut also shows 
that it was equally possible, and even more probable, that 
plaintiff was struck by some other car. 
5-0nly logical explanation of evidence of plaintiff and 
his principal witnesses is that plaintiff was injured before 
defendant ever reached intersection. 
6-Even if evidence supported finding that defendant's car 
hit plaintiff, tha.t would not be sufficient to sustain judgment 
because there was no evidence of any causal neg·ligence on 
part of defendant. 
7-Plaintiff's testimony was self contradictorv-much of 
it without any corroboration-and much of it so ·improbable 
and contrary to human experience as to be inherently iu-
crediible. 
8-Plaintiff 's testimony convicts him of contributory neg-
lig·ence. 
9:11; ·The Evidence· Was Insufficient to Support Ju,ry F-ind-
in,q Tlw.t Defendan.t's Car Struck and Injured 
Plaintiff: 
Huddy-''E·ncyclopedia of Auto Law," Vol. 17-18, Section 
27, 
'' The identity of the vehicle causing the injury must be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence (Note 40). 
There can be no recoverv when it is merelv a matter of con-
jecture, surmise, speculation or suspicion." (Note 41). 
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Nenizer v. Newkirk, 154 N. Y. S. 117; Star v. Brumley (Okla.), 
263 Pac. 1086. 
Defendant absolutely denied that his car struck plaintiff: 
Sanders (R., Page 151 (11-13) ). 
Defendant's passenger also denied collision: Morrison 
(R.~ Page 133 (11-13) ). 
Plaintiff's two "disinter~sted" witnesses-Berry, Jr., and 
Berry, Sr.,-had an unobstructed view of the crossing-with 
their ljghts shining directly on crossing, and, yet both deny 
seeing plaintiff walking· across intersection, and both deny 
seeing any car strike plaintiff: Berry, iSr. (R., Page 23 (13)); 
Berry, Jr. (R., Pag·e 42 (15) to R., Page 44 (16) ). 
Althoug·h collision with huge heavy ma.n like plaintiff 
( violent enough to break his leg· and knock him down) would 
undoubtedly have caused some break of headlight in fender 
or scratch or dent in Ford fenders (which everyone knows are 
easily bent and scratched), nevertheless, Police officers ex-
amining car at hospital same night found no broken lights 
and no dents or scratches on defendant's car: Sanders (R., 
Page 156 and R., Page 148 (22) to R., Page 149 (13)); Wake-
.field (R., Page 117 (5-13); 122' (10-12); R., Page 123 (14-16) ). 
Only thing found fby examining officers ( rain smeared off 
on fender) was caused by contact of body of plaintiff and 
defendant-after aceident-rubbing against fender in lift-
ing plaintiff up; Wakefield (R., Page 117 (14-18)) and (R., 
Page 118 (13-17)). 
10* * Plaintiff's Attempted Identification of Defendant's 
Car As the Car That Hit Him Was Merely Opinion 
Testimony, Was Contrary to Some of His Other Testi-
niony, and Was Obviously a Mere Conclusion of Plain-
tiff1.s Mind Arrived At Some Time Afterward: 
Plaintiff admitted that the car that struck him might have 
been one of the two he saw standing· a.t cor~er when he started 
to cross (R., Page 102). This would exclude. defendant's car 
because, first, plaintiff swore that first time he saw defend-
ant's car it was already in intersection making· left turn to-
ward him (R., Page 102), and, second, uncontradicted te_sti-
mony of defendant and plaintiff's two witnesses (Berry and 
son) showed that defendant's car was not "standing" at 
corner hut came down Franklin and into intersection with-
out any stop at corner: 
'' Berry, Sr. (R., Page 35 (23) t-0 R., Page 36 (8)): 
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"A~ Yes, sir. This gentleman was going with the light. 
He had a green light.'' 
Mr. Wicker: 
'' Q. Whom do you mean by 'thh, g·entleman t' ' 1 
'' A. This gentleman over here'' (indicating the defend-
ant). 
Mr. Wicker: Mr. Sanders. 
'' A. He was coming with the ligI1t then, yes, when nobody 
was passing·, and the lig·ht-I watched to see if anything was 
coming, so when they went around there, the light changed 
just the time that he hit the intersection,. and he went around, 
but he didn't get all the way around, when he come to a sud-
den stop.'' 
Berry, Jr. (R., Page 38 (1-6)) : 
'' A. We were parked there at the stop-the light had 
turned red, and we had stopped waiting for it. This car came 
down Franklin Street, turned into Second, and as the car 
turned, the light changed to g-reen, and we went across the 
street, and there was this old man laying down 1ight beside 
the wl1eel of the car, on the left-hand side wheel." 
No accusation of defendant by plaintiff until hour or so 
after the defendant picked Mm up. 
Berry, Jr. (R., Page 47 (2-17)): 
"Q. Did you or your father or :Mr. Newsome or anybody 
else sa.y anything to indicate that 1\fr. Newsome thought that 
Mr. Sanders had hit him7" 
"A. No, sir." 
'' Q. You say ]\fr. Sanders didn't make a.ny-Y ou were 
asked if he made any ex.pla.nation, and you said 'No.' Did 
you or your father a.sk him for any explanation?" 
"A. No, sir." 
11* *"Q. And Mr. Sanders seemed-the only thing he 
was thinking about was getting- the man into the car to 
µ:et him to a hospital; isn't that rig·htT" 
"A. Yes. sir." 
"Q. That is the way it looked to you f" 
"A. Yes, 8ir." 
Berry, Sr. (R., Page 35 (2-7)) : 
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"Q. That is right. Mr. Newsome made no sort of state-
ment; anything indicating that Mr. Sanders had hit him!" 
· '~·A. Neither one of them. That is what I said. One of 
them said: · 'Help me get him in the car,' and the other one 
said: 'Watch my ·1eg.' That is all the conversation that 
went on. '' · 
(R., Page 19 (1-4)) : 
"A. This gentleman here, J\fr. Sanders. He says: 'Help 
me get this man in the car.' .And the other old g·entleman 
says : 'W a teh my leg.' That wa.s all that was said in the 
meantime, so I g·oes home. Nobody a.sked me anything, and 
all I ·can tell-'' · · 
Srllnders (R., P~ge ~~7 (20) to R., Page 148 (9)): 
"So I carried him to the Memorial Hospital. I drove to 
the emerg·enc.y · entrance, as the officers stated; my car was 
sitting ·there when they came ; it hadn't been moved. I got a 
couple o.f intemcs to come··out and get him out of my car. 
They came orit and I assisted him on a stretcher, out of the 
car. We go into the hospital; we come back out; told the 
nUl~se ·what happened, and so forth. And he says: 'You 
were the one that hit me.' That is the first time he accused 
me of it. · Before that be was very appreciative.'' 
''Q. Very wh'aB;' 
'' A. Appreciative. And that is the first time it came 
through his mind that I had hit him, :th~t he had intimated 
I had hit him. And we approximately had him in the car 
an hour, or an hour and a half, had elapsed." · · 
Ambiguous statement of plaintiff en route to hospitals 
("you beJong; to take me there") was merely an assertion by 
plaintiff of defe11dant 's duty to complete task he had started; 
viz .. take him to hospit.at 
Plaintiff's accusation a.t Memorial Hospital several days 
after injury obviously and ·on· its face mere c.onclusion of' 
plaintiff's mind for he said (R., Page 79): "It was some-
thing said about hitting me, and I told him ( defendant) it 
wasn't any use to try to get out of it because there ,vas:no pos·-
Rible chance, because there was no other ca.r passed there, 
neitl1er wa.y. from· the tinie I entered· the Street until I left 
·there.·: So it ,vas oblh!;ed' to·be.'' 
112* · •obviously the idea· or conclusion that defendant's 
e::i.r l1ad been the one that hit him was not in plaintiff's 
mind a.t the S·Cene ( otherwise' p}ain~iff would have said some-
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thing about it to defendant or the Berrys) ; nor during the 
hour or so driving around to different hospitals ( otherwise 
plaintiff would have accused defendant in plain language 
when defendant said he was merely "doing· a favor''); but 
only after plaintiff, reasoning· through the confused and un-
reliable memory of a man suffering from "apoplexy," etc., 
and following shock of injury, finally decided to accu~2 de-
fendant since he was the '' bird in hand.'' 
In Meade v. Samiders, 151 Va. 636; 144 S. E. 711, your 
honoruble Court rejected the direct statement of the plaintiff 
that he had been struck hy the front of defendant's car even 
though the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff and accord-
ingly· must have settled all c.onflicts in the testimony in favor 
of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court pointed out that al-
though plaintiff had testified positively that he was struck 
by the front of the defendant's car (just as the plaintiff in 
the case at bar testified that he was struck by the front bumper· 
and fender of defendant's car) nevertheless the plaintiff had 
also admitted that, after seeing the defendant's car the first 
time and thinking· that he was safe, he kept on walking across 
and paid no more attention to the defendant's car until it 
actually struck l1im. 
This· is very similar to the case at bar where the plaintiff 
testified that although he saw an automobile making a left 
turn toward him, he turned his attention to another direc-
tion and never saw the automobile that hit him again until 
it was actually on him,-'' in the act of hitting me.'' 
As the Court said in the Meade-Saunders case after re-
viewinQ: the plaintiff's testimony (beginning at bottom of 
Pag·e 711): 
"From this testimony it is quite apparent that the plain-
tiff has no knowleclg·e of how the accident occurred. That he 
never saw the car after leaving the sidewalk until he was 
struck is the onlv rational inference to be drawn from his 
testimony. While he says he was st.ruck by the front of the 
oar, it is perfectly manifest, when his evidence is taken as a 
wl1ole, that this statement is in conflict with his entire narra-
tive of the accident, was a mere conclusion, and not based on 
facts of the case.'' 
1 B* * Attitude of Plaintiff ancl Defendant While Berrys lV ere 
Present at Scene ,Was More Consistent With De-
f enda.nt 's Innocence Than With Any Gitilt: 
No one said anything· even intimating any g·uilt of defend-
ant; no questions or explanations were asked or given by 
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anyone; defendant appeared, like Berry, to be thinking only 
of plaintiff and getting him to a hospital: 
Berry, Jr. (R., Pa.ge 47 (2-1.7)): 
"Q. Did you or your father or Mr. Newsome or anybody 
else say anything to indicate that Mr. Newsome thought that 
Mr. Sanders had hit him f" 
"A. No, sir." 
"Q. You say Mr. Sanders didn't make any,-You were 
asked if he made any explanation, and you said 'No.' Did 
you or your father ask him for any explanation Y ', 
"A. No, sir." 
"Q. You all didn't ask any questionsf'' 
"A. No, sir." 
'' Q. And Mr. Sanders seemed-the only thing he was think-
ing about was getting the man into the car to get him to a. 
hospital ; isn't that right f'' 
"A. Yes, sir.'' 
'' Q. That is tbe way it looked to you!'' 
'' A. Yes, sir.'' 
Sande1·s (R., Pag·e 161 (20) to R., Page 162 (13)) : 
'' Q. vVlw didn't you make some explanation to either Mr. 
Berry or his son as to your finding· Mr. Newsome in the 
street? 
'' A. At the time that Mr. Berry assisted me in picking 
him up I didn't know of any injury. Not only that, I wasn't 
liable for it. It wasn't my business to make any explana-
tion to anyone. I was just acting· as a g·ood Samaritan, and 
instead of standing there, I got him to the hospital as early 
as possible.'' 
"Q. So that is why you made no explanation at all to Mr. 
Berry about finding the man in the street? 
"A. I didn't know l\fr. Berrv and I didn't have to be in 
conversation with him4 My car was sitting there and in the 
meantime some other cars had driven up, and I pulled on 
off after tbev g·ot him loaded. I often g·o out to get ambu-
lance patients~ and we never talk to anyone in the accident, 
anything· like t11a.t, at the time. My only thought was to get 
him to the hospital and make him as comf ortab]e as possible, 
~fter I found out that he happened to have a leg- injury.'' 
Berry, Sr. :-asked no questions and heard no accusations 
or other statements except defendant asking· for help to get 
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.-,~--~ ·.~ ·~ ··"·.~· ... ~;:.: · .. r·· .. ~.,. 
plaintiff in c~r t9 go to ho~pitfll fl.!ld plaintiff's say~ng ''Watch 
:m)"'leg/'·· 1 •• • ,_, •· •• • .. •• ...... :·: • • • ;, · 
14~ : ~Berry, Sr. (R., P~9~ 35 (2-7)): 
"Q. That is right. :Mr. News9me made no sort of state-
:µient~ anytµinl(iritlica,ti':ng· that· Mt. 1~anderR ha'd· hit him?" 
1 
"A.. Neitliei- on·e· of theni. ·That iif ,vha.t I said: 011e of 
them said: 'Help me g·et him hi the cai~;' ai~tl the other one 
said: 'vVatch my leg.' That is all the conve'i·sation that 
werit on.,, ___ . 
• • . <. I 
Plaintiff claimed (R., Page 73) l1e saw Berry's beadlig·hts 
shine across street aboµt time defendant &'ot · out';· that he 
wanted Berry to sfop 'becaus~ he ·was ·suspicious of man who 
h;iq. hit him; yet when Berry and son stopped· and got out, 
pTaintitr· ·said notl1ing; · whatevei· fo tlieui. 
Jf guilty, hiiina1t experience show~: 
I-Plaintiff would surely have accused defendant or asked 
assistance of Berry; and · · 
2-Defendant would have denied or explained. 
The fact. that. neither one of these things happened is elo-
qµent p!_oof of q.efendant 's innoc~nce. 
T J l I• j • '• ' ' • • • . • • ' ' 
.A.t Most, Evidence Shows Merely That Plaintiff JJ{ay Pos-
sfbly Have Bee_n Struck by Defendant's 0(fr, But Also 
Shf?w~ fhat It Was Eq,µally P9ssible, and 'Even More 
Probable, That PlainUff Was· Struck Tm Soni.e Other Car: 
. ' . '.' . ' 
Plaintiff himself admitted on cross examination that l1P. 
saw'"one o'r hvo cars' standing at f.he southwest' corner ·11e·adecl 
East as he started across and tl1at one of these cars ·mav 
have been tl1e cifr tl1at hit him. (See R., Page 101, line 12, to 
Page 103, line 17) .. : ... · · ' 
• • I 
"Q. I mean, when did you first see the car, the car tlmt 
hit y9u, when did you first see that?'' 
'' A. Well. some man was standing at the corner when I 
~tarted across · the street.'' · 
·,,Q. It was standing· still at the corner when you started 
across the street?'' · 
Mr. Rudd : "No, be didn't say tllat." 
Mr. Wicker: '',Just a minute. Please let me J1ave my 
cro'ss examiha tion~'' ! . . 
,. .. · .. ·.· ' . 
Harry ,v. Sanders v. Lucius Newsome 
"Q. Is that what you said or noU" 
Mr. Rudd: "If Your Honor please-'' 
15 
The Court: "Let me hear that objection. What 1s the 
objection t'' 
Mr. Rudd: ''Go ahead.'' 
'' A. Yes, he was standing at the corn~r." 
15• *'' Q. And that was the first time that you saw the 
car that you say hit you?" 
'' A. No, that car standing at the corner when I started 
to cross the street, whether he is the one that hit me, I don't 
know that.'' 
''Q. ·whether he was the one that hit you, you don't know 
thaU The car that was standing at the corner?" 
Bv the Court : 
·"Q. The car that you are speaking of now that was stand-
ing at the corner, that you have just been speaking of to 
Mr. Wicker, was that on Franklin StreeU" 
'' A. That was over on Franklin Street.'' 
''Q. All right. ...i\.nd a.t what corner was it standing·!" 
'' A. On the west corner." 
'' Q. The corner west?'' 
'' A. West corner. West.'' 
"Q. By 'west' do you mean the west side of .Second 
Street?" 
'' A. Yes, sir.'' 
'' Q. All right.'' 
'' A. That is what I mean, the west side.'' 
By Mr. Wicker: 
'' Q. And that was facing east at the time?'' 
'' A. Yes. \'\7hether it was two there I couldn't say; it 
might have been two.'' 
''Q. It mig·ht have been two there, you couldn't say?'' 
'' A. I wouldn't say.'' 
'' Q. All right. Th.ank you.'' 
Bv the Court: 
··,' Q. When did yon next see the car then, if you did see it 
again, that hit you, whatever car it was?" 
'' A. The one t.hat llit me?'' 
"Q. Yes. You said you saw a ca.r 01· maylbe two ears on 
Franklin Street, on the west side of Second Street, headed 
east.'' 
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'' A. Yes, sir." 
'' Q. And you said you saw this when you started across 
Second Street.'' 
'' A. Yes. sir." 
'' Q. Now, when did you next see the car, whatever car it 
was, that hit you f" 
"A. That it actually hit me; it was nearly on me; I couldn't 
get out of the way of it. I tried to go on top.'' 
All evidence shou)s defendant's car was not either one of 
these standing cars ( either one of which plaintiff admitted 
might have been car that hit him). 
Either of these standing· cars ( especially the rear one) 
shifting gears, starting up, and making· left turn could 
16"' have struck plaintiff and then gone *on before either 
Berrys or defendant g·ot to intersection. Plaintiff tes-
tified he started across north side of J:t'ranklin Street while 
Berry car was still clown in next block South (R., Page 95). 
And testimony of Berry shows clearly that Berry car 
reached intersection and remained there for appreciable in-
terval before defendant's car ever came into sight: 
Berry, Sr. (R., Pag·e 31 (119) to R.., Pag·e 32 (3)) : 
'' Q. Now, l\fr. Berry, as you proceeded you were looking 
directly ahead? I mean, you were looking directly north on 
Second Street?" 
'' A. Y eR, sir, I was.'' 
"Q. And you were there before Mr. Newsome's car ca.me 
in sight¥" 
"A. Before Mr. Sanders' car." 
"Q. Before Mr. Sanders' car c.ame in sighU" 
"A. Yes, sir, that is rig·ht." 
'' Q. Before the defendant came in sight 1 '' 
'' A. Yes. sir." 
Plaintiff, lying- in street little over half-way across inter-
8ection, would be to the left range of Berry's lights and be-
low line of Berry's vision (R., Page 43). 
Shadow of curbing and drug store lower window would 
obRcure man in black lying on street. 
Tall man standing up or walking· would have been sil-
houetted clearly in Berrys' vision on background of drug 
store window. 
This is only logical and reasonable way to explain failure 
of both Berrys to see plaintiff crossing intersection or tc 
8ee the other car or cars plaintiff testified about. 
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Physical Position of Plaintiff After Defendant Stopped Was 
Ji1,st .A.s Consistent With Theory of Defendant As 
fJTith Theory of Plaintiff: 
Defendant said plaintiff was one and one-half feet to two 
feet. to left of front wheel (R., Page 144). 
Passenger said plaintiff was sitting· in heap in middle of 
street, approximately foot or more to left of auto (R., Page 
129). 
Berry, Jr., said plaintiff was sitting or lying down in cross-
walk. about center of street with his back about opposite 
front wheel and l1is legs sticking westwardly and defendant 
grasping plaintiff under armpits trying- to lift him up (R., 
Pa,g·e 46 ( 5-23)). 
17* *Berry, Sr., said plaintiff was leaning on middle of 
left-hand side of front fender, and defendant was trying 
to lift plaintiff up (R., Page 21). 
From the foregoing citations and quotations of the evi-
dence. it is plain that the plaintiff's testimony and that of 
his own witnesses tend to prove only that defendant may pos-
siblv have struck plaintiff. At the same time this evidence 
also proves that plaintiff may have been striwk by som.eone 
else other than defendant. 
In fact, plaintiff himself admits that the car which struck 
him may have been one of the two ca.rs he saw "standing 
.~till" at 1110 diagonally opposite corner. This admission, of 
itself, excludes defendant because all witnesses ag-ree that 
dofe:ndant 'R car was not one of the cars standing a.t the cor-
ner. 
Hence, we have· a, ca.se in which the pla.intiff, while claiming 
that defendant struck him, ad11iits that it ma11 have ber.n, some-
nne el.qe. 
Under sueh circumstances the law is settled that no re-
covery is possible, for the plaintiff has failed in his proof, 
and any verdict is necessarily bound to be founded upon 
speculation and conjecture. 
In General Accident Corporo.Uon v. Mi1,rray, 120 Va. 1.15; 
90 S. E. 620 at 624, your honorable Court said: 
'' The case is analogous to that class of cases frequently 
comddered and ruled upon by this Court, in which damages 
were sought to be recovered for injuries resulting from an 
nccident alleg-ed to have been caused by the negligenee of 
the defendant, and wl1erein it has been uniformlv held that 
the burden of showing· negfo:rence by a. preponderance of the 
evidence was on the plaintiff, and if tl1e injury might have 
resulted from one of two causes, for one of which the plain-
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tiff was responsible, but not for the other, the plaintiff could 
not recover; neither could he recover if it was just as prob-
able that the damage was caused by the one as 1by the other." 
And in the case of Norfolk, etc. v. ·white, 143 Va. 875, 129 
S. E. 339 at 340, your honorable Court said: 
'' The fact of accident carried with it no presumption of 
negligence on the part of the employer, and it is an affirma-
tive fact for the injured employee to establish that the em-
ployer has been guilty of neg·ligence. • * * 
'' It is not sufficient for the employee to show that the em-
ployer may have been guilty of neg·ligence-the evi-
18:W, deuce must *point to the fact that he was. And where 
the testimony leaves the matter uncertain and shows 
that any one of half a dozen things may have brought about 
the injury, for some of which the employer is responsible 
and for some of which he is not, it is not for the jury to guess 
between these half a dozen causes and find that the negli-
gence of the employer was the real ca use, when there is no 
satisfactory foundation in the testimony for that conclusion. 
''If tlie employee is unable to adduce sufficient evidence t-0 
show negligence on the pa.rt of the employer, it is only one 
of many cases in which the plaintiff fails in his testimony." 
In the case of Hicks v. Romaine, 116 Va. 401, 82 S. E. 81, 
(cited with approval in Pearcey v. St. Pmil, etc., Co., infra.) 
a ma.n walking· along the Petersburg· Pike at night was found 
bruised, injured and dead on the hig·hwa.y a very short time 
after a speeding· nutomoibile had passed along the same spot . 
.A witness of the plaintiff testified that he had seen the 
automobile passing- a short distance prior to the scene of t11e 
accident at a high ra.te of speed; that J1e had jumped out 
in the ditch himself to avoid being hit by the car; that. shortly 
thereafter as he walked along the highway he came upon the 
hody of the deceased; that no other car or cars had passed 
in eitl1er direction between the time that he saw this car speed 
past himself and the time t.liat he found the body of the de-
ceased; that shortly thereafter the defendant came to the 
Rc.ene of the accident driving· a ear in the opposite direction 
from the one in which he l1ad gone before, and that he, the 
witness. recognized. tlie car as being the same one which had 
almost hit the witness; tllat he accused the defendant and 
t1u1t tl10 defendant denied a-nilt but stated: "I hit. some-
thing· up at the top of the h·ill, .not down here.'' 
However, your honorable Cohrt, on appeal from a sustained 
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demurrer to the evidence, held that no recovery could be had 
in such a case because of the uncertainty and insufficiency of 
the plaintiff's evidence. In so ruling the Court said: 
''If it appears that the facts and circumstances from which 
a conclusion is soug·ht to be deduced, although consistent 
with that theory, are equally consi~tent with some other 
theory, they do not support the theory contended for.'' 
In Pearcey v. St. Pa.u.l Fire Insurance Company, 163 Va. 
928, 177 S. E. 843, a plaintiff recovered a verdict from a jury 
for loss of ibuilding by fire. The Trial Court set aside the 
verdict and entered judgn1ent for the defendant on the gTotmd 
that under the evidence it was possible for the loss to have 
been preceded by an explosion which was not covered by the 
fire insurance policy. · 
19* ·rn that ease the plaintiff had three apparently dis-
interested witnesses, all of whom testified that they saw 
the building on fire first and that the first sound or sign of 
any explosion came several seconds thereafter. :Some of the 
witnesses introduced by the defendant testified that the light 
of the fire and the noise of the explosion were almost simul-
taneous. An expe1·t testified for the defendant, after exami-
nation of tl1e ruins, that it was equally possible that the fire 
preceded the explosion or tl1at the explosion preceded the 
fire. · 
In spite of this conflict of testimony, which the jury decided 
in favor of the plaintiff, the Trial Court's action in setting 
aside the verdict and entering up judgment for the defend-
ant wns affirmed by your houo·ra.ble Court on the ground that 
the evidence was equally consistent with either theory and 
consequently the plaintiff had failed in his burden of proof. 
Only Logical Explanation of Testi11wn~1 of Plaintiff and His 
Principal TVitnes.i; Is That Plaintiff Was Inju,red Be-
l ore Def end ant Ever Reached Intersections 
Plaintiff started across intersection when light turned gTeen 
for him and when Berry's car was some distance off in next 
block (R., Pag-es 95-96). 
·when plaintiff started across West, one or two other cars 
beaded East, were at the southwest corner of the intersec-
tion (R., Pages 101-102). 
These standing cars had left the corner and g·one out of 
sight before Berry's car reached intersection for they both 
testified tllere was no other traffic until later when defend-
ant's car came down Franklin Street and into intersection 
just before light changed again (R., Pages 30, 33 and 42). 
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Plaintiff must have finished his walk (to middle of cross-
ing) and fallen or been hit before Berry's car got to inter-
section, otherwise they would have seen him moving in front 
of their headlights or moving in the refiection of drug store 
light (R., Pages 31, 32, 33, 42 and 44). 
An appreciable interval elapsed with no activity whatever 
at the intersection (R., Pages 17, 18, 23, and 42) . 
. Tust about end of this interval, defendant came in sight 
coming East on Franklin Street and partially completing left 
turn in intersection (R., Pages 17-18; 31-32). 
20* ""Starting- across when the light turned green, plain-
tiff claims he was hit just after getting half-way across 
(R., Page 72). 
According·ly\ plaintiff must l1a.ve been bit less than 10 sec-
onds after he started across, because it could not have taken 
more than six or seven seconds for plaintiff to walk less than 
20 feet. 
The green ligl1t being· on 30-40 seconds, the plaintiff being 
injured during first third of this interval, Berrys waited 
at corner at least 1r5 to 20 seconds with no traffic (walking or 
riding) in sig·ht. Then defendant got to intersection just 
before green Iig-l1t period expired. 
Plainly defendant did not get to intersection 1u,ntil 20-2t, 
seconds after plaintiff was injured. 
'' Courts may properly· take judicial notice of facts that 
may be reg·arded a.s forming- part of the common knowledge 
of every person of ordinary intellig·ence and understanding" 
* * * and of "w]rntever is or ought to be generally known 
within the Jimits of their jurisdiction * * *." 28 C .• J. "Evi-
dence'', Section 1810, Notes 22-25. 
'' .T udicial notic.e extends to distance and speed and their 
relation to each other." 23 C. J. "Evidence", Section 1965, 
Note 20. 
'' The Courts judicially notice articles and thing-s in com-
mon use and the facts in relation to them which are commonlv 
known." (Sueh as automobiles, etc.) · 
2R C. tT. ''Evidence", Section 1972, Note 63. See also: 
Rrd Edition, Section 128 of Jones on ''Evidence.'' 
21 • *Even If Evidence 81.1,pported Findin,q That Defendant's 
Ca.r Hit Plaintiff, That Wou.ld Not Be Sufficient to 
8itstain Judgment Becaitse There was No Evidence of 
Any Causal Negligence on Part of Defendant. 
Undoubtedly, jury found for plaintiff merely because jury 
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decided in their own minds that defendant's car hit plaintiff 
causing serious injuries. Evidently jury assumed that mere 
collision justified verdict for plaintiff, ignoring law and in-
structions that, in addition evidence had to prove defend-
ant guilty of causal negligence. 
There was no evidence of lack of looko-ut: 
Defendant saw all that evidence shows was visible-all that 
anyone else saw-in fact more: 
Defendant saw Berry's car standing at south corner and 
also saw plaintiff lying· in walkway in black overcoat to left 
of his car 10 feet away. . 
There was no e·vidence of lack of control:: 
AH agree defendant made practically perfect stop: 
Sanders (R.., Pages 151-162) "very sudden stop." "two 
or three feet" "so sudden 1bumped Miss Morrison's head on 
windshield. '' 
Morrison (I-t., Page 126 (1-5)) '' Stopped so suddenly 
humped my head on windshield.'' 
Berry, Jr. (R., Pag·e 49 (10-17)) "Sudden stop'' "car went 
only a bout foot after starting to stop'' stopped in cross-
wa.lk (R., Page 38 (14-17)). 
Berry~ .Sr. (R., Page 19 (21-22) ). 
There was no evidence of negligent speed: 
Sanders (R., Page 161 (13-14)) "in second gear about 10 
to 12 miles an hour". 
Berry, Sr. (R., Page 35 (18-21)) "maybe 15 to 20 miles an 
hour.'' 
Berry, Jr. (R., Page 38 (7-9)) ''20, 25 miles an hour" "as 
it came to the intersection.'' 
Morrison (R., Page 135 (5-18)) "approximately 10 or 12 
·miles an hour.'' 
Plaintiff: No testimony of speed at all. 
Such a _qoorl stov, with no advmice warning, on a damp and 
1nistv night is strong evidence of reasonable sveerl and ,Qood 
control. 
In Souslhe·rn Ra.ilwa,y Company v. Hall's Admr., 102 Va. 
135; 45 S. E. 867, your honorable Court said: 
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''Negligence is not to be presumed because the plaintiff 
has. received an injury, but the facts from which negli-
22* gence may be *inferred must be proved by competent 
evidence. The burden is on the plaintiff to show how 
and why the accident occurred.'' (Italics supplied.) 
In Hicks v. Ro1naine, 116 Va. 401; 8:2 S. E. 71 at .... ; it 
was said: 
'' While a party demurring thereto is considered as ad-
mitting the truth of his adversary's evidence, and all just 
inferonces which can properly be drawn therefrom by a jury, 
be docs not admit any fact not proven by the evidence nor 
does he admit any forced or illogical deductions from the 
tei,timony.' ' 
In Che::;apeake cf; Ohio R. R. Co. v. Heath, 103 Va. 64, 66; 
48 S. E. 508, the following appears: 
'' The party who affirms negligence must establish it by 
proof sufficient to satisfy reasonable and well-balanced minds. 
The evidence must show more than a probability of a negli-
gent act. An inference cannot be drawn from a. presumption, 
but must be founded upon some fact legally established. This 
court has repeatedly held that when liability depends upon 
carelessness or fault of a person, or his agents, the right of 
recovery depends upon the same being shown by competent 
evidence, and it is incumbent upon such a plaintiff to furnish 
evidence to show how and why the accident occurred-some 
fact or facts by which it can be determined by the jury, and 
not be left entirely to conjecture, guess, or random judgment, 
upon mere supposition, without a single known fact.'' 
In Arnold v. Wood, 173 Va. 18; 3 S. E. 2nd 374 at 376; it 
was said: 
"Now it is a matter of common knowledge that collision~ 
between motor vehicles and pedestrians frequently occur on 
the highways without fault. on tlrn part of the drivers of the 
vehicles and due to causes entirely beyond their control, such 
as the negligence of pedestrians themselves." 
In Southern Railway Company v. Adams, 129 Va.. 233; 105 
R. E. 566, it was held that the evidence was insufficient for 
submission of issue of negligence to the jury; the cause of 
the accident being· a matter of conjecture. In that case a 
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railroad employee walking along a track to work was killed 
by a train of that railroad coming from !behind the employee 
oil the same track. At the dose of evidence for the plaintiff, 
the defendant railroad offered no testimony but demurred to 
the evidence. The demurrer was overruled, and judgment for 
the plaintiff entered, but this judgment was afterwards re-
versed by the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
No one who testified actually saw the train strike the de-
ceased, but he was seen walking along the track shortly be-
fore the train came along, and he was found lying dead right 
by the track shortly after the train had passed by, and 
smears of blood and parts of his flesh were found on the 
track. 
23·~ ""The accident happened in the daytime, and witnesses 
testified that '' there was nothing to prevent the engineer 
from seeing anyone on the track''. 
The railroad contended that there was no evidence upon 
which the ;jury could properly find the railroad guilty of any 
neglig·ence proximately causing the injury and death, because 
such .findings would require drawing an inference from a 
presumption and since the jury would have to indulge in 
speculation and conjecture. 
The Court quoted with approval the following from the 
United States Supreme Court decision in the case of Looney 
v. 1J1 efrovolitan Ra-ilroad Conipany, 200 U. S. 480, as follows: 
"In an action for damages for personal injuries * • * the 
plaintiff must establish the grounds of defendant's liability. 
,.,. :IF * Negligence of defendant will not be inferred from the 
mere fact that the injury occurred, or from the presumption 
of care on the part of the plaintiff. There is equally a pre-
sumption that the defendant performed his duty.'' 
"The fact that deceased was struck by defendant's engine 
carried with it no presumption of defendant's negligence, the 
burden of proving which is on the plaintiff.'' '' The negli-
gence of a def cndant cannot be inferred from a presumption 
of care on the part of the person killed. A presumption in 
the performance of duty attends the defendant as well as 
the person killed. It must be overcome by direct evidence. 
One presumption cannot be built upon another.'' 
The Court also quoted with approval from the case of 
Soiithern Railway Conipan.y v. Hall's Admr., 102 Va. 135, 45 
S. E. 867. 
"When liability depends upon carelessness or fault of a 
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person or his agents, the right of recovery depends upon the 
same being shown by competent evidence, and it is incumbent 
upon such a plaintiff to furnish evidence to show how and 
why the accident occurred-some fact or facts by which it can 
be determined by the jury, and not be left entirely to con-
jecture, guess, or random judgment upon mere supposition, 
without a single known fact.'' 
"An inference cannot be drawn from a presumption, but 
must be founded upon some fact legally established.'' 
In reversing the judgment, your honorable Court also said 
the following·: 
''·we might pursue in the case in judgment a like course 
of speculation and surmise with respect to the circumstances 
of the death of young Adams as appears in the extracts cited, 
siwra, from Hall's Case and Smith's Case, and would reach 
a like indeterminate conclusion. These exercises of the 
imagination would fail to afford any solid and satisfactory 
finding that reason would approve. The books abound in 
cases in which it clearly appears that the injuries complained 
of are traceable to the sole and exclusive neglig·ence of 
24* the party *injured. Common knowledge advises us to 
the same effect. 
'' Hence, unless the circumstances of an accident are meas-
urably revealed by the evidence, it is impossible to fix the re-
sponsibility of a defendant by the processes of reason, an<l 
in such an extremity we are forbidden by the established rules 
of law to draw an inference from a presumption. 
'' This is but another ii1stance in which a plaintiff has failed 
to furnish the evidence necessary for recovery. It is thP 
province neither of the Court nor of the jury to supply this 
deficiency and afford a recovery by a tou,r de force." 
From the foregoing and numerous other similar decisions, 
it is noteworthy that the plaintiff's burden is not only to 
Rhow that the accident occurred and how it occurred, but also 
"why" it occurred. 
In the case at bar,-even if the most favorable of the plain-
tiff's own con~icting· and ambiguous statements are accepted, 
-he has furnished evidence merely to show that he was struck 
by an automobile which might have been the defendant's au-
tomobile or might have been one of two other automobiles,-
but he has not furnished any evidence whatsoever from whfoh 
a finding by the jury might be supported as to ''why'' the 
accident occurred. 
H~ry vV. Sanders v. Lucius Newsome 25 
In other words, at best, he has merely proven the occur-
rence of the accident, but he has not adduced any evidence 
which can reasonably be said to have shown preponderantly 
that defendant's car actually was the one that hit him, and 
that the accident occurred because of some negligence,-some 
wrongful act on the part of the defendant and was not con-
tributed to by any wrongful act on his own part. 
25• • Plaintiff's Testinwny Was 8elf-Co'11,tradwtory1 Much 
of It ,Without .Any Corroboratio'J'lr--0/fl,d Much of It 
So Improbable and Contrary to Human Experience .As 
to Be Inherently Incredible: 
As to 1'raf fic at inter.r,ection when he started across: 
At first plaintiff' clawned that when he started across he saw 
110 automobiles at all except one car "south of Franklin com-
ing· up toward Franklin''. 
Newsome (R., Page 94 (17-24)): 
"Q. And when you got to the corner of Second and Frank-
lin you looked around to see if the way was clear before you 
started across the street, did you?" 
"A. Yes, sir. Yes." 
'' Q. vVha.t automobiles did yon see?'' 
'' A. Traffic f '' 
"Q. ·what automobiles did you see?" 
"A. None at all. It wasn't any passing either way." 
Later, plaintiff ad'lnitted that when he started across the 
street there was one car ( or maybe two cars) facing East and 
standing on Franklin Street at the corner of the west side of 
Second Street (R., Pages 101-102). 
As to plaintiff's phys-ical condition,: 
At first plaintiff claimed he had never fainted (R., Page 82 
(23-25) ). 
Later, plaintiff admitted having· unconscious spells (R., 
Page 82 (23-25); R., Page 90 (22-23); R., Page 88 (10-13); 
R, Page 91 (1-10; 22-23), and R., Page 99 (20-25) ) . 
.At first, Plaintiff' claimed no prior sickness '' except one 
trouble I used to have, knocked me out for day or two-'' apo-
plexy" (R., Page 82 (7-11)). 
Later, plaintiff admitted hospitalization just three months 
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before injury and Memorial Hospital four or five years be-
fore for ·two weeks (R., Page 89 (20-23) ). 
Also, plaintiff later admitted he had become unconscious-
while riding a truck (R., Page 91 (25) to R., Page 92 (2)) and 
once became unconscious alone iu house which had to be 
broken open by neighbors; that he would become unconscious 
and then upon waking would be out of his head; would get 
up and then fall down account of legs giving away under him 
(R., Pages 82-83). 
As to which car hit pla-im,tijf and when and where he saw it : 
Plaintiff first cla.inied that defendant's car struck him 
26* and it was *impossible for any other car to have hit 
him (R., Page 79 (21-25) ). 
Yet plaintiff later adniitted that either one of the two other 
cars which were standing at diagonally opposite corner as 
he started across, might have been the car that struck him: 
Newsome (R., Page 102 (2-6)) : 
"Q. And that was the first time that you saw the car that 
you say hit you f" 
"A. No, that car standing at the comer when I started to 
cross the street, whether he is the one that hit me, I don't 
know that.'' 
In the case of White v. Riahniond Greyho·it,nd Lines, Inc.,. 
158 Va. 462, 163 S. E., Page 78, your honorable Court affirmed 
the action of the Trial Court in setting· aside the verdict of 
the jury in favor of the plaintiff, where a logical reconstruc-
tion of the situation at the scene of the accident showed that 
the plaintiff's contentions were incredible. 
In the case at bar, plaintiff's testimony on the vital points 
was inherently incredible and inexcusably contrndictory. Any 
logical reconstruction of the situation at the time demonstrates 
that the accident could not possibly bave occurred the way the 
plaintiff claims. Obviously, plaintiff must have been struck 
by one of the cars standing; at the opposite corner, otherwise 
plaintiff would not liave been hit at aII, for he would have 
been safely across tbe intersection and inside the drug store 
before defendant ever reached the intersection. · 
"No litigant can successfully ask a Court or Jury to lJC1-
Iieve that be has not told the trutll. His statement of fact 
and the necessary inferences therefrom are binding upon him. 
He cannot be heard asking that his case be made stronger 
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than he makes it, where, as here, it depends upon facts within 
his own knowledge and as to which he has testified.'' 
(Massie v. Pinnstone, 134 Va. 450; 114 S. E. 652, at 656; 
Davis v. Dozier, 139 Va. 628; 124 S. E. 411 at 415.) 
27* • Plaintijf 's Testimony Convicts Hini of Contributory 
Negligence : 
Plaintiff testified to two contradictory versions of the ac-
cident. Under one version, he saw car that hit him twice; 
once just before he started across and ag·ain just as it was. 
hitting him about the middle of the crossing·. Under the other 
contradictory version, he first saw car on his left already in 
intersection making left turn toward him, then he deliberately 
diverted his attention to his right, thereby ignoring the im-
mediate approaching danger on his left; then he did not look 
back left again until the car was nearly on him, actually hitting 
him. 
Under eithP,r version, vlaintiff was gitilty of contributory 
ne,qli_qence, ba,rrin.r1 his recover:11. 
Under one of plaintiff's versions: 
Plaintiff admitted that before starting west across street, 
he saw one or two cars standing at the diagonally opposite 
corner headed East: 
Newsome (R., Pag·e 103 (8-13)): 
"Q. Yes. You said you saw a car or maybe two cars on 
Franklin .Street, on the west side of Second Street, headed 
east." 
"A. Yes, sir." 
'' Q. And you said you saw this when you started across 
Second Street V'' 
'' A. Yes, sir.'' 
Plaintiff further admitted that the car that hit him might 
have been one of those two cars: 
Newso1ne (R., Page 102 (2-6)): 
"Q. And tha.t was the first time that you saw the car that 
vou sav hit vou ! '' 
., "A. ·No, that car standing at the corner when I started 
to cross the street, whether he is the one that hit me, I don't 
know that." 
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Plaintiff further admitted that the next time he saw the 
car that hit him it was "in the act of hitting me". 
N e'Wsonie (R., Page 103 (14-17)): 
"Q. Now, when did you next see the car, whatever car it 
was, that hit you f" 
'' A. That it actually hit me; it was nearly on me ; I couldn't 
g·et out of the way of it. I tried to go on top.'' 
Plaintiff knew night was dark, foggy, and misty; that 
28* he had on black *overcoat; that, on the same green light 
permitting him to cross, either or both of the cars at the 
opposite corner might make a left turn toward him. Yet, be 
never looked in that direction again after starting across 
until he had crossed over half the street and was actually be-
ing struck; and all the while there was no other traffic in 
any other direction to divert his attention. 
Under doctrine of Meade v. Saitnders, siip1·.a, and numerous 
other cases, this conduct was contributory negligence as a 
matter of law barring any recovery for plaintiff. 
Under the other of vla.intiff's versions: 
Plaintiff looked just before starting across and saw no cars 
anywhere except Berry car in next block south: 
Ne'Wsome (R., Page 94 (21-24)): 
"Q. What traffic did you see f" 
'' A. Traffic?'' 
'' Q. ·what automobiles did you see?'' . 
"A. None at all. It wasn't any passing either way.n 
(R., Pag-e 95 (14-20)): 
"Q. I see. Is that rig·hU There was no automobile either 
on your left on Second Street or on your right?" 
'' A. It was one sou th of Franklin coming up tow a rd-'' 
''Q. That went up which way?'' 
"A. Coming up towards Franklin. It was the only one in 
sight.'' 
'' Q. There was only one in sight t '' 
"A. That is all I seen.'' 
At middle of crossing·, plaintiff for first time saw another 
car already in intersection making left turn towards him. 
After seeing car on his left turning towards him, plaintiff 
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diverted his attention away and to the right and did not look 
back to left (in direction of car he had previously seen turn-
ing toward him) until he heard something and then car "was 
hitting me" (R., Page 72 (13-18) ). 
Under this version also, plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as matter of law barring his recovery. 
While he was crossing westwardly, if he was exercis-
29* ing the minimum of "''ordinary care for his own safety, 
he would certainly have seen def eudant 's car (just as 
both Berrys saw it) coming- East on Franklin Street before 
it reached intersection. 
Furthermore, after actually seeing car already in intersec-
tion making left turn toward him, his conduct in turning his 
attention away from approaching car and looking in opposite 
direction (just on the implied assumption that he would be 
safe, having· passed middle of intersection) was, in the lan-
guage of your honorable Court "listless disregard for his 
ovm safety"; and brings case squarely under Frazier v. Stoitt, 
snpm, and similar cases. 
Upon seeing this C(llr in intersection 1naking left turn to-
ward him, pla,intiff 's ine8capable du.ty was to have kept his 
a,ttention upon this im,1nediate irnpending danger and to ha,ve 
take·n steps to protect himself. As said in Frazier v. Stout, 
plaintiff' stopved looking at the very tirne when continued 
looko·ut was 1nost iniport(l!}it. 
The case of Stephen, Pueine:lJ Shoe C01npany v. Onnsby's 
.A.dmr., 129 Va. 297, 105 S. E. 563, is somewhat similar to the 
-case at bar except that it occurred in the daytime when the 
truck driver had just as good a view of the pedestrian as the 
pedestrian did of the truck driver; whereas in our case with 
the time being at night the pedestrian could see approaching 
automobiles clearly by the headlights whereas the pedestrian 
himself dressed in black could not be as clearlv seen as in the 
daytime. Drumwright v. Walter, 167 Va. 307°', 189 S. E. 310, 
held that auto headlights at nig·ht make its prominence all 
the more pointed. It has also been held in Virginia to be 
contributory neg·ligencc as a matter of law to ,xmlk in middle 
of highway at night though not if done in daytime. 
In the Stephen Putney case, the pedestrian was going across 
the crosswalk over 9th Street on the northern side of thr 
Grace Street intersection while the truck was coming east-
wardly on Grace and making a left turn northwardly on 9th. 
The pedestrian was killed and consequently was unable to 
give his version of the case at the trial. 
Viewing the case in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff, the pedestrian was struck by the right front fender of 
the truck while he was lawfully in the crosswalk a few feet 
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from the east curb. On the basis of the difference in relative 
spe·ed of the pedestrian walking and the truck running, 
30*. *both reached the intersection at approximately the 
same time. Even conceding that the negligence of the 
defendant might be considered as established on account of 
excessive speed, the Court held that there could be no recov-
ery because the plaintiff must be held to have been guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law,-cither in failing 
to look and see the approaching car in close proximity to him 
or in failing to get out of the way if he did look and see the 
approaching truck. 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff (in one of his contradictory 
versions) claims to have looked and to have seen the approach-
ing car. Yet, he admits that he then turned his head and at-
tention away from the approaching car and looked away in 
the opposite direction and paid no further attention to the 
approaching car, until the car was actually hitting him. 
If the plaintiff was correct in his contention that the de-
fendant's car actually struck him, then it must also follow in-
evitably that when plaintiff saw the approaching car making 
a left turn toward hjm in the intersection, the approaching 
car was in dangerous proximity to him. Since this was so, 
according to the plaintiff himself, the plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law in deliberately di-
verting his attention from the known and impending clanger. 
In the case of Bailey v. Fore, 163 Va. 611, 177 S. E. 100, a 
man was killed at the intersection of 32nd and Broad Streets 
bv collision with an automobile. The defendant ~laimed that he was maintaining a lookout but tl1at he never saw the de-
ceased until the moment of impact. The deceased was strn()k 
by the left front fender of defendant's car and (apparently 
sliding along the side of the car) was also struck by the rea 1· 
fender of the defendant's car. 
Even on the basis of conceding negligence on the part of 
tl1e defendant, the Supreme Court reversed a judgn1ent for 
the plaintiff on the ground that it was a "case of contributory 
or concurrent negligence, if the defendant was neglig·ent at 
all. of which latter there is little or no proof". In its opinion 
the Court quoted with approval from Davis v. Rodgers, 139 
Va. 618, 124 S. E. 408, at 409, as follows: 
'' The fact that the jury had a right to consider aH the cir-
cumstances in the case is stressed. This is entirely true, but 
the circumstances which it mav consider must be· of eviden-
tial value. Under the gui"se of considering· circumstance 
31 * it is not left free *to roam at will. The verdict must 
rest on facts proven, fair inferences therefrom, or cir-
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cumstances having· a tendency to establish the necessary facts. 
Where affirmative relief is asked, it must affirmatively ap-
pear that the verdict rests at least on some one of these 
foundations.'' 
The case of J?razie·r v. Stout, 165 Va. 68, 181 S. E. 377, is 
very similar to some important particulars to the case at bar, 
except that it occurred 011 a highway in the daytime when a 
pedestrian does not have to use as much care in order to ex-
ercise ordinary care as he has to exercise when crossing the 
street on a misty foggy night, and also except that the pe-
destrian looked m01~e effectively toward the oncoming car 
when she first started across the street and during· the first 
part of her crossing than the plaintiff did in the case at bar. 
In the Frazier v. Stout case, the plaintiff started to cross a 
hard paved highway at a time when she saw an automobile 
approaching recklessly and at a high rate of speed but at 
such great distance away that she thought she had plenty of 
time to get across. She testified that she continued to look 
at the oncoming· car all the while she was walking across the 
hard paved highway until she got clear across the concrete, 
and then, thinking that she was safe, she took her attention 
away after steppmg off the concrete. Thereafter the auto., 
mobile swerved toward her and struck her. 
The Court reversed the judg1.nent for the plaintiff on the 
ground of contributory negligence as a matter of law. On 
page 379 the Court said : 
"During all the while she was crossing the road she kept 
her eyes on the rapidly approaching automobile. When she 
had cleared the hard surface she stopped looking, and saw 
the car no more until it shot in front of and sideswiped her. 
When she was struck she was only 21h feet, just one step, off 
of the hard-surfaced portion of the road. 
''},rom the testimony of the plaintiff it is obvious that she 
stopped looking at the car at the very instant when it was 
most important for her to look. By her own admission, when 
she stepped off of the concrete the car was then 'pretty close' 
on her. 
''According-to the testimony of her son, it was approaching 
at an approximate speed of 50 miles per hour. It is evident 
that she did not see the car just before it struck her, because 
she said she did not know that the driver bad turned his course 
sharply to the rig·ht and had run entirely off of the concrete 
on the shoulder in the effort to avoid her. 
32* *''As she crosses she watches the rapidly approaching 
car all the time until she is only one step from its path~ 
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then she assumes that she is safe, although she knows that 
the car is almost upon her, stops looking, and steps right in 
its way. Assuming that the driver was guilty of primary 
negligence, it is too clear for argument that the plaintiff, un-
der these circumstances, was guilty of contributory negli-
gence.'' 
In its opinion, the Court goes on to show that in a case of 
this kind the doctrine of '' last clear chance'' cannot apply 
since it must affirmatively appear that the defendant actually 
had an appreciable opportunity to avoid the accident after 
he realized, or should have realized, that the plaintiff was in 
peril and was not going to do anything to avoid it. 
J·ust as the Court said above in the Frazier case, so it might 
well be said in the case at bar that the plaintiff, according 
to his own testimony, '' stopped looking at the car at tho very 
instant when it was most important for him to look". 
It mig·ht also be said, in the language of tl1e Frazier de-
cision, that the plaintiff "had the same las~ clear chance to 
protect himself as the defendant had to protect him, for the 
doctrine of last clear chance is the duty imposed by law on 
both the plaintiff and tlle defendant. If, being in plain view 
of each other, and with equal opportunity to prevent the ac-
cident, they arc guilty of concurring negligence, there can 
be no recoverv'' 
This is all the· more applicable to the case at bar because 
with the accident occurring at night it was much easier for tho 
plflintiff to discover and see the lighted automobile coming 
toward him than it was for the motorist to see a pedestrian 
in black clothing not directly in front but rather to the left 
of the front of his car. 
In the case at bar, the contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff consisted of two thing·s: First, the plaintiff evidently was 
not maintaining any effective lookout for he· failed to see the 
approaching automobile until it ,~ms already in the intersec-
tion ( although it was clearly visible with its headlights and 
which was actually seen by both of the other parties at the 
intersection as it came down Franklin Street and before it 
got to the intersection); and, secondly, because the plaintiff 
nfter seeing the approaching automobile, already in the in-
tersection making· a left turn toward him ( and necessarily in 
dangerous proximity to him) instead of keeping his attention 
on the closely approaching automobile and doing whatever 
he could to get out of its pathway, hlstead carelessly 
38* turned his head and *diverted his attention to the op-
posite direction where there was no traffic whatever. 
In other words, the plaintiff with actual knowledge of his 
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impending danger turned his attention away from the known 
and immediate danger to look in another direction for some 
possible unknown dang-er. 
Plaintiff cannot be heard now to claim that when he turned 
his attention away he thought he was safe since he had just 
passed beyond the middle of the street, for his own testimony 
(R., Page 72) shows that when he saw the approaching car 
that he claims hit him it was already in the intersection and 
was coming '' up around the corner on Franklin .Street''. 
The plaintiff is chargeable with knowledge that while he 
as a pedestrian could see the lights of the approaching auto-
mobile very clearly, at the same time he was not yet in the 
range of the lig·hts of the approaching automobile because 
it was making a left turn and at the time the plaintiff naturally 
had not come within the range of the automobile's lights. Un-
der these circumstances, the pedestrian can always see the 
automobile before the driver can see the pedestrian. This is 
a matter of common knowledge with which the pedestrian-
plaintiff is charged. 
In 1.l!cade v. Saunders, 151 Va. 636, 144 S. E. 711, a pedes-
trian was held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law when he failed to look again until he was struck by 
an automobile which lie had seen coming toward him as he 
started to cross the intersection. That was a much stronger 
case from the plaintiff's standpoint than the case at bar for 
it occurred in the daytime and was a right-angle collision. 
The decision and princple applied in 1"Vl eade v. Saunders 
has been approved in the recent case of M-iller v. iones, 174 
Va. 336, 6 S. E.. 2nd, page 607 at page 609, the Court saying 
that in the 1.vl eade v. Saunders case-
'' * * * a plaintiff at a crossing on Broad Street looked as 
he started over and saw an approaching car half a block away; 
lie did not look again and was struck before ho reached the 
center of the street. This was held to be neglig·ence as a mat-
ter of law. The principle applied is eminently sound. * * * '' 
In the 1lliller v. Jones case the Court distinguished the 
Meade v. Saunders decision by pointing out that in the Miller 
cnse the attention of the plaintiff was properly diverted bv 
another approaching car on the opposite side and closer to 
the plaintiff than the defendant's car. 
34* *In the case at bar, there was no other car requiring 
or excusing any diversion of attention of the plaintiff 
away from the impending immediate danger of the approach-
ing car he had already actually seen in dangerous proximity 
to him. 
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In Harris v. Howerton, 169 Va. 647, 194 S. E. 692, the Trial 
Court set aside a jury verdict for the plaintiff and entered 
judgment for the defendant and the Supreme Court affirmed 
the Trial Court's action. In that case the plaintiff, driving 
an automobile, collided with an unlighted truck, parked on 
a street in violation of the traffic· code. Pointing out that. 
in spite of this violation by defendant, the plaintiff had ample 
opportunity to see the parked truck and avoid the collision, 
the Supreme Court held that this failure on the part of the 
plaintiff was not excused by plaintiff's testimony that he was 
confused by the lights of other cars and was diverting his at-
tentiou to some other oncoming cars. In this connection the 
Court said on page 696 : 
'' This explanation is not sufficient excuse, however, for 
failure to keep a lookout in the direction ahead.'' 
Likewise in the case at bar, if plaintiff's counsel should 
claim that plaintiff turned his attention away from the on-
coming car, which was already in the intersection with him 
and turning toward him, in order to look in the other direc-
tion for possible traffic, the all-sufficient answer is that '' this 
explanation is not sufficient excuse'' for his failure to con-
tinue his lookout to the left toward the known imniediate and 
i·mpending danger. 
"h,urther on the Court said that the plaintiff's case "cannot 
be made stronger than he has made it himself. The failure 
to give any clear and satisfactory account of, or reason for, 
tl1e col1ision, will not justify judgment based on speculation 
or sympathy''. 
The case at bar is quite different on material facts from 
cases in which it has been held that it was not contributory 
negligence as a matter of law for a pedestrian to fail to look 
again after starting across the street. In all of these cases. 
<me or more of several disting-uishing· facts will be found. 
Either that when the pedestrian first looked on starting across 
the street, no car was in sight in the direction from which cle-
f endant 's car eventually came; or that the pedestrian 
35* and the defendant's automobile were *traveling at right-
angles to each other and consequently that the defend-
ant's automobile was not making a left tun1; or that plaintiff's 
attention was properly concentrated upon or diverted to some 
other, closer and more threatening car coming· from a direc-
tion other than defendant; or that defendant's car came upon 
defendant from the rear or from behind an obstruction. Not 
a. one of the.C?P excusing conditions existed in the case at bar. 
Harry W. Sanders v. Lucius Newsome 35 
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF' ERROR. 
llef'usal of Court to strike mtt Bosquet's testi.mony of his 
opinion ( tha.t def endl1!lzt 's car st rite le vlaintifl) was vrejiidicial 
to def end ant: 
Lt. Bosquet (R., Pages 56, 57 and 58) of the Richmond Po-
lice Department was permitted to testify that after investi-
gation he changed his report from '' hit and run" to "acci-
dentally injured by an automobile, by Mr. Sanders". 
Defendant's counsel objected and moved the Court to strike 
out this '' opinion testimony''. However, the Court refused 
to strike it out on the ground that the witness had previously 
been cross examined about changing his report. 
But the cross examination of Lt. Bosquet was not regard-
ing his own report but rather only as to whether the report 
of the investigating officers (Wakefield and Alexander) had 
ever been changed. There wa~ no cross examination about 
Lt. Bosquet 's own report, and no examination by defendant's 
counsel as to ,vhat either report contained. (See Bosquet, 
R., Pages 54 and 55.) 
Lieut. Bosquet's opinion was naturally very influential with 
jury since he was high ranking· city detective and testified he 
had made complete investig·ation. 
The Court itself stated that "opinion" could not be ad-
mitted (R., Page 57, Lines 9-10), but plaintiff's counsel per-
sisted and got the testimony of the officer's unfavorable opin-
ion before jury just the same and then the Court declined 
to strike it out.: 
Bosquet (R., P_age 57 (23-25)) (Questioned by Mr. Rudd): 
'' Q. What did your report disclose as to who was respon-
sible for the accidental injury1 '' 
"A. I just put it accidentally injured by an automobile, by 
1\fr. Sanders.'' 
36* *l\fr. Wicker: "If your Honor please, I will have to 
ask that that be stricken out.'' 
The Court: "l\Ir. Wfoker, I overrule your objection. You 
asked what chang:e had been made in this report." 
Mr. Wicker: "Thii:, is the report that he saw, now, written 
for him; the Lieutenant identified it and said that it was no 
chang·e. '' 
The Court: '' The report is not in evidence. And then you 
did ask him whether he made a check. All right, gentlemen, 
I admit the question and answer and overrule the objection. 
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Gentlemen of the jury, I will tell you that in the final analysis 
it is incumbent upon you to determine whether the plaintiff 
was str.uck by the defendant or not, from all the evidence that 
is before you." 
Mr. Wicker:_ '' I note an exception.'' 
'fhus, opinion testimony was gotten in under the guise of 
having the officer state "what his report disclosed". Inad-
missible opinion does not become admissible by reason of be-
ing contained in some ex pa·rte Departmental report. For 
example, suppose his report contained hearsay statement of 
third party that either plaintiff or defendant was '' liar and 
unworthy of any belief''. 
See Jones on ''Evidence" ( 3rd Edition), Sections 372 and 
376. 
Error was not cured by later admission of Report card: 
that merely diminished to some extent, but did not obviate, 
the damage already done by erroneous admission of Lieut. 
Bosquet 's prejudicial opinion. 
The improper testimony was made all the more harmful 
by Court overruling defendant's motion to exclude this opin-
ion testimony. 
FOUR.TH ASSIGNMENT OF ER.ROR. 
Right-of-Way Instruction. Was Erroneoiu,: 
1'his instruct-ion was obviously based upon erroneous as-
81t1nption that plaintiff had right-of-wa.JJ by ,'3tatule. 
Virgfoia Code, .Section 2154 (126), by its express terms ex-
empts an intersection with traffic lights. 
Virg·inia Code, Section 2154 (123), is ambiguous and must 
be read together with (126) and harmonized. Michie on "Law 
of Automobiles'' shows that no pedestrian right-of-way ex-
ists against motorist making left turn on g-reen light. See 
Michie ''Law of Automobiles", Page 283, Note 86, where Vir-
ginia Code, Section 2154 (1.26) and (123), are harmonized 
and where :Michie says : 
37* *"It seems manifest that the right-of-way of the pe-
destrian is curtailed not only at intersections where a 
traffic officer is maintained but also at intersections wlrnre 
traffic lig·hts are maintained, and the pedestrian cannot as- · 
sert a right-of-way as against a vehicle proceeding· with a 
green light at the intersection.'' 
Even. if a right-of-way instru.ction has been applicable, th.P 
instruction actually given was reversible error for it was mis-
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leading and assumed as facts certain iniportant points on 
which the testimony was conflicting, and which should have 
been left for the jtiry: s determination. 
In this instruction the Court told the jury that if they be-
lieve that plaintiff was walking across the intersection in ac-
cordance with the traffic light, 
"then he had the right to expect the defendant would yield 
him, the right of way, etc." 
The instruction further told the jury that they should find 
for the plaintiff if they believed from the evidence 
'' the defendant negligently failP.d to yield the plaintiff the 
ri.qht of way, etc.'' 
Defendant's Counsel objected to this instruction and stat~d 
detailed g-rounds for the objection ( See R., Pages 167 and 
168). In so objecting, after pointing out that since traffic 
lights controlled traffic at that intersection there was no right 
of way, defendant's counsel further pointed out that this in-
struction was improper because : 
1-it assumed that plaintiff had the right of way; 
2-it necessarily assumed that plaintiff entered the inter-
section before the car that struck him; 
3-it assumed that defendant's car struck the plaintiff; and 
4-it assumes that defendant was in a position where he 
was called upon to yield the right of way. 
Obviously, these were important points upon which the tes-
timony was conflicting·. Consequently, these points should 
have been submitted to the jury rather than being· assumed 
(and thereby inferentially decided) by the Court. 
No evidence whatever that plaintiff was walking across in-
tersection when defendant entered intersection. On contrary, 
since plaintiff entered intersection 20 seconds or more before 
defendant arrived, and, since plaintiff had ample time to 
complete crossing· before defendant arrived, evidence 
38* really *showed tI1at plaintiff was not ,walking across 
when defendant made his left turn. 
Instruction erroneously assumes nevertheless that defend-
ant was driving toward plaintiff while plaintiff was walking· 
across intersection, by stating plaintiff had right to assume 
that "defendant" would yield plaintiff the right-of-way. 
TJJis language, naming "defendant", instead of impersonal 
''motorist'' was bound to mislead jury. Defendant was not 
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called upon to yield any right-of-way to anyone not walking 
across at the time. 
From the foreg·oing, it seems clear that this "right-of-way',. 
instruction was erroneous and misleading and highly preju-
dicial. 
Jitdgrnent Being Unsupported by the Evidence, Contrary to 
the Evidence, Is Pla-inly Wron,g and It Is the Duty of 
the Coiirt to Set It Aside and Ente1· Judgment for the 
Defendant: 
It is submitted that a careful reading of the record (which is 
not unduly long·) and consideration of the foregoing analysis 
and the citations of authorities will convince the Court that 
the judgment should be set aside. 
The prejudice to defendant ca.used by permitting Lieut. 
Bosquet 's personal opinion,-founded upon hearsay and 
mostlv ex parte investigation-to be expressed before the jury 
and not stricken out, should alone be sufficient to warrant a 
new trial. 
The right-of-way instruction, with its erroneous and very 
prejudicial assumptions and implications, is enough to require 
a new trial. 
Consideration of the insufficiency and fatal uncertainty and 
self-contradictions of plaintiff's testimony should cause judg-
ment to be entered for defendant. 
Any logical reconstruction of what took place at the in-
tersection of Second and Franklin Streets,-from the time 
that the plaintiff started across the intersection until the de-
fendant's car came into the intersection and made its sudden 
stop and picked up the plaintiff,-results in the inescapable 
conclusion that the plaintiff is bound to have received his in-
jury ( either from another automobile or from a fall) prior 
to the time that the defendant's car ever reached the inter-
section. 
Even "if it might possibly be believed that defendant's car 
struck plaintiff, nevertheless, no causal negligence wag 
39* proven on the part of the *defendant; and in any event, 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence barring 
recovery. 
The contention of plaintiff's counsel that the plaintiff has 
given positive testimony and that his testimony has evidently 
been believed by the jury is not sufficient where, as in the case 
at har, plaintiff's testimony is so contradictory and inconsist-
ent with the physical and other facts testified to by plaintiff 
and his own witnesses. Furthermore, even upon the most fa-
vorable view from plaintiff's standpoint, the evidence merely 
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shows that the plaintiff may possibly have been struck by de-
fendant or may possibly have been struck by someone else. 
Your honorable Court has repeatedly held that under such 
circumstances the jury's verdict should be disregarded and 
judgment entered for defendant. 
As was said in the case of Cawley v. Hanes, 173 Va. 381, 4 
S. E. 2nd 376 at 380: 
'' The very fact that he ( the Trial ,Judge) is g·iven the power 
to set aside a verdict as contrary to the evidence necessarily 
means that he must to some extent at least, pass upon the 
weig·ht of the evidence.'' 
'' It would, indeed, be a futile and idle thing for the law 
to give to a court a supervisory authority over the proceedings 
and the manner of conducting a cause before the jury, and 
the right to set aside the verdict of the jury therein because 
contrary to the evidence, unless the ,Judge vested with such 
power could consider to some extent at least the evidence in 
the cause. * * * '' 
CONCLUSION. 
In view of the foregoing, defendant prays that a writ of 
error and s-itpersedeas may be awarded; that the judgment 
complained of may be reviewed and reversed; that final judg·-
ment may be entered in favor of defendant or, at least, that 
a new trial may be ordered. 
Counsel for defendant (petitioner) desires to state orally 
the reasons for reviewing· the judg·ment of the trial court and 
hereby adopts this petition as his opening brief in support of 
this petition. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARRY W. SANDERS. 
By JOHN J. "WICKER, JR., 
His Counsel. 
40* *I, John J. Wfoker, Jr., an attorney practicing· in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virg·inia, do certify that 
in my opinion there is sufficient matter of error in the record 
accompanying this petition to render it proper to have the 
judgment complained of reviewed and reversed. 
JOHN J. WICKER, JR. 
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Notice that the foregoing petition for writ of error and 
supersedeas and the accompanying record will be filed in the 
clerk's office of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
on the 10th day of July, 1941, is hereby acknowledg·ed. 
Receipt of a copy of the foregoing petition is also hereby 
acknowledged. 
Witness my hand this 10th day of July, 1941. 
R. HUGH RUDD, 
Counsel for Lucius Newsome, Defendant in Error. 
Received July 10, 1941. 
M. B. 1VATTS, Clerk. 
Received Aug. 28, 1941. 
C. V. S. 
·writ of. error and superscdeas granted. Sept. 2, 1941. 
C. V. S. 
Received Sept. 2, 1941. 
M. B. \V. 
BOND. 
KNO"\i\T ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That we, 
Harry "\V. Sanders and rrhe Aetna Casualty and Surety Com-
pany are held and firmly bound unto the Commonwealth of 
Virginia in the sum of Four thousand dollars to the payment 
of which we bind ourselves, our heirs and personal representa-
tives, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents. ·witness 
our hands and seals this 25th day of April, 1941. 
·we hereby waive our homestead exemption as to this oh-
1igation. 
THE CONDITION OF THE ABOVE OBLIGATION IS 
SUCH, That whereas at a Law and Equity Court of the City-
of Richmond, held on the 14th day of April, 1941, in a certain 
suit pending in the said Court between Lucius Newsome 
plaintiff, and Harry W. Sanders defendant, a judgment was 
entered for the said Lucius Newsome; and, whereas, on the 
14th clay of April, 1941, the said Court, in order to allow the 
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said Harry W. Sanders in said suit to apply for a writ of 
error and supersedeas from the said judgment, made an or-
der at the instance of the said Harry vV. Sanders suspending 
the execution of the said judgment for the period of 90 days 
from the date thereof, or until the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia has acted upon a petition for a writ of error 
or appeal presented to said Court, or one of the Justices 
thereof, within the time prescribed by law and until the fur-
ther order of this Court; upon condition that the said de-
fendant or some one for him enter into bond before the Clerk 
of this Court in the penalty of Four thousand dollars, with 
surety to be approved by said Clerk, and conditioned accord-
ing to law within ten days from the date of this order, en-
larged for a further period of fi~e days by an order of this 
Court entered April 23rd, 1941. 
And, whereas, it is the intention of the said defendant to 
present a petition for a writ of error, and S1U,persedeas from 
the said judgment; 
Now, therefore, if the said defendant shall perform and 
satisfy the said judgment, and pay all damages, costs and 
fees which may be awarded against or incurred in the .. A.p-
pel1ate Court by the said defendant asking· for the suspen-
sion, and all actual damag·es suffered in consequence of a 
S'ltpersedeas that may be granted by the Appellate Court, in 
case the judg·ment be affirmed in whole or in part, or the 
writ of error or appeal be dismissed or in case a writ of error 
be refused or not petitioned for witllin the time prescribed 
by law, then this obligation to be void, otherwise to remain 
full force and virtue. 
(Signed) HARRY W. SANDERS (Seal) 
(Signed) THE. AETNA CASUALTY 
& SURETY CO. (Seal) 
By: A. J. SHORT, 
Attorney-in-fact. (Seal) 
Executed in the presence of Ira M. Barr, Deputy Clerk, 
and A. J. Short, Attorney-in-fact, justified on oath, before 
me, Ira M. Barr, Deputy Clerk of the Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond, in my office, as to the sufficiency 
of its estate as security to the above bond; this 25th day of 
April, 1941. 
A Copy, Teste: 
IRA M. BARR, 
Deputy Clerk. 
LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Willis D. Miller, Judge of 
the Law and Equity Court of the City of lliclunond, held 
for the said City at the Courtroom thereof in the City Hall 
on the 5th day of June, 1941. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond 
on the 3rd day of May, 1940: Came Lucius Newsome by coun-
sel, and filed his Notice of Motion for Judgment against Harry 
W. Sanders, which Notice of Motion for Judgment is in the 
words and figures following, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Law & Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Lucius Newsome, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Harry w·. Sanders, Defendant. 
NOTICE OF :MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To Harry W. Sanders 
300 E. Marshall Street 
Richmond, Virginia 
You are hereby notified that on the 22nd day of May, 194U, 
at ten o'clock a. m., or as soon thereafter as I may be heard, 
I shall make a motion in the Law & Equity Court of the City 
of Richmond at its courtroom in said city for a 
pag·e 2 }- judgment against you in the sum of Ten Thousand 
($10,000.00) Dollars, which sum is due and owing 
to me by you by reason of the following facts and circmn-
stances, to-wit: 
On or about the 22nd day of November, 1989, I was a pe-
destrian in the City of Richmond, Virginia, and was attempt-
ing· to cross Second Street on the North side of Franklin 
Street at the place reserved for the use of pedestrians, the 
wllile exercising due care for my own safety. 
And I alleg·e that at the said time and place you were op-
erating an automobile then nnd there owned by you in an 
Easterly direction along and upon Franklin Street and that 
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in and about the operation of your said automobile it was 
your duty so to do in a careful and propur manner at a proper 
and careful speed having due regard for all conditions then 
and there existing; to have your said car under proper con-
trol at all times; to maintain a proper lookout for other 
traffic using the streets and particularly for me, a pedes-
trian, at said intersection of Franklin & Second Streets; and 
to accord me, a pedestrian, who was undertaking to cross 
Second Street on the North side of Franklin Street, the right 
of way, to which I was then and there entitled by virtue of 
the laws of the State of Virginia and ordinances of the City 
of Richmond; and in general it was your duty to obey all of 
the statutes of the .State of Virginia and ordinances of the 
City of Richmond pertaining to and regulating the passage 
of traffic at street intersection and the use of said street in-
tersections by pedestrians. 
And I now allege and charge that while operating your said 
automobile in an Easterly direction along and upon 
page 3 ~ Franklin Street aforesaid, and at the same time 
that I was crossing Second Street on the North side 
of Franklin Street, the automatic signal light at said inter-
section being green for East and West traffic at the time, 
you failed to have your automobile under proper control; 
you failed to maintain a proper lookout for other traffic and 
particularly for me, a pedestrian; you operated your auto-
mobile at a speed excessive in view of all of the conditions 
then and there existing and in a generally negligent, reck-
less, and careless manner; and you essayed a left turn, that 
is a turn North into Second Street without giving· any sig11al 
by hand or by horn, or otherwise, of your intention so to do, 
thereby failing to accord me, a pedestrian, who was then 
and there crossing Second Street in the space reserved for 
the use of pedestrians, the right of way to which I was en-
titled, thereby driving your said automobile with great force 
and violence against and upon my body, ,,Thereby I was dashed 
to the street and suffered numerous wounds, lacerations, con-
tusions, bruises, and injuries on my body and particularly I 
suffered a multiple fracture of my left leg-, whereby I was per-
manently and incurably injured and was forced to be taken 
to the hospital, where I remained for a long period of time 
receiving hospital care and also treatment by physicians in 
and about endeavoring- to be cured of my said injuries and 
thus making· it necessary for me to be incapable of perform-
ing my usual duties of life and making it necessary for me 
to expend divers great sums of money in hospital fees, doc-
tors' fees and other expenses. 
I, therefore, allege and charge that, as the direct and 
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proximate result of your careless, reckless, and neg-
page 4 } ligent acts, as aforesaid, I was greatly and incur-
ably damaged and injured, I suffered great physi-
cal and mental pain and anguish and I was and still am 
greatly and permanently crippled and incapacitated and shall 
so remain throughout the rest of my natural life, all as the 
result of the negligent and careless actions of yourself, as 
aforesaid. 
Wherefore judgment will be asked at the hands of the Law 




By R. HUGH RUDD, Counsel. 
And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond held the 22nd day of l\Iay, 1940. 
Lucius Newsome, plaintiff, 
a,qainst 
Harry W. Sanders, defendant. 
lvIOTION. 
This day came the plaintiff and defendant by counsel and 
on the motion of the plaintiff by counsel, it is ordered that 
this case be docketed. 
The defendant then by leave of Court filed herein a plea 
of '' not guilty'' and put himself upon the Country and the 
plaintiff likewise. 
page 5 } Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Lucius Newsome, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Harry "\V. Sanders, Defendant. 
PLEA OF GENERAL ISSUE. 
The said defendant, by his Attorney, comes and says that 
he is not guilty of the premises in this action laid to hiR 
charge, in the manner and form as the plaintiff hath com-
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plained. And of this the said defendant puts himself upon 
the country. 
HARRY vV. SANDERS. 
J·oHN J. ·wrcKER, JR., P· d . 
.A.ncl at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity Court 
of the City of Richmond held the 9th day of January, 1941. 
This day came the plaintiff herein by counsel and, on his 
motion, it is ordered that the notice of motion hereinbef ore 
filed in this case be, and the same is hereby amended, by add-
ing, on the second page of said notice on the eighth line of 
said page, after the word "control'', the following clause: 
''you failed to have your said automobile equipped with 
proper lights and proper brakes". 
page 6 ~ And on the same day, to-wit: .. A.ta Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, held on the 9th day 
of .January, 1941. 
This day came again the plain ti ff and defendant, by coun--
sel, and a jury, to-wit: J. Carter Enroughty, Lewis B. Gray~ 
Robert S. Cosby, Woodrow R. Hudson, J. J. Yarbrough, Cal-
vert A. Montgomery and J. Wesley Rogers, who were sworn 
well and truly to try the issue joined in this case and havinp.' 
fully heard the evidence and arguments of counsel were sent 
out of Court to consult of a verdict and after some time re-
turned into Court and not being able to agree of a verdict 
were adjourned until tomorrow morning at half past nine 
o'clock. 
page 7 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond held on the 10th day 
of .January, 1941. 
This day came again the plaintiff and defendant, by coun-
sel, and the jury sworn in this case appeared in Court in ac-
cordance with their adjournment on yesterday, and were 
a~·ain sent out of Court to consult further of a verdict and 
after some time returned into Court with a verdict in the 
words and :figures following, to-wit: "We, the Jury, on the 
issue joined, find for the plaintiff and assess his damages at 
Three Thousand & Five Hundred Dollars ($3,500.00)." 
Thereupon the defendant, by counsel, moved the Court to 
set aside the said verdict as contrary to the 1aw and the evi-
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dence and for other reasons set forth in writing and now filed 
and macJe a part of the record herein, which motion the Court 
continued for argument to be heard thereon. 
page 8 ~ Virginia : 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Lucius Newsome 
v. 
Harry W. Sanders. 
GROUNDS OF DElf'ENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
VERDICT, ETC. 
The defendant, by counsel, moves the Court to set aside 
the verdict of the jury in this case and to enter up judgment 
for the defendant herein upon the following grounds : 
(1) That the verdict of the jury is contrary to the law and 
the evidence ; 
(2) That reversible error was committed in granting In-
struction No. 2-A, since this instruction assumed without any 
supporting evidence that the defendant drove into the inter-
section while the plaintiff was lawfully crossing the same1 
and because it assumed without any supporting evidence that 
the defendant failed to yield the right of way to the plain-
tiff; 
(3) The Court erred in overruling the defendant's motion 
to strike the evidence ; 
( 4) At least one essential element, necessary to support a 
verdict in accordance with Instruction C, was not proven by 
preponderance of the evidence, to-wit: "That tl1e automobile 
which struck and injured him" (the plaintiff) "was being 
operated by the defendant;'' in fact the preponderance of 
the evidence showed tbat the defendant's automobile did not 
strike and injure the plaintiff; 
( 5) There was no reliable evidence identifying· the defend-
ant's automobile as the car which the plaintiff claimed had 
struck him. The plaintiff's own testimony clearly showed 
that his assertion that the defendant's automobile had struck 
him was merely a conclusion of the plaintiff's mind. ~,ur-
thermore, the plaintiff in his own testimony admitted tl1at 
the automobile which struck him might have been another car 
rather than the one operated by the defendant; 
(6) The physical facts as shown by plaintiff's testimony 
and tbat of his witnesses, plus matters of common knowledge, 
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of which the Ci?urt takes judicial notice, show clearly th3:t 
the defenda1i~ ~ust have received the injury ( either from an-
o_ther a:utomobile or from a fall) at a time previous to the 
time when defendant's automobile first entered the in-
tersection. . 
page 9 ~ (7) The plaintiff's own t~stimony, plus the physi-
cal facts, showeq. that plain~~ff ,vas gu~lty of con-
tributory negligence in attempting to. crOSEJ the street tn hi~ 
condition and in the manner in which he attempte4 to cross 
the same; i •• 
(8) The Court erred to the prejudice of the defendant by 
admitting into evidence, over the objection of :defendant, ~es-
timony by Police Detective Bosquett as to bis opinion and 
personal conclusion, formed several. days subsequent to the 
accident, that the plaintiff bad been struck and injured by the 
defendant. 
(9) The amount of the verdict was excessive. 
JOHN J. ,v1CKER, JR., p. d. 
page 10 ~ And at another day, -to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of -Richmond, held the 
14th day of April, .1941 .. 
. This day came again thff plaintiff and def end ant, by coun-
sel, and the motion of the defendant io set aside the verdict 
of the jury rendered in this case having been argued and the 
Court now being advised of its opinion and judgment to be 
rendered upon the said motion, doth overrule the same, to 
which action of the Court the defendant by coumwl, excepted. 
·Therefore .it is considered by the· Court that· the plaintiff 
recover against the defendant the sum of Th tee tho1Jsand, 
five hundred dollars, with interest thereon to be computed 
after the rate of six per centum per annum from the 10th day 
of January, 1941, until paid, and his costs· by him about hi~ 
suit in this behalf e~pended. · 
Memorandum: Upon the trial of this case the defendant 
by counsel, excepted to sundry rulings and opinions of tlw 
Court given against him, and the defendant having· sig·nified 
his intention of applying for a ,:vrit of error a,nd su,perse{lea.c: 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, it is ordered 
that the judgment this day entered in this proceeding be sus-
pended for a period of ninety days from this date in order 
to enable the said defendant to apply for such writ of error 
and su,persedeas, upon condition that the s_aid defendant or 
some one for him enter into bond before the Clerk of this 
48 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Court in the penalty of Four thousand dollars with surety 
to be approved by said Clerk, within ten days from this date, 
which said bond shall contain all of the conditions 
page 11 ~ relating to a supersedea.s borid, and if such be 
given the execution of said judgment shall be sus-
pended for said period of ninety days or until the defend-
ant's petition is acted on by the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia if such petition is actually filed within the said 
ninety days. 
pnge 12 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of H.ichmond held the 
23rd day of April, 1941. 
']~his day came again the defendant by counsel, and on his 
motion and for reasons appearing to the Court, it is ordered 
that the time within which the defendant was permitted to 
execute the bond mentioned and described in the order en-
tered in this action on the 14th day of April, 1941, be enlarged 
and the defendant given five days additional time in which 
to execute the said bond; the said order in all other respects 
to remain and stand as entered on said 14th day of April, 
1941. 
page 13 ~ And now at this day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond held tlrn 
5th day of June, 1941. 
This day came again the plaintiff and defendant, by com1-
sel, and thereupon the judge of this Court delivered to the 
Clerk thereof two certificates of exception numbered Certifi-
cnte of Exception #1 and Certificate of Exception #2, which 
are now fi]ed and made a part of the record in this case. 
page 14 ~ Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Luci us Newsome 
v. 
Harry W. Sanders. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION #1. 
The Court hereby certifies that the following evidence, as 
81Jown by the attached stenographic transcript, beginning· 
with all of page 2 and ending with line ll, page 146, is all of 
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J. J. Berry. 
the evidence introduced at the trial of this case, and which 
evidence is further identified by the sig·nature '' VVillis D. 
Miller, Judge". · 
page 15} J. J. BERRY, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, be-
ing first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAl\UNATLON. 
Bv Mr. Rudd: 
."Q. Mr. Berry, please state your name and residence, please, 
SU. 
A. J. J. Berry. 3108 Third Avenue. 
Q. Now, Mr. Berry, raise your voice so the Court can hear 
and these gentlemen of the jury over there can hear exactly 
what you say. Where do you live, sir? 
A. 3108 Third A.venue. 
Q. 3108 Third Avenue 1 How old are you f 
A. :Fifty-two. 
Q. What is your business, Mr. Berry? 
A.. Parkkeeper, Gamble's Hill Park. 
Q. Could you talk just a little louder 'f 
A. Parkkeeper, Gamble's Hill Park. 
Q. That is, you work for the City of Richmond t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been employed by the City of Rich-
mond, Mr. Berry? 
A. Twenty years. 
Q. And how long have yo1,1 been over at that 
page 16 ~ park 1 
A. Same place, twenty years. 
Q. Twenty yearsf 
A. Yes, sir. A little over twenty. 
Q. Mr. Berry, let me ask you at the outset; before the eve-
ning of this accident that we are talking· about, had you ever 
seen or heard of either of the parties, either Mr. Sanders or 
l\fr. Newsome l 
A. No, sir, I had not. 
Q. Did you know anything about them at alH 
A. Neither one of them, no, sir. 
Q. Do you have any interest in the outcome of this matter? 
A. No, sir, I have not. 
Q. All right. Now, 1\1:r. Berry did you see this accident? 
A. I seen-I could tell what I seen up there. 
so Sripreni~ C~ri~t -~f ~ii>e~ls o·f Virginia 
. J. J! J3f3rry._ .. 
Q. · Yes. Now, go ahead and tell this jury and the Court 
just exactly what you saw. · 
A. It was the night-I don't know exactly what day, but 
it was the night before Thanksgiving-
Q. Talk to the jury. 
A. -and I was going north on Second Street. And when 
I gets to the-
Q. What time of night was iU 
A. About ten o ~clock, around ten, a quarter of ten, some-
thing like that. 
Q. Where were you going! 
page 17 ~ A. I was going home. 
Q. And was anyone with you t 
. A~. :My sop. was ~vith me, yes, sir. 
Q~ All, right, sh~~ _ · . . .. . _ 
·_ -4 .. · ~nd __ I was going. no~th on Second Street, and it was 
kind of~ foggy day, like _.today; it had bee~ 1~aining :the ~ar.1Yi 
pad o_f the day, and it _was ~·ainy, mtsty and cloudy. And 1 
told the boy,_ I says: "Bad d!1Y for d~·iving/' In the 1_11ean-
time when I pulled up I looked up the street, you know; it 
wasn't much traffic on the street that night_; and_ th,~ boy-; 
I wiped the windshield off and the b9y wiped the windshield 
off. So then, ,yhen the light chang·ed-
Q. When you got to Franklin Street there, headed north 
on Second, what was the condition of the· light¥ · · 
A. The condition of the light when I pulled up there·? 
Q. Yes.. · . · · 
A. That was gTeen-I mean, it was red; when I pulled up 
th~·re it was red, and I stopped for it. 
By the Court: 
Q. You mean .it was ·red north- and south, .red for traf.ffo on 
Second -Street f 
A. ¥ es, sir.- It I~nocked me off, yes, sir. · 
Q.- Now, go ·ahead. · 
A.· :N" o more -traffje going either way. So about· the time 
that this light changed for me to pull off, a car 
page 18 ~ come around, coming east, coming· from the west, 
coming east, goes aro-gnd the corner, stops sud-
denly, and I told my boy sitting in the car, I say: '' Some-
thing· done happened over there now.'' Well, it was tjmc 
for me to go then, so I pulled right over tlJere, and when I 
qid, l noticeq. the car sitting there, ~nd a l_ady was there with 
he1: head--holding it that way (indicathrn·). I looked around 
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and I could see the car had gone on a forty-five degree, going 
around the corner-
Bv Mr. Wicker: 
·Q. The car was whaU 
A. On a forty-five degree, going around the corner. 
The Court: Forty-five degree, going a round the corner¥ 
Q. Kind of on an angle? 
A. Yes, sir, that is right. 
Bv Mr. Rudd: 
• Q. All right. 
A. Yes, sir, kind of an ang·le, and I got out of my car and 
I told the boy, I said, ''You help this old gentleman in there", 
and the only thing· I heard said at all-nobody tells me a 
thing-tl1e only thing he said, he says: '' Help me get this 
man in the ca.r. '' 
Bv the Court: 
., Q. ·who said that to you? 
pag·e 19 ~ A. This gentleman here, Mr. Sanders. He says: 
'' Help me get this man in the car.'' And the other 
old gentleman says: ''Watch my leg." That was all that 
was said in the meantime, so I goes home. Nobody asked me 
anything, and all I can tell-
By Mr. Rudd: 
Q. Now, before you go on there, Mr. Berry, let me ask you 
this: Can you tell this jury how much time elapsed between 
the time that you saw that car coming·, making a turn, mak-
ing a left turn into Second Street and stop, and the timo 
tl1at you pulled across there T 
A. About that time I saw him I was getting ready to pull 
off and go across the street. 
Q. It happened at the same time? 
A. Yes, I was getting ready to pull out as he turned around, 
he was rig·ht,-making the turn. 
Q. And he made a left turn? 
A. Yes, sir, be made a left turn, going towards Broad 
Street, at Second. 
Q. I say, immediately you pulled off? · 
A. Immediately I pulled off, and I saw his car come to a 
sntlden stop. I pulled right over alongside of him, and I 
gets out to see what was the-
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Q. Now, the first time that you saw l\fr. Newsome, tell the 
jury just how he was standing or what his atti-
page 20 ~ tude was. 
~ A. He was ou the left-hand front fender, up 
against the fender, and this g·entleman was helping him up, 
tried to get him up, and this boy of mine gets out and helps 
him. I was going to clo it, but the old gentleman was too 
heavy for me, and I had a spell of siclniess, and I told the 
boy to help him g·et him in the car. 
Q. Well, now, did you see or hear any conversation g·o on 
between Mr. Sanders and Mr. Newsome f 
A. None at all; the only thing I heard him s~y, the whole 
thing was said when I went there was: "Help, me get this 
man in the car.'' . And Mr. Newsome said: '' Watch my leg,'' 
when the boy was helping.him up. That is all I heard. No-
body said .anything :to me at all, nobody asked my name. · So 
J goeR home, that night-
Q. Let me ask you this first. Who got out of your car first, 
you or your son? 
A. l gets out first. I was on the driver's seat, and I got 
out first. 
Q. You got out first"? 
A. Yes. 
Q . .And you -tell this jury that you started off almost as 
soon as that car had _stopped over there at that crossing? 
The Court: Objection sustained. ~fr. Rudd, you have been 
over that, and it is decidedly leading. 
Q. Nov{, as you passed hy-You said you imme-
pag-e 21 ~ diately crossed the street and went over and 
parked? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. So you passed Mr. Sanders' car, as I understand it, on 
the rig·ht; is that righU 
A. Yes, on the right, that is right. 
Mr. Wicker: .Just make that clear, will you? 
Q. You were on the right of Mr. Sanders' car? 
A. Yes, I was op the right of it, yes, sir. 
Q. Now, as you passed there,· before you drew up to the 
curb, did J'OU see Mr. Newsome and Mr. Sanders before you 
actually passed? 
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.A.. No, sir, I couldn't see them, for the car was around, 
like I say, on a forty-five degree. 
Q. Yes. 
A. The car was sitting· this way. That broke the view from 
me to the car, you see; the car kept me from seeing him. 
Q. ·what I am getting at is this: As you pulled up to the 
l'ig·ht to pass Mr. Sanders' cal\ did you see him and Mr. New-
some before you actually got out 1 · · 
A. Yes, yes, I did. 
Q. You did i .And what was Mr. Newsome 's position at 
that timeoi · · · 
· A. He ;as up against the front fender, about middle way 
of the fender, on the left-hand side. · · 
Q. Leaning on the fender at that time f 
A. Yes. 
page 22 }- Q. I see. Now, as you saw them, did they ap-
pear to be in conversation f 
A .. No, sir, I didn't notice no conversation, didn't hear 
them say anything at all. I am just telling you-
, Q. Did you have your "'rindow down as you pulled over 
there, do you remember t 
A. No, I don't remember. I dou 't remember whether my 
window was down or not. 
Q. Ilut you got out immediately, did you f 
A. I got out immediately, yes, sir .. 
Q. Now, did you hear Mr. Sanders make any explanation 
at that time1 
A. None at all, no, sir .. The only thing he asked me was 
to help him get him in the ear. 
Q. I see. Now, when you first saw this young· lady who 
was ·with Mr. Sanders -in the car, what was her. attitude? 
A. I saw her before I seen 1\fr. Sanders and :Mr.. New-
some; I seen her; she was holding· her head this way, and I 
didn't know what had happened-
(~. She was still in the car! 
~~. She was still in the car. She didn't get out of the car, 
thoug·h. 
· Q. You say you saw her before you saw the others? 
· A. I seen her setting. in the car. holding her head before I 
seen Mr. Newsome and Mr. Sanders. He was out 
page 23 ~ helping the man. 
Q. Now, Mr. Berry, I believe you stated you 
were standing-your car was standing there during the whole 
time that the light was red; is that rightf 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Did you see anything lying in the street? 
A. No, sir. · 
Q. In Second Street, in the crosswalk Y 
A. No, sir, no, sir, I did not. 
Q. Let me ask you this question: When you saw Mr. New-
some the first time, where was he with reference to the cross-
walk? 
A. I didn't see Mr. Newsome crossing the street. 
Q. No, what I mean is, when you first saw him after you 
pulled up and stopped-
A. Oh, I saw him right there on that fender. 
Q. 1 know, but where was he with reference to the cross-
walk! 
A. Oh, he was on the left-hand side, about the center of 
the st,reet. 
Q. Center of what street ~1 
A. Of Second Street, crossing Second, see 1 
Q. I see. You know there is a crosswalk there across Sec-
ond Street? 
A. \V ell, I said-the crosswalk coming down I:i'ranklin 
Street. 
Q. vVas he in the crosswalk f 
page 24 ~ A. He ,·vas in the crosswalk, just aibout the cen-
ter of the street. 
Q. After you left there, where did you go? 
A. I went home. 
Q. And when next did you hear of this accident f 
A. I looked in the paper next morning to see how the old 
gentleman had got hurt-
Q. Now, let me ask you this question: What kind of a car 
was it f Did vou take anv notice of the car that :Mr. Sanders 
was in? · ., 
A. I did not, no, sir. 
Q. Did you notice the license number of that car! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ·what made yon do that¥ 
:Mr. Wicker: Now, just a minute. If Your Honor please, 
I believe that :Mr. Rudd-I have reason to believe that coun-
sel is attempting to elicit some information which T don't 
think he has any right to go into before the jury in any 
way, and I just want to object to going· into the reasons in 
the man's mind. 
The Court: I can hear the answer, gentlemen, and then 
mle on it. I will let the jury go out. 
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page 25 ~ Note: Last quostions and answer read, as fol-
lows: 
'' Q. Did you notice the license number of that cad 
"A. Yes, sir. 
''Q. What made you do thatf'' 
The Court: What is the materiality of that! 
Mr. Rudd: If Your Honor please, I think it is proper for 
this witness to explain to the jury why it was that he made 
a mental note of the license number of that car. 
~L'he Court: Let me hear the answer before I rule on that. 
A. You want me to answer7 
Q. Will you tell th8 Judge why¥ 
.A. ·well, it was sucb few words passed there between this 
gentleman who was helping the old gentleman up, and no-
body said, now, to rn.e: "I didn't hit this man." Nobody 
said nothing at aH, only helping him in the car, and I thought 
maybe-I didn't know this gentleman-I thought maybe he 
might take him around the corner and dump him out, and I 
got the license number of this car, and the next morning I 
looks in the paper and I seen where it was a hit-and-run. So 
I goes to the-an automobile came the next day, and after 
the automobile came, I goes to the hospital, and I asked that 
g·eutleman down there-I went down there and asked for this 
old g·entleman 's name. I seen him; went upstairs 
page 26 ~ and seen him, and I asked him at the hospital, I 
· says: ''Do you know wl10 hit you!" He says: 
''Yes''. I said: ''Who do you think hit you 1 '' He said: ,,rrhe 
man that brought me here." I said: "Well, that is what I 
thought". That is the reason; I never would have known 
nothing about it; never got my name or anything·, and I just 
volunteered and went down there. That is all I know about 
it. 
The Court: That answer is excluded from the considera-
tion of the jury, g·entlemen. 
Mr. Rudd: An exception is noted. Now, if Your Honor 
please, let me get this straight. It is my purpose to ask this 
witness whether he took the license number. I believe he 
has already answered that. 
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The Court: I will let that be answered. And you asked 
him why, and he gave the answer why, which you wish to get 
before the jury. 
Mr. Rudd: I will ask him this question: 
{~. What did you do with this license number after you took 
it! Let me get that answer. 
A. After I took it, I told that boy of mine-I didn't have 
no paper; I had a pencil in my pocket; I took the pencil out, 
but didn't have no paper, and he writes it on my sticker on 
the car. 
Q. You mean you wrote the license number on the sticker 
of your car? 
page 27 ~ A. The boy of mine did. He wrote this num-
ber, the liceiise number, up on there. So the next 
morning, so I thought it was a hit-and-run case, and .I goes 
down, and volunteers to go down, and let them know what I 
seen about the accident. That is how come I got to know that 
Mr. Newsome was the man who got hurt. 
The Court: There has been no objection to that. Is there 
any objection to that answe1· f I excluded the first answer, 
why he took it. Then Mr. Rudd asked a second question: 
What did you do with· the number after you g·ot it f And the 
answer is now given. Is there any objection to that ques-
tion? 
Mr. ·wicker: Yes, sir, I certainly object to that. I object 
to the answer there. I think it is improper. 
'rhe Court: Objection sustained. Are you ready for the 
jm-y to come back? 
i\:[r. Rudd: If Your Honor please, I don't want to ask any 
other questions that the Court is also going· to rule improper. 
1 would Jike to suggest some other questions that I would 
like to ai;;k now, since the Court has ruled out both of those. 
The Court: All rig·ht, I will let you ask them in 
page 28 ~ the absence of the jury. 
Mr. Rudd: I also want what the result was. 
,ve want to except to the ruling on the second question. 
The Court: I am not excluding so much of the answer to 
that last question of "vVl1at did you do with the license num-
ber when you got it,'' and he said he wrote it on the wind-
shield or sticker of his car-
1\fr. R,udd: You will let that g·o in 1 
The Court: I will let that much go in. 
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Mr. Rudd : I would like to ask him this question : 
Q. How did you use the license numlber of that car after_, 
wards? 
The Court: You can answer that . 
.A. How did I use it? 
Q. Yes. 
A. The only thing I used it 1s, I went down and asked 
him-
Q. You can't-
.A. Well, I told him the license number that I got. And I 
asked the old gentleman, I said: '' First time I ever seen 
you in my life"-
Q. You gave the license number to Mr. Newsome? 
A. Yes, and he turned it over to the polic.e. 
Q. Now, I think that that is probably-
The Court: And he turned it over-what f 
.A. I think he turned it over to the police. 
page 29 ~ By the Court: 
Q. You don't know about that? 
The Court: I will let it go in that he wrote the license num-
ber down and later gave if to this old man. Do you object to 
that? 
Mr. Wicker: I don't object to that. I think the witness 
$hould be cautioned not to relate any conversation. 
The Court: I am g·oing to let so much of these questions 
and answers be read to the jury, and the rest of the answers 
is excluded : 
'
4 Q. vVhat did you do with the license number when you 
got it? 
"A. My son wrote it on the sticker of mv car. 
''Q. How did you use the license numbe.r? 
".A. I gave the license number to the old man at the hos-
pital the next day.'' 
.Mr. Rudd: I understand that auv conversation that Mr. 
Berry had with Mr. Newsome at the hospital-
.The Court: Is excluded, yes, sir, because it does not con-
stitute part of the res gestae. 
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Note:· At t.hirs point the jury returned to the courtroom. At 
the direction of the Court, the reporter read to the jury the 
ques.tions and answers thereto ruled by the Court 
page 30 ~ to be admissible, as above set fotth. 
Bv Mr. Hudd: 
·Q. Now, did you see any other traffic in the intersection?-
.A.. No, sir. 
Q. - While you were parked there waiting for the light 
to change¥ 
.L\.. No, sir, I dicln 't notice anything going either one way 
or the other. It wasn't much traffic on the street. 
Q. .Dirl you see anybody lying in the street over there? 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. '!'here is a drug store o\;er there at the northwest corner 
of Second and Franklin, is there not? 
..A.. l7'es, sir, it is. 
Q. Tell the jury whether or not there was any consider-
able light over there-rrell them what was the condition of 
the street as far as lig·ht there over on that side towards the 
drug store. 
A. On that side towards the drug store, it lit up here on 
the Second Street side, and the Franklin Street side, too, was 
lit up; hig· plate glass there. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. ,Vicker: 
Q. That drug store, :Mr. Berry, is on the opposite side from 
the side on which Mr. Newsome's-Mr. Sanders' car drove 
and your car drove, isn't it I It is on the west 
pag·e 31 ~ side¥ 
A. It is on the west side, northwest side. 
Q. You did drive on the east side, didn't you? I say, you 
drove on the east side of Second Street! 
A. WherP the old gentleman was, like I said, the light will 
shine about the middle of the street. It will shine that wnv 
about the middle of the street. It is on that side1 you see, it 
is on the northwest side, northwest corner. 
By the Court: 
Q. You mean tbe drug store is on the northwest side or 
the light that is there! 
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Q. What light do yon mean? I just want to get it straig·ht 
in the record, whether you mean the light that came from the 
drug store or whether you mean the street light. 
A. No, it is the drug store light, a plate glass window there, 
that it is lit up right much there. 
Q. All right. 
Bv Mr. Wicker: 
·Q. Now, l\ir. Berry, as you proceeded you were looking di-
rectly ahead! I mean, you were looking· directly north on Sec-
oucl Street¥ 
A. Yes, sir, I was. 
Q. And you were there before Mr. Newsome's car came 
in sig·ht? 
A. Bdore Mr. Sanders' car. 
Q. Before .Mr. Sanders' car came in sight1 
page 32 ~ A. Yes, sir, that is right. 
Q. Before the defendant came in sight? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe you stateu you dicln 't see anyone lying in the 
street? 
A. No, sir, I dicln 't see anyone lying· there. I didn't see 
anyone before I saw-I didn't notice; if anybody had been 
passing there I wouldu 't have paid any attention nohow. 
Q. Your lights were shining on the east side of Second 
Street right on that crosswalk, weren't they t 
A. Yes, sir, across that way. 
Q. Yes, and if anyone had gone straight across the street 
while your lights were shining, they would have shone on 
him, and you would have seen him? 
A. I would have seen them if I was looking at things over 
there, but I wasn't looking for nothing before-
Q. You saw the automobile? 
A. I wasn't paying no attention except that sudden stop; 
I knew something had I.ta ppened then. 
Q. The first time you paid any attention to anything there, 
this automobile made a. sudden stop, 
A. Yes, when I heard it come to a sudden stop, I knew 
something had happened. 
Q. That is the first time there that you really paid any at-
tention t 
page 33 ~ A. That is right. 
Q. Now, there was no traffic 1 
A. No, sir, I didn't notice no traffic at all coming- up, not 
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one way or the other, while I was standing waiting. I was 
the first one pulled out when the lig·ht changed from red to-
Q. You hadn't see anybody walking across there in front 
of you t 
A. Didn't see anybody walking across there, and didn't see 
no traffic going· neither one way nor the other until this gen-
tleman come down the street. 
Q. And that sudden stop-
.A. Yes. 
Q. -That is what attracted your attention? :Mr. Berry, 
this lady's head : You say she had her hands up to her head 
like that; she was kind of leaning over with her hands up 
to her head, the lady in 1\fr. Sanders' cad 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you passed rig·ht after that sudden stop, didn't 
you? 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see-was her head near the windshield? 
A. No. 
Q. Was it bent over like that'? 
A. She had hold of her head this way; had her hands up 
against her face that way. 
page 34 ~ Q. You don't know whether she hit her head on 
tlw windshield or not 0! 
A. No, sir, I do not. (J. If she had, it would be right natural for her to put her 
hands up there, woulcln 't it? 
A. That is right, yes, sir. 
Q. 1Vere you close enoug·h to hear, after you got out of the 
car, were you close enough to hear anything that 1\fr. New-
some or Mr. Sanders said until they got him into Mr. Sanders' 
carf 
~.\.. Yes, sir. I heard him when he said-when I g·ot then, 
he said: "Help me g·et him in the car." 
Q. The first thing you saw of Mr. Sanders, he was alreaclY 
lifting· the man up¥ · 
A. That is right. 
Q. Asked you to help? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Looked like he couldn't get him much further? 
A. That is right; he couldn't. 
Q. And Mr. Newsome-I don't lmow which hand, but he 
had one of his hands on the fender, didn't he! 
A. He was up against the fender. I don't know whether 
he had his hand up against it. I didn't pay no attention. He 
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was standing there and said: ""\Vatch my leg." That is the 
only thing he said. 'J~hat is the only things said 
page 35 ~ between the two gentlemen while I was there. 
Q. That is right. Mr. Newsome made no sort 
of statement, anything- indicating that Mr. Sanders had hit 
himf 
A. Neither one of them. That is what I said. One of them 
said: "Help me get him in tlie car," and the other one said: 
"Watch my leg." That is all the conversation that went on. 
Q. Where was your car at the time this sudden stop took 
place·f 
A. ·well-where was I at? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I was getting ready to pull off from the south side of 
~,ranklin Street. 
Q. Thank you. 
A. Going north. 
Q. Thank you, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rudd: 
·Q. J\fr. Berry, will you tell us, please, sir, as best you can, 
the speed of :M:r. Sanders' car as it came into the intersection 
and made that left turn 1 
A. Well, I will say it was going maybe 15 to ::W miles an 
hour. 
Q. At the time that it made the turn f 
A. Yes, sir. This gentleman was going with the lig·ht. He 
had a green light. 
M:r. "\\Ticker: "\\Thom do you mean by "this gen-
page 36 ~ tleman' 't 
A. This gentleman over here (indicating the defendant). 
l\fr. Wicker: Mr. Sanders. 
A. He was coming with the light then, yes, when nobody 
was passing, and the light-I watched to see if anything· was 
coming, so when they went around there, the light changed 
just the time that he hit the intersection, and he went around, 
but he didn't g·et all the way around, when he come to a sudden 
stop. 
Q. Did you see this young lady who was in the car with Mr. 
Sanders-did she get out of the car at any Hme f 
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The Court: Gentlemen, you have got to get rid of this 
witness. You have gone over it twice. 
A. No, I don't think she got out of the car. The only way 
she got out of the car was to help him get in the back, I think. 
Q. In which on~ of the seats was 1'Ir. Newsome placed! 
A. In the back seat. 
Q. Iu the back eeat1 All rig·ht, sir, that h~ all. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 37 ~ JOHN A. BI~RRY, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, be-
ing· first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rudd: 
Q. Mr. Berry, please state your name. 
A. 628 N orthside Avenue. 
Q. Lift your -yoice and talk to these gentlemen over here. 
,Jo]m A. Berry. What is your occupation'? 
A. Ralesman for \Vilson & Company, meat packers. 
Q. Are you related to Mr. J. J. Berry, who has just testi-
fied? 
A. He is my Daddy. 
Q. How old are you, sirt· 
A. Twentv-six. 
Q. Mr. Berry, did you see this accident at Second and 
Franklin streets in November--f 
A. I did, yes, sir. I saw it and I didn ~t see it. I was there. 
Q. Where were you i 
·A. We were across the street. 
Q. You were in the car with your father? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I want you to tell those gentlemen of the jury just ex-
actly what you saw. 
page 38 ~ A. '\Ve were parked there nt the stop-the light 
had turned reel, and we had stopped waiting for 
it. This car came down E,ranklin Street, turned into Second, 
and as the car turned, the light changed to gTeen, and we 
went across the street, and there was this old man laving· 
clown right beside the wheel of the car, on the left-hand ·side 
wheel. 
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Q. Now, Mr. Berry, what was the speed of that Sanders 
car as it came to that intersection f 
A. I should say 20, 25 miles an hour. 
Q. Now,· did it make a right turn or left turn¥ 
A. Left turn. 
Q. North in Second Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what happened to it 1 What did the car do 1 
A. rrhe car suddenly stopped. 
Q. ·where was the car when it stopped i 
iL Just about in the-where people walk across. 
Q. The crosswalk Y 
A. In the white lines, yes, sir. 
Q. I see. Now, what happened after that, after the car 
stopped 1 . 
A. ~ehen we pulled up 1.tp beside; the lady grabbed her face, 
and we pulled up beside the car. 
Q. What lady was that l 
A. A ladv in the car with Mr. Sanders. 
·· Q. Grabbed her face ? 
pag·e 3H ~ A. Yes, her face. 
Q. How? 
A. In this manner (indicating). (J. Did you see tlrnt? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was she thrown against the windshield when the car 
stopped Y 
A. I couldn't say whether she was thrown against the 
windshield or whether the excitement caused her to grab her 
face. 
Q. Do you know why she grabbed her face? 
A. I do not. 
Q. All right, now, go ahead and tell what happened when 
you pulled up across the street. 
A. Then we pulled up beside this car, and I got out. to help 
this gentleman put the old man in the car. 
Q. What was Mr. N"ewsome's position when you first saw 
him? 
A. His back was laying just about up against the front 
wheel, with his legs out. 
Q. Back against the front wheeH 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And at that time, when yon first saw him, had you gotten 
out of your car Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And what conversation, if any, did you hear between 
him and Mr. Sanders f 
page 40 r A. Didn't hear any, only this old g·entleman 
said: '' w· atch my leg·,'' when we grabbed his legs 
to pick him up. 
Q. ·what explanation did :Mr. Sanders maket 
.A. None whatsoever. 
Q. Didn't say anything- at alU 
A. He just said: "Help me g·et the old man to the hos-
pital,'' I believe. 
Q. Did you observe Mr. Sanders' demeanor at that time? 
How did he appear to you? 
A. Well, I didn't pay much attention to him, except-I just 
had my mind on the old man more than anything else. 
Q. Was the old man unconscious"? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Now, where, with reference to the middle of Second 
Street, was the old gentleman in the street when you first 
saw himf · 
A. He was looking towards Broad Street. He was about 
two or three feet to the left of the middle of the street. 
Q. You mean to the middle of Second Street·? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then he was to the west of the middle of Second Street; 
is that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was he with reference to that crosswalk? 
A. He was inside of the crosswalk. 
Q. Now, did you help put him in the car? 
- page 41 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what about the young lady in the car; 
did she g·et out 1 
A. She got in the back. 
Q. She got in the back 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And Mr. Newsome was put in front? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what else happened after that-? 
A. Then after that this car drove off, and my Daddy told 
me, he saicl-
~fr. Wicker: I objoot to that. 
Q. Don't say what your Daddy said. Just say what you 
did and what he did. 
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A. w· ell, we took the man's license number. 
'.rhe Court: All right. 
A. Because--
The Court: Don't say that. 
Q. Don't say the reason. You tell the jury that you took 
the license number. vVas any explanation offered to you by 
l\ir. Sanders or the young lady or anybody as to how the ac-
cident happened Y 
A. None whatsoever. 
(~. Did you see Mr. Sanders any time after thaU 
A. vVe saw him next day, I believe it was, up at Bliley's. 
We rode up there and met the detectives there, 
page 42 ~ questioned him and talked to him. The next day, 
or t.he next Saturday, I clon 't know which. 
Q. Now, Mr. Berry, I want you to tell the jury whether or 
not you saw anything lying in the street there as you stopped 
for that light. 
A. No, sir, I didn't see a thing lying in the street when we 
stopped. 
Q. Did you see any other car pass that intersection while 
you were stopped there? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you see any other traffic of any kind 1 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS l~XAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. vVicker : 
· Q. Mr. Berry, did you see anyone walking across the street Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. That cross,valk there on which l\fr. Newsome, you state, 
was lying or sitting-
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. If he walked across and got to that position, you didn't 
Ree him·? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And your lights were in that position, weren't they? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Headed north, and your lights shining on the 
page 43 ~ east side of that crosswalk? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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CJ. You think anyone could have walked acro~s there with-
out you seeing them t · 
A. Well, probably wouldn't have noticed anybody walking·, 
whereas anybody if they had been laying in the street, I would 
have been bound to have noticed it. 
Q. Well, now, let me see about that. You would have been 
less likely to see them down, with your vision down low ; if 
anyone was sitting· or lying· down in the street, he had to be 
sort of below your line of vision; whereas anybody walking, 
particularly a big man, you would almost have to see him 1 
A. Even at that, the lights would not have shone on the 
street where he was on. 
Q. The lig·hts would not have shone? 
A. ·No, sir. 
Q. Your lig·hts ¥ 
A. The lights were shining· directly straight and he was to 
the left, you see. 
By the Court: 
Q. He asked you if he was walking across, l\!Ir. Berry, 
whether you would have seen him or not. 
A. ·we probably would have seen him if we paid any atten-
tion to anybody walking. 
Bv :Mr. Wicker: 
page 44 ~ ··Q. You paid enough attention to know, didn't 
you 1 You were looking ahead; you were looking 
straight across? 
A. Yes, sir, we were. 
Q. You were, and you didn't see anybody walk across there, 
now, did you¥ · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And over where he was lying, that was to the left of 
your lane? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Consequently and naturally you could not see as good 
over to the left, where he was lying, as you could right 
straight ah end of you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is right. And there was no other traffic in the 
block? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Now, about this left turn, Mr. Newsome making a left 
turn-1fr. Sanders: I keep mixing them up there. Suppose we 
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say the old gentleman and the young gentleman'? I don't 
know, they may object to that-
The Court : No, use the names. 
Q. Use the names f All right. l\Ir. Sanders, in driving his 
car, he had the green light with him, didn't he·¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he drove to the center of the street be-
page 45 ~ fore he attempted his turn, didn't he 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What! 
A. No, sir, not directly to the center. 
Q. I mean, he drove a little beyond the center, didn't you 
think so at that time or shortlv afterwards '1 
A. ,v ell, I couldn't say he we;1t right to the center to make 
the turn. He cut the corner a little short. 
Q. You would say that the car came approximately to the 
center of' the intersection before beginning this curve, 
wouldn't you 1 
A. Yes, sir, approximately. 
Q. That is right. You couldn't see whether he gave a 
hand signal or not f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And there wasn't any traffic for him to give a hom 
signal for? 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. In fact, there wasn't any traffic that you could see for 
him to give a hand sig11al for, either? 
A. 'fha t is all-
Q. Behind him, or-? 
A. No, sir. He was standing; tlmt is the only car I saw in 
sight. 
Q. You dicln 't see any traffic, I mean, either car 
pag·e 46 ~ or pedestrian¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Nothing to sound a horn for or stick a hand out f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Now, you said that when you g-ot out and went over 
there, l\fr. Newsome was sitting or lying down in the cross-
walk, about the center of the street, with his back about op-
posite the front wheel? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. With his legs-1 
A. Sticking out. 
68 Supreme Court . of .Appeals of Virginia 
ti ohn, ...d.. Berry. 
Q. Sticking· out toward the west? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was Mr. Sanders and what was l\fr. Sanders do-
ing at that timef 
.A. He had him by evidently his arms, trying to lift him up. 
Q. Mr. Sanders had his arms under Mr. Newsome's arm 
pits, trying to lift him up t 
.A. Yes, he had him under the arms, and I grabbed his legs. 
Q. Then you g-rabbed his-? 
A. Legs. 
Q. His leg·s, and that was when Mr. Sanders said "Watch 
ont for my legs'' or '' Look out for my legs''? 
page 47 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you or your father or Mr. N ewsomc or 
anybody else say anything· to indicate that Mr. Newsome 
thought that Mr. Sanders had hit him 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You say Mr. Sanders dicln 't make any-You were asked 
if he made any explanation, and you said "No". Diel you 
or your father ask him for any explanation°? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You all didn't ask any questions¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And M.r. Sanders seemed-the only thing he was think-
ing about was getting· the man into the car. to get him to a 
hospital; isn't that right f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is the way it looked to you¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rudd: . 
Q. Now, Mr. Berry, what was the condition of your wind-
shield f 
A. Well, it was drizzling that nig·ht, and kind of misty, 
and as we pulled up to the stop my Daddy and I both wiped 
the windshield off. 
Q. Now, can you tell this jury that no one walked across 
that crosswalk in front of vou f 
page 48 ~ A. I didn't see anybody· walk across the cross-
walk. 
Q. Did you look for anybody? 
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A. No, sir, I did not. 
Q. Could somebody have walked across there and you not 
seen him! 
Mr. )Vicker:. Just a minute. If Your Honor please, isn't 
that a question for the jury! It seems to me we have covered 
that. He put him on as his witness. 
The Court: You asked him, Mr. Wicker, wouldn't he be 
apt to see him or something, on his cross examination a little 
while ago, if he were walking across, and I will let him an-
swer it. 
A. It was possible for anybody to ·walk across and I didn't 
even notice them, anybody walking, whereas anybody laying 
in the street, I would have been bound to have noticed that. 
Q. vVhy do you say thaU 
A. vVell, it is a light right there in the drug store. 
The Court: Gentlemen, you have been over it before; the 
same thing you have been over before. 
Mr. ·wicker: He said it was out of his lights. 
Q. Now, had Mr. Sanders just gotten to Mr. Newsome when 
you got there t 
A. Just had stopped when I got out of the car, 
pag·e 49 ~ and there was the old man laying there beside the 
wheels of the ca.r. 
Q. So you say when you got there lVIr. Sanders had his arm 
around-under ~fr. Newsome's arm pits; is that right? 
The Court: Gentlemen, that ,,1itness has answered that 
question twice already, and the other one answered it four 
times-
Q. That is all. 
RE-CROSS EXAl\HN . .t\.TION. 
By Mr. Wicker: 
Q. I just want to ask you about that sudden stop. You say 
it was a right sudden stop t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. From the time the stop started until the car actually 
stopped I don't believe it went over a foot, did it, if that? 
A. I don't guess it did. · 
Q. Thank you, sir. 
·witness stood aside. 
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a witness introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, be-
ing first duly·- sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT ~XAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rudd: 
Q. Lieutenant Bosquet, please state your name and occu-
pation. 
A. Lieutenant F. l\I. Bosquet. Police Headquarters, Rich-
mond. 
Q. How long have you been on the Police Force in Rich-
mond! 
A. Thirty years. 
Q. Lieutenant, did you make any investigation of this ac-
cident in November, 1939? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you state to the jury just what you did? 
A. "vVell, the morning· of the 23rd, Sergeant Bain and my-
self got a report that Mr. Newcome had been hit by a hit-
and-run driver. I went down to the Hospital, Sergeant Bain 
and myself, and I interviewed Mr. Newcome there-
Q. Newsome? 
A. Newsome. And he told us-
Mr. Wicker: ·wait a minute, please. Don't say what he 
told you. 
The Court: Objection sustained .. 
Q. Unless l\Ir. Sanders was present. 
The Court: You can say wbat yon did, but 
page 51 ~ don't tell conversation between you and l\fr. New-
some. 
Q. As a result of your conversation with Mr. Newsome1 
·what did you do Y 
A. "\Vell, I investigated it; I found l\:Ir. Sanders; I went 
and talked with Mr. Berry, who is over on the Park, you know, 
Mr. Berry-
The Court: Don't tell what I1e told you. 
A. Then from there I went to Bliley's and interviewed l\fr. 
Sanders, Sergeant Bain and myself, in the presence of 1\Ir. 
Berry and his son. 
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Q. You had the two Mr. Berrys tlrnre 1 
A. He was, and'his-Yes. 
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Q. And would you state what occurred on that occasion '-l 
A. Now, Mr. Sanders told me himself, if he hit the old man, 
he didn't know nothing about it. 
Mr. Wicker: ·what was tba t 7 
A. Said that if he did hit the old man that he didn't know 
nothing about it. 
Q. Did Mr. Sanders ever categorically deny hitting 1\fr. 
Newsome? 
A. He never did deny it. 
Q. And bow many times did you interview him ·i 
A. Twice. 
Q. Now, did you take l\Ir. Sanders down to Mr. Newsome 
at the hospital? 
page 52 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what happened there? 
A. Well, I told Mr. Sanders I would rather have him go 
down there and hear what Mr. Newcome would say about this 
acddent, and then, well, we went on down there, and I beard 
the old gentleman tell him, you know, said: '' ,v ell, if you 
broug·ht me here, you are the man that hit me.'' 
Q. If you are the man that-? 
A. "If you are the man that brought me to the hospital, 
you are the man that hit me." 
Q. And what did 1\fr. Sanders say·¥ 
A. Mr. Sanders said-he didn't say anything; he dicln 't 
deny it. He walked away. 
Q. He walked away f 
A. He walked away from his bed. 
Q. He dicln 't deny it? 
A. No, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Wicker: 
"Q. At that time-that was shortly after the accidentj 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. This conversation you are speaking of in the hospital, 
Lieutenant, was shortly after the accident? 
A. Yes, sir. I went to Bliley's, and I told him, you know, 
I would rather have l\fr.-the gentleman there that 
page 53 } we had, to listen to what the old gentleman had 
to say. 
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Q. And you say he went willingly with you down to the 
hospital¥ 
A. Yes, sir. We waited for him and we took him down in 
our car and took him back to the place of business. 
Q. And when M.r. Newsome said: "If you are the nian 
who brought me to the hospital, you are the man that hit 
me," :M:r. Sanders, he di<ln 't argue with him at all? 
A. Didn't give him no argument at all. 
Q. He didn't g·ive him any argumentf 
A. No, he didu 't give him any argument. 
Q. Mr. Sanders at that time was on his feet, and Mr. New-
some was flat on his hack, sick in bed, wasn't he 1 
A. That is rig·ht, yes, sir. 
Q. Suffei·ingrf 
A. Suffering right severely. 
Q. And Mr. Sanders di<ln 't enter into any argument? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Now, Mr. Bosquet, or Lieutenant Bosquet, you inter-
viewed all of the witnesses f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I am not going to ask you what the others said, but I 
mean vou interviewed them? 
A. Yes, all of the witnesses that was in this report. 
Q. Lieutenant., you talked to officers ·w akefield 
pag·e 54 ~ and Alexander, who made the report in the case? 
A. Yes, sir . .And they g·ave-
Q. I don't want you to say what they said. 
A. All right. 
Q. But just the fact that you did interview them. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I suppose you examined the report that they made f 
A. Yes, sir. I wrote the report up, you know; you see, 
when they go to these scenes, like this happened, ten o'clock 
of the night of November 22nd, I didn't know nothing about 
this case until the Captain, you know, assigned it to us the 
next morning. Then we write these thing·s up in our memo-
randum books, just like it is on the report, and we add to 
our report of it our investigation, you see, if our investi-
gation leads any further, you know, than what is on the origi-
nal report. 
Q. Then you wrote up the examination on the report which 
was signed hy Officer Wakefield and Officer Alexander? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then you made as thoroug·h an investigation as you 
could! 
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A. Well, I called you up first thing-
Q. As soon as you could, of course 1 
A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Now, after that investigation was completed, 
page 55 ~ did you place any charges against Mr. Sanders for 
anything 0/ 
A. No, I did not. I thought Mr. Sanders done, you know, 
what he should have done, you know, and I did not. 
Q. I mean, you didn't charge him with reckless driving or 
anything else? 
A. No, didn't put no charges at all against him. 
Q. Now the report, when it was made out, was made out 
after the first investigation, wasn't it 1 
A. Now that report is made out by the uniformed officers, 
you see. 
Q. Yes, those who went down to the hospital that night? 
A. That is right. Mr. ·w akefield and Mr. Alexander, I 
think, were the two officers that went to the scene that night. 
Q. That is right. 
A. The murder and assault report is another report made 
at the station house. That ones goes to the Traffic Depart-
ment, and then there is another one, you know, that comes to 
the Detective Division, but both of them are practically the 
same. 
Q. And as far as you know that report has never been 
changed? 
A. Never been changed 1 Vv ell, I changed my report from 
a hit-and-run to an accident injury. 
Q. Yes, and this report, as far as you know, has never 
been changed? 
A. Has never been chang·ed. 
page 56 ~ RE-DIRI~CT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Rudd: 
'Q. Lieutenant Bosquet, you say you changed your report 
from hit-and-run to accidental injury f 
A. Yes. 
Q. ,vby did you do that? 
.A. Well, I done that-I just thought from the investiga-
tion~ 
Mr. Wicker: Now, if Your Honor please, I think I will 
have to object to going into the mental processes. I don't 
believe-
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Mr. Rudd: l. will withdraw that question, if Your Honor 
please, and ask this question : 
Q. What final report did you make? 
A. I just stated that I changed it. I didn't clrnnge-only 
the hit-and-run, you see, from hit-and-run to accidental in-
jury. 
Q. Well, now, hit-and-run means you don't know who did 
it; is that right? 
A. That is rig·ht. 
Q. Now, when you chang·ed your report to aceidental in-
jury, what was the report that you actually made? 
A. Well, that was all, and it is filed, you know, and instead 
of adding up to hit-and-run, added it up with acciclental-
Q. You mean you knew who was responsible for it? 
A. ·wen, I thought he-
page 57 ~ l\Ir. Wicker: Wait a minute. This is your wit-
ness. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Mr. Wicker : You a re leading all the time. 
Mr. Rudd: He stated on cross examination-
M r. "\Vicker: You just made a clean statement to him: 
''You knew who was responsible for the accident.'' That is 
the question, and it was a decidedly leading one. 
The Court: You can ask him what his report disclosed, but 
you cannot ask him to give an opinion. 
Q. What did your report that you finally made disclose as 
to this accident? 
A. Disclosed it as an accidental injury. 
Q. What I mean is, what did your report disclose, Lieu-
tenant Bosquet, as to the party rcsponsihle for the accident! 
A. Well, I based that-
The Court: Don't say what your opinion is, now. JuHt 
say what your report disclosed, if anything·; what the report 
showed. 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. ,Just told, as I told you, that it was acddental injury. 
That is all. That is all it was to it. 
Q. ·what did your report disclose as to who was respon-
sibJe for the accidental injury1 
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A. I just put it accidentally injured by an auto-
page 58 ~ mobile, by 1\fr. Sanders. 
Mr. Wicker: If Your Honor please, I will have to ask that 
that be stricken out. 
The Court: Mr. \Vicker, I overrule your objection. You 
asked what change had been made in this report. 
Mr. Wicker: 'l,his is the report that he saw, now, written 
for him; the Lieutenant identified it and said that it was no 
change-
The Court: The report is not in evidence. And then vou 
did ask him whether he made a check. All rig·ht, gentlemen, 
I admit the question and answer and overrule the objection. 
Gentlemen of the jury, I will tell you that in the final analysis 
it is incumbent upon you to determine whether the plaintiff 
was struck by the defendant or not, from all the evidence that 
is before you. 
Mr. vVicker: I note an exception. 
Note: At this point, by direction of the Court, the entire 
testimony on cross examination of Lieutenant F. M. Bosquet 
was read. 
Mr. Wicker: If Your Honor please, I would like to move 
now to ask Lieutenant Bosquet to g·o back and bring- that re-
port over that he has testified about. 
page 59 ~ The Court: All right. 
The ·witness: You want me to get it! . 
Mr. Wicker: Yes, sir, the report to which you have just 
testified. 
The Witness : Yes, sir. 
The Court: You are excused until you can bring that re-
port over here. 
The Witness: I will go on over now and bring it over here. 
Note: At this point the Court took a short. recess. The 
following took place in chambers : 
The Court: Out of the presence of the jury the Court states 
that both counsel have pursued an examination concerning 
the report or reports made by the police or the Police De-
partment, Mr. Wicker having pursued that examination at 
length. The witness made certain statements concerning a 
ehange in the report, that is, that he changed it from hit-and-
run to accident, and then Mr. Wicker asked him as to whether 
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any charges were preferred whatever against the defendant 
in this case, and he stated ".No". The matter having been 
opened to that extent, the Court is of the opinion that Mr. 
H.udd had a right to interrogate the ,vitness as to the en-
tirety of any changes that he made in the report; that is, 
having changed hit-and-run to an accident, he had 
page 60 ~ a right to pursue as to who was the party thought 
to have been-or at least thought by the police to 
have been responsible for the accident, that is, who was the 
driver of the car. 
l\fr. vVicker: I have nothing to say. 
Mr. Rudd: I would like to state this: as I recall it, on di-
rect examinatio~1 I never asked this witness a single thing 
concerning this report or any other report; I simply asked 
him to tell the jury what explanation, if any, this defendant 
had made in regard to this accident, which was clearly ad-
missible. 
The Court : All right. 
:Mr. ·wicker: I will just state there in the record that my 
examination was intended to, and I believe a careful reading 
of the record will show that it did, refer only to the official 
report made out. by the investigating officers. I therefore en-
tered an objection to the witness stating- what was in effect 
nothing· but his own private conclusion, when be talked about 
his own unofficial report, and I particularly objected to him 
responding to Mr. Rudd's inquiries seeking to bring out ,,1hat 
individual he thought had been the driver that struck the 
plaintiff. 
Note: At this point the Court and counsel and jury re-
turned to the courtroom, and Lieutenant F. l\L Bosquet re-
sumed the witnes.5 stand. 
page 61. ~ 
Bv the Court: 
'Q. Did you g·et that report? 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv M:r. Wicker: 
·Q. Lieutenant, what I just want to ask you is, after you 
liad finished with all tlw investigation and reports, it is your 
duty, the duty of the investigating- officer in case an investi-
g·ation discloses that there has been a~1y violation of law, a 
violation of the traffic code in connection with an accident, it 
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is your duty to place a charge; if some of the parties do not, 
it is the duty of the officer to do that, isn't iU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. .And you did not place -any charge, and no other officer 
did? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Thank you, sir. 
Mr. Rudd : You went all over that. 
Mr. ·wicker: No, indeed. 
Q. Lieutenant Bosquet, you are on the Detective Bureau, 
aren't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The Detective Bureau are interested in traffic viola-
tions¥ 
A. If anyone is injured like a hit-and-run, on a hit-and-run, 
and anyone is injured, you understand, we generally get or-
ders to investigate it. 
page 62 } The Court: All right. You are through with the 
Lieutenant? 
Mr. Wicker: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Rudd: "\Vait just a minute. 
RE-DIRECT EXA1HNATI0N. 
By l\f r. Rudd: 
Q. Lieutenant Bosquet, is it the function or custom of the 
Detective Bureau to bring charg·es in simple cases of traffic 
violation f 
A. Yes, sir, if we can find out there was any carelessness or 
negligence on the operator's part, we generally do. 
:Mr. Rudd: If Your Honor please, I make a motion that 
tllis complete report that we have been talking· a.bout here 
Bo much this morning go in for whatever probative value it 
nmv have in this case. 
1\fr. Wicker: If Your Honor please, I will have to object 
to the complete report going in. I think we have covered 
everything- and perhaps more than we should have. I don't 
think that i8 relevant and properly admissible. 
The Court: Let me see it. 
Note: The Court examines the report. 
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Mr. Rudd:. Particularly in view of the fact that counsel 
for the defendant himself asked for the report and has ques-
tioned this witness as to this particular report .. 
page 63 r For that reason I think the report as a whole ought. 
to go in for whatever light it will throw on this 
case. 
The Court: I am g~oing to reject the report,. gentlemen .. 
Mr. Rudd: I note an exception .. 
·witness stood aside .. 
page· 64 ~ DR. JAMES T. TUCKER,. 
a witness introdueed on behalf of the plaintiff,. be-
ing first duly sworn, testified as follows~ 
DIRECT EXA.l\HNATION. 
Bv l\ifr. Rudd: 
"'Q. Dr. Tucker,. wilI you please sfate- your name and occtt-
pation 1 
A. James T. Tucker. Physician. 
Q. How long have you been practicing~[ 
A. Fifteen years. 
Q. Where were you educated in medicinei Doctor T 
A. The Medical College of Virginia. 
Q. And what is your specialty, sir! 
A. Bone and joint surgery. 
Q. Bone and joint surgery t 
A. Yes, sir .. 
Q. How long· have you been prneticing that specfoity in 
Richmond? 
A. Ten years .. 
Q. Dr. Tucker, did you treat 1\fr. Newsome, the plaintiff 
in this case, for an injury 1 
A. No, sir, I did not treat him at tI1e time· of tl1e injury. 
Q. When did you see him f 
A. I saw him following tile death of my a&"Socia te, D1 ... 
Faulkner. 
page (j5 ~ Q. Dr. Fa1..1lkner treated llim f 
A. Yes. I took him over after Dr. Faullrner"s 
death, 
Q. Now, wiII you please teII the Court and jury wlrnt your 
records s11ow Mr .. Newsome's condition was when he came 
to your· 
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A. This gentleman was injure<l, as my record goes, on No-
vember 22nd, 1939. He gave a history that he ,•tas hit by an 
automobile. He was taken to :Memorial Hospital. An X-ray 
revealed that he had a break in both bones of the left lower 
leg, about the mid portion. He also had some injury to his 
left shoulder that he complained of at the time. The break 
was set and he was put in a plaster cm;t from his toes to his 
groin, with no small pain, and in that manner he remained 
for three months until he got union in his bones that were 
broken. When he came out of the cast, and by an X-ray it 
was determined that the bones had firmly united, he had some 
stiffness in llis knee from prolonged immobilization. He got 
g·ood union. He was in the hospital approximately fi~e months 
in all, two months following the removal of the cast that he 
remained ·so that he might get strengih enoug·h to walk. He 
was on crutches about a month, and my last examination was 
on October 11th, 1940, whic.h I thought was about the end of 
his recuperation. I found that his knee was stiff to the extent 
that he could bend it 90 deg-rees, that is, to a rig·l1t 
pag·e 66 ~ angle, but anything fmther than 90 degrees was 
impossible. He complained of pain in his knee on 
account of the stiffness and the rheumatism that was there 
possibly before the break, but it was probably made a little 
stiffer by the time that he was kept immobile. His left shoul-
der, he complained of some pain and inability to raise it from 
the side. He claimed he had a lick on his shoulder, which g-ave 
him a bursitis or inflammation of the soft parts about the 
shoulder, which throug·h adhesions kept it from moving 
through the normal range of motion. 
Q. Doctor, will you, please, sir, tell the jury what in your 
opinion will be his permanent disability as a result of this 
injury? 
A. I think he is going to have a permanent stiffening of 
his knee to the extent that he can not move it over 90 degrees, 
to a right angle. His left shoulder, I think, is going to be 
quite well. He is going to have improvement of function. 
He can't move that either through the full normal motion. 
He claims that both of them are hurt, but on my examination 
the left one was more immobile than the right. 
Q. Doctor, what arc your charges up to the present time 
for the services that you have rendered! 
A. I haven't a statement here. I think Dr. Faulkner ren-
dered a statement some time-
Q. Is this the statement 5? 
pag·e 67 ~ A. Yes, tl1is is the statement from our office. 
$150.00. 
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Dr. Janies T. 'l'uck,er. 
Q. None of this has been paid, has it, Doctor? 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Rudd: I offer this in evidence. 
Note: Statement in question marked "Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 1 '' aud filed in evidence. 
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page 69 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv l.\fr. Poole : 
$150.00 
".A.. Dr. Tucker, did you see the X-rays taken of Mr. New-
some's leg? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Could you tell us from that X-Yay-as a specialist, could 
vou teII us if that break was caused by a trauma or whethc1· 
it mip:ht be caused by someone failing~ 
A ,Juror: A little louder, please. 
:Mr. Poole: Did you hear the question? 
A ,Juror: No, sir. (Note: Question read.) 
A. No, sir. Of course the question is a little bit confusing-, 
lwcause trauma results from a fall. Trauma means an in-
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jury. I could not tell whether it came from such an injury 
as he had. It was a break, that is all. 
Q. Doctor, perhaps I should make it a little bit more clear. 
Could you determine whether it came from a direct force, 
such as something hitting his leg, striking bis legY 
A. No. 
W"itness stood aside. 
page 70} LUCIUS NE"\VSOME, 
the plaintiff, being first duly sworn, testified as fol-
lows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rudd: 
Q. Mr. Newsome, you are the plaintiff in this case, are you 
not, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Nmr, :Mr. Newsome, I will ask you to make a special ef-
fort to talk clearly and raise your voice so that these gentle-
men over here and the Court c.an hear what you say. What 
is vour full name? 
A. Lucius B. Newsome. 
Q. Lucius B. Newsome 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. How old are vou, sir! 
A. Sixty-seven . ., 
Q. Mr. Newsome, on this evening that this accident hap-
pened, I want you to look at the jury now· and tell them where 
you were going and just exactly how this accident happened, 
just as you saw it. 
A. I was going to the drug· store on the corner of Second 
and Third-
Mr. \Vicker: The corner of Second and what! 
page 71 } A. ( Continued) -going· to get a prescription 
filled. I got to the stl·eet-I come down Third 
Street and crossed over Franklin Street-
Q. Let me ask you this, M:r. Newsome. Let me ask you 
this question: Where did you start from when you first 
started out to the drug store? 
A. I Rtarted from 17 South Third Street. 
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Q. Seventeen South Third ·t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what side of Third Street did you go -qpf 
A. East side. 
Q. The east sider 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did you continue on np Third Street until you got 
to Franklin Street¥ 
A. Yes .. 
Mr. Wicker: Wait a moment. ff Your Honor pfoasc-
The Court: Objection sustained. Just ask him what route 
he took there. 
Q. Go a.head and tell the j'ury the whole thing now .. 
A. I went over on Third and Fra.uklin, crossed over thc-
west-the north side of Third Street and Franklin Street,, 
went up to Third S'treet;: I got there,. the light was setting· 
right for me to cross-
Mr. Wicker: Wlmt was- thatr 
page 72 f The Court: '' The light was: setting right for me 
to cross" is what he said. 
A. (Continued) -I clidn 't see anything-
Mr. ·wicker: I see 1 I get it .. 
A. (Continued) -and I started across. 
Q. What side of Franklin Street were you on? 
A. I was on the east-of Franklin! 
Q. Yes. 
A. I was on the nortll side. 
Q . .All right, sir, and in which direction were yon walking! 
A. ,vest. .. 
Q. All right, sir, go ahead. 
A. I started to cross. I got about mid-way of the street.. 
It was a car come up around tI1e corner on Franklin Street 
west, but me being past the middle of the street-and I looked 
to the right to see if it was anything coming; it was nothing· 
coming at all. About that time I heard something, looked 
around, and the car was hitting me. No chance to get out of 
the way. I tried to go on top to keep it from going on top 
of me. That was always my motive, always said I would do 
that; I would try to go 011 top of a car and not let it hit on 
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top of me. Of course that is the first thing that struck me, 
for to go on top. I tried to g·o on top, and throwed myself 
around, you know, and throwed my feet off of it, 
page 73 ~ so it wouldn't get on me. It throwed me. I got 
over on the fender, though. They finally got me 
off. Pushed me up there. I hurt my shoulder, strained both 
Rhoulders, the muscles. Hurt my sl10ulder as bad as my leg. 
It has g·iven me more trouble. He stopped-
Q. Who are you talking about now1 Who is it stopped? 
The car that hit you t 
A. The man that hit me. 
Q. All right. 
A. I think that is the man over there (indicating). 
Q. Go ahead, now. Relate what happened. 
A. He backed off and g·ot out and come over there. About 
that time he got out the heacllig·hts shone across the street; I 
could tell the car was moving; I wanted to stop him. I didn't 
know what that fellow would do. I knew he had hit me, but 
just what he would do I didn't know. I was watching both. 
1 wanted to stop that man if I could. And he stopped. I 
didn't know the man, never spoke to him before he come to 
the hospital in my life. I didn't know him. 
Q. Now, go ahead. 
A. His son, I never talked to him. I didn't know either one 
of them personally. Never talked to either one of them. 
Q. Now, :Mr. Newsome, who are you talking about how: The 
man that hit vou or the man that testified here this morn-
ingf ., 
A. ]\fr. Berry, the man whose car stopped and helped me 
up. . 
page 74 ~ Q. All rig·ht, sir. Now go ahead and tell what 
happened after that. 
A. He stopped and helped me, Mr. Berry, helped :Mr.-I 
can't say his name-
Q. Sanders f 
A. Mr. Sanders, helped me up and put me in his car. 
Q. In whose cad 
A. In that man's .over there. 
Q. The car tl1at hit you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Now, irr. Newsome, what was the first thing· 
iliat Mr. Sanders said to you¥ 
A. vVell, I ain't certain about it. He said something when 
he come and put his lmncl on me. I don't know for certain 
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whether he said: '' Are you hurt!'' or '' How badly a.re you 
hurt?'' But he said one or the other. 
Q. Said one or the other·)? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right. Then what did you sayf 
A. I told him, yes, I was hurt. 
Q. And what else did he say·? 
A. l don't know· whether he said anything. 
Q. What did he do'? 
A. Mr. Berrv come over then~ about that time and he asked 
him., to help him get me in the car. 
page 75 ~ Q. Then what did he do 1 
A. He helped me in the car. 
Q. vVhat did they do after you got in the cart 
A. He said he was gohig to bring me to the hospital, the 
:Memorial. 
Q. Memorial Hospital? 
A. I told him not to do it. 
Q. Why didn't you want to go to Memorial Hospital? 
A. (To the Comt) "Well, Judge, that is my lawyer, but I 
think that is a question that I-
The Court: Do you withdraw the question? 
Mr. Rudd: Yes, sir. You don't have to answer it. 
Q. Had you heeu in Memorial Hospital before! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right, r,;ir. And you dicln 't want to go back there? 
Yon didn't want to go back there ? 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. All right. ·what did he do wl1en you told him not to 
take you to l\Iemorial Hospital¥ 
A. I told him where to take me. 
Q. Where did you tell him to take you? 
A. To the Retreat. 
Q. What did lie say then? 
A. He said, all rig-ht, he would bring me up there. 
Q. Now, relate what conversation occurred be-
page 76 ~ tween yon and him, if any, on the way up to flip 
Retreat Hospital. 
A. He g·ot tllree or four squares from ,·vhcre he started. 
He says to me, he says: '' I am just doing; you a favor." 
Mr. "'\Vick.CY: Excuse me. ·wm you repeat that? 
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A. ''I am just doing you a favor.,, 
The Court: '' I am just doing you a favor.'' If you gen• 
tlemen can't hear, just say so. 
Q. Go ahead, :Mr. Newsome. 
A. I asked him what he meant 
Q. You asked him what he meant by iU 
A. Yes, sir. He says: ''I just picked you up and take you 
to the hospital.'' 
Q. Go ahead! 
A. I said: "The Devil you say." (Pause.) I have for-
got it. I don't know. I may get it. I know: "You belong 
to take me there. 1 ' 
A Juror: What was thaU 
Note: Reporter reads: ''You belong to take me there.'' 
A. ( Continued) So he went about three or four squares 
further; he says to me, he says: '' ,vhy did you get over on 
the fender of the car?" 
Q. Go ahead. 
A. I told him, to keep him off of me. 
Q. To keep him off of you f 
A. Yes. To keep the car off of me. 
page 77 ~ Q. Go ahead. 
A. He taken me on to the hospital with no more 
words said with him. He taken me on to the hospital, and 
the darkies come to take me out. 
Q. Now, what happened at the Retreat HospitaH 
A. Oh, he got out. Drove on :Mulberry Street. 
Q. Drove on Mulberry Street! 
A. Yes. Stopped and got out and come over to the street 
west of it, went around the corner, was gone a little bit, and 
lie come back and said they didn't have any room. The gfrl 
that was in the car riding with him come over-
Q. Did she get out too? 
A. She got out. 
Q. At the Retreat! 
A. Yes, and they walked up Mulberry Street toward the cor-
ner, south corner. 
Q. The south corner¥ 
A. Y cs. They were up there for-I reckon it must have 
been-they mm,t have been up there about five minutes; it 
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seemed like ten or fifteen to me, but I don't reckon it was 
over five. And the nurse come out the front, and looked, and 
come out on the sidewalk, and looked at the car, looked up 
the street, saw them standing up the street talking, and she 
went up there towards them, but she stopped before she got 
to them. I turned around in the car. She stopped 
page 78 ~ before she got to them. I think she said some-
thing, but whatever it was I don't know,. and she 
come on past and went back in the Hospital. They stayed 
up there 15 minutes and then come on hack and got in the car 
· and come on down to the Memorial Hospital. 
Q. Now, what else was said, if anythi11g1 between you and 
Sanders or the young lady on the way down to Memorial 
Hospital? 
A. Well, I didn't hear the lady say anything, talk to him 
or me, either, all the way down there. 
Q. What about Sanders! 
A. I told him to take me over on Grace Street to the hos-
pital on Fourth Street. 
Q. You mean 400 West Grace! 
A. Yes. 
Q. What hospital is thaU 
A. That is-it is-I don't know; it is one there. 
Q. All rig·ht, go ahead. 
A. He drove all around but never did come by there. 
Q. Never did go by there Y · 
A. No, never did go hy there. He come on down to Me-
morial. 
Q. Go ahead, now. v\That happened at l\femorial? 
A. vV ell, two da rkies come out and took me out. There 
was nothing said. He never said nothing to me. 
Q. Now, how long were you in :Memorial Hospital, l\Ir. 
Newsome? 
page 79 } A. Five months. 
Q. How were you injured? Tell the jury just 
what part of you was hurt. 
A. My shoulders was hurt, and my leg broke. 
Q. And what treatment was given to you? ·w1iat did they 
do to yon°! 
A. They .treated my fog, but I never was given any treat-
ment, any at all, for my arm, as long as I stayed in tl1e hos-
pital That hurt me over three months. They had to feed 
me. I couldn't feed myself. But give me no treatment for 
neither rnv hand nor mv shoulder. 
Q. Now: :Mr. Newsome, let me ask you this question: Diel 
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.A. Yes. 
Q. Relate the circumstances. 
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A. The Sergeant brought him down there. He talked with 
me for a while, but he didn't as much as say-
Q. What did you say to him f • 
A. What? 
Q. What did you say to him? 
A. It was something said about hitting me, and I told him 
it wasn't any use to try to g-et out of it, because there was 
no possible chance, because there was no other car passed 
tbere, neither way, from the time I entered the street until I 
left there. So it was oblig·ed to be. It was no 
pag·e 80 ~ chance at all. I told him that. 
Q. "'What did he say1 
A. He didn't sav nothing. Neither denied it nor affirmed 
it. . '-' 
Q. Have you falked to him at all-f 
A. The Serge-ant says, he says: "That is the old man," he 
says, "and it is no use to try to fool him", he says, "you 
can't do it". He says: "No use to try to fool that old 
111an. '' 
Q. Is that the lnst time you have had any conversation with 
M:r. Sanders? 
A. Yes, I think 80. 
Q. Now, Mr.-
A. He dicln 't come clown there but once. If he did, I dicln 't 
see him. 
Q. Mr. Newsome, was this a painful injury that you re-
ceived 1 
A. Certainly. 
Q. Tell the jury whether or not it was painful, and if so, 
just describe whatever you felt, as well as you can. "'Where 
was the pain? 
A. In both shoulders; the muscles in my leg; my muscles 
strained to death. The doctors do,vn there told me, what 
they told me, says: '' They were strained,'' he says, '' every 
muscle in here,'' he says, '' in your shoulder was strained to 
death.'' 
Q. Now, did you have any pain in your leg? 
page 81 ~ A. Yes, I had pain in my leg. 
Q. How long did these pains last! 
A. Oh, they lasted-I suffer frqm them yet. 
Q. How long did you have a cast on your leg! 
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A. Well, the first one, it stayed on there about three 
months. Took that one off and put another one on. 
Q. How long was it before you could walk? 
.A. 'fhat stayed on there about a month, or something like 
that, near a full month, that cast. 
Q. How long was it before you could walk! 
A. What do you mean, on crutches"? 
Q. Yes. 
A. It was about four months before I walked on them. That 
iR, it was over four months when I walked on the crutches. 
Q. Now, how ean you walk now 0l 
A. I can walk all right whel'e it is level. 
Q. ·what? 
A. Where it is level. 
Q. Where it is level 1 
A. Yes, sir. Not rough, I can walk pretty good. 
Q. Diel you use a cane before this injury 't 
A. No, sir. .Never did. 
Q. You have to use 0110 now'? 
A. Yes, I need it. I walk around the house, but if I go on 
the str~et I have to have a cane. 
page 82 ~ Q. Now, :i\Ir. Newsome, were you able to walk 
all rig·ht before this accident? 
A. Yes, sir. ·walked auywhere I pleased. 
Q. Now, on the nig·ht that this thing· ltappcned, were vou 
sick that ni!~ht at all ·f ~ • 
A. No. 
Q. Had you boen sick prior to that 1 
A. I wou]dn 't say real sick, except one trouble that I used 
io have, knocked me out for a day or two. 
Q. What was that t 
A. ~rhat was-the doctor called it apoplexy. 
l\Ir. \Vicker: Apoplexy? 
A. Apoplexy. 
Q. How did that affect you t 
A. I w·ould go to sleep, and sometimes I would not be able 
to wnke. 
Q. I didu 't get that a11swc1·. What? 
Note: Answer read l)y the reporter. 
A. I would he out of mv head when I waked. 
Q. All right. Go aheacl, sir. 
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.A. That is the only trouble that ever bothered me. Other-
·wise I was perfectly in good health. 
Q. Did you ever have fainting spells and fall out f 
A. Never had one in my life~ never fainted in my life. I 
have never fell out nowhere. 
pag·e 83 } Q. Did you ever fall out in the street at any 
timef 
.A .• No, sir. 
Q. Did you ever fall out in the yard 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Ever fall out at home f 
A. Yes, I have been out in the house; fell down in the 
house; I would get up; had one of those spells, got up and 
tried to walk; I would fall; but never have fallen in the yard. 
Q. Had you had any of these spells at this time this thing 
happened¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you been treated for thaU 
A. Oh, yes, I had been treated. 
Q. Where were yo.u treated i 
A. I was freated down at the Government Hospital. 
Q. Whereabouts 1 
.A. Down at Hampton. 
Q. Down at Hampton f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ancl were vou discharged from that hospital I 
.A... No, sir. ~ 
Q. ·what happened 1 
.A. I left there. 
Q. '\Vhen did you leave there 1 
A. As soon as I could get on my feet. 
page 84 } Q. Had you been all rig·ht since you left there t 
A. Yes, all right. 
Q. Had you had any spells? 
A. No, I had not. 
Q. Now, 1\fr. Newsome, will you tell these gentle1nen what 
your expenses have been as a result of this accident? How 
much have you paid t "T]iat sort of hospital bill, if nny, have 
you paid Y 
A. I paid the hospital, Memorial, $385.00. 
Q. You have paid J\fomorial $385.00? 
A. I have paid out that amount in expenses. 
Q. Do you owe them any more money? 
A. I have l1ad $30.00 doctor bills since 1 come out. 
Q. You sa~,.. you have about $30.00? 
90 
A. Yes. 
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Q. To whom did you pay that Y 
A. I paid $10.00. I owe $20.00. 
Q. You paid $10.00 to whom, to the doctor at :Memorial? 
A. No, no. I can't think of the name of the-here it is. 
(Witness reads envelope.) I can't reach that hand out, you 
see, no further than that. 'rhat is the farthest I-that is as 
ffl.r as I can reach tbnt hand out. I can't straighten it out. 
I can stick it up this way, and I can straighten it-get it up 
like that, you see; I can straig·hten it, hut if I get it high 
up, I can't straighten up. 
pag·e 85 ~ Q. Could you straig·hten that'?-
A. That is as far as I can straighten it. 
Q. Could you straighten it all rigllt ?-
A. And getting· it high, I can't straighten it; I can't get it 
up to my head; I can't carry it up there. I can carry this one 
up, you see. 
Q. Could you straighten this arm out before you were hurt? 
A. TI1at lrnrts in the muscle! 
Q. Could you straighten tllis arm out b~fore you were bmtr 
A. Sure. I had perfect use of it. Perfect use of it. 
Q. This is a bill from Terrace Spring Clinic for $20.00. 
A. Yes. Yes, I paid him $10.00. 
Mr. vVicker: It doesn't say when. T suppose l1e- This is 
the bill you. got after you paid $10.00, isn't it? 
Q. You say you originally owed owecl $30.00, and you paicl 
$10.00, and this is a biII for $20.00? 
A. Yes. 
Note: Bill in question marked "Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2" 
and filed in evidence. 
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Harry W. Sanders v. Lucius Newsome 











ALL .. WORK DONE A.ND CREDITS RECEIVED 
AFTER THE 28th WILL APPEAR ON NEXT 
MONTH'S STA'rEMENT. 
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE M:ONTijLY 
page 87 ~ Q. Now, do you owe Memorial Hospital for a 
bill! 
A. They sued me, got judg111ent for $325.00. 
Q. Sued you and g·ot judgment for $325.00 ! 
A. Yes. 
page 88 ~ 
pitaH 
Q. Do you know who sued you? 
A. Memorial Hospital. 
Q. Do you know who represented Memorial Hos-
A. A fell ow-his name is-
The Court: Is that material, gentlemen I 
Mr. Rudel: All right, sir .. 
A. I dicln 't get his name-
The Court: ·well, that does not matter. 
Q. Now, have you had any of these spells that you tell us 
a bout since this thing happened? 
A. \Vell, I was bothered with one the other clay, not so had, 
some effects of it, you know, but not but what I was perfectly 
safe in every way, any place you put me, I was all right. 
],ound mysclf-
Q. What time of day do these spells generally hit you? 
.A.. Oh, in the morning. 
Q. In the morning t 
A. Yes. Any time I get on my feet, always after I get on 
my feet, get something to eat, get some sug·ar in my system, 
I do all right. I am myself, perfectly all right. 
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Bv Mr. "\Vicker: 
page 89 ~ ·Q. Mr. N ewsorne, you were talking about these 
spells, which you say the doctor called apoplexy. 
You say you were at the Government Hospital; that was just 
about two or three mouths before this time that you are talk-
ing about there when 1\fr. Sanders picked you up, wasn't it f 
A. Yes, I left there about three months before. 
Q. About three months before'? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then you were treated at Grace Hospital just about 
a month before, we1~e11 't you "l 
A. Yes. 
Q. For about four days? 
A. Yes. I had that thiug tested out, that same trouble 
tested out, to see what it was, to sec if it was any chance of 
finding out what had cam.;ed it, and anything I could do to 
prevent it, keep it off. 
Q. See if there was anything you could do to keep off these 
spellsf 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, a bout four years ago, which would have been a 
little over three years before your accident, you were in :Me-
morial Hospital for about two weeks, wcren 't you 'f 
A. Hasn't that heen long·er than that t 
Q. No, sir. 
A. I think it has. 
pag·e 90 ~ Q. ,Vell, sta tc your recollection; how long· do you 
th ink it has been 1 
A. It has heen five or six vears. I know· it hasn't been 
less than five. · 
Q. Five 01· six yea rs, not less than five f It was around 
Christmas time, wasn't it? The time I am speaking of is 
around Christmas time. 
A. Yes, it was Christmas day. 
Q. That wRs the time ,vhen you had a speU, when you were 
at home, and you fainfod and became unconscious, and your 
4 neip;bbors nncl the police broke in the l1ouse and found you 
unconscious and took you to the hospital; isn't that right'? 
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A. You say that I fainted? 
Q. Didn't you'? 
A. I asked you, did you say so? 
Mr. Rudd: He didn't understand your question. 
93 
Q. He asked me. ':11hat is my information, yes, sir. That 
jg my information from the hospital records, that you be-
came-
A. Then your information is wrong. 
Q. All rig·ht, then, tell us what is right, will you? You 
asked me; I am telling you from the hospital records. 
A. I didn't faint. I never fainted in my life. I told you 
that. 
Q. Did you get unconscious ·f 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't faint, you just got unconscious1 
page 91 }- All right. And the neighbors and police broke in 
and found you unconscious and took you to the 
hospital; isn't tha.t right f 
A. Yes. The neighbors-
Q. And you stayed there about two weeks 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Ten days or two weeks? 
A. I stayed there 14 clays. 
Q. Fourteen days? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is all rig·llt. Now, you say if you get sugar-the 
trouble is if you get where you need sugar, that is what 
makm, you unconscious, is it f 
A. Vv ell, that is, the la.ck of it, of course. Is that-
Q. 1Sir? 
A. The lnck of it is what makes it come that wa.v. 
Q. The lack of sugar in your system? ,, 
A. Yes, sir. That is what the doctors say. 
Q. That is wlmt the doctors say1 Now, where had you 
been-Let me see; you had had these spells for a good many 
yea rs, hadn't you? 
A. Yes, sir, I have been lmving- them for a good while, but 
11evcr have been out on the street. 
Q. 1Sir? 
A. Never have been out on the street but once, 
1mg-c 92 ~ and I was rumtlng· a truck; I parked the truck up 
against the sidewalk and sat in it. And-
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Q. "\Vhat did you sit in? 
A. And alwa.ys-
Mr. Rudd: -wait a minute. Let him answer the question. 
The Court : You all stop talking and see if he has got 
anything else to say. 
Q. G-o ahead, :Mr. Newsome. 
A. You understood-
Q. ·wm you go ahead, Mr. Newsome? Just tell us about 
it. I didn't understand where you said you-
The Court : He said be sat in a truck. 
Q. You never were taken but one time out on the street r 
A. Never had a spell on the street. 
Q. Yes1 
A. Never in my life, a.t no time. 
Q. And on that one occasion you went to a truck and sat 
down; is that right 1 
A. I was in the truck, diiving the truck. Can you hear 
that¥ 
Q. Yes, I think I can hear now. 
A. All right. 
Mr. Rudd: Now, l\Ir. Newsome-
Mr. Wicker: Let him go, l\fr. Rudd, please. 
The Court: One minute. I a.m going to ad-
page 93 }- journ for lunch now. Gentlemen of the jury, do 
not discuss this case with anvone or let anvone 
discuss it in your presence. ~fr. Newsoine, you are oi{ the 
witness stand, so don't you discuss it with anyone. And if 
you gentlemen ( to the jury) in going to lunch, have to p;o 
hv Second and Franklin streets, do not make any observa-
tion there at all. It is best that you do not g·o by. If it is 
necessary to see the corner at a later time I will let you go 
UR a juryw 
Note: Here foJiowed recess for tl1e lnnch l10ur, after which 
the plain"tiff resumed tl1e witness stand. 
The ·Court: All riglit, go ahead, now. 
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By i\f r. "Wicker: 
95 
Q. Mr. Newsome, the night you got hurt, I think you said 
you started out from 17 South Third Street. 
A. That is right. 
Q. Is that where you were living? 
A. Yes, that is right. 
Q. I beg your pardon? 
A. ~l.1hat is rig·ht. 
Q. Now, did you have anybody with you when you started 
out? 
A. No. 
Q. You said you started out to go to a drug store? 
A. Yes. 
page 94 ~ Q. Now, 17 South Third; that is the other side 
of Main Street, south of Main, isn't it 1 
A. Yes. Yes. 
Q. And were you g·oing to some parti~ular drug· store, some 
Hpecial drug store t 
A. Yes. I was p:oing to the drug store on the corner of 
Rccoud and Franklin. 
Q. Second and Franklin f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you had then been out of the hospital just about a 
month; isn't that righH 
A. I think it was about six weeks, the best I remember, 
a bout six weeks. 
Q. You were going to, the drug- store to get some medicine? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And when you got to the corner of Second and Franklin 
vou looked around to see if the wav was clear before vou 
started across the street, did you? . ., 
A. Yes, sir. Yes. 
Q. vVha t traffic did you see f 
A. Traffic? 
Q. ·what automobiles did :vou see? 
A. None at all. It wasn't any passing either way. 
Q. You looked, of course, straight ahead, which 
page 95 ~ would be looking down on Franklin Street between 
First and Second; you looked that way and dicln 't 
sec anything; is that right 1 
A. On Franklin 7 I didn't see it was anything· on F!ranklin 
but Second Street was the one I was watching. 
Q. What is that f 
A . .Second Street was the street I was watching-. 
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Q. You were not watching· :B,ranklin, but you watched Sec-
ond? 
A. Both. 
Q. Both ways ·t 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there was no automobile m sight either on your 
right or on your left; is that righU 
A. Over here, 110. 
Q. I see. Is that right? There was no automobile either 
on your left on Second Street or on your right? 
A. It was one south of Franklin coming· up toward-
Q. That went up which way? 
A. Coming up towards Franklin. It was the only one in 
sig·ht. 
Q. There was only one in sight¥ 
A. That is all I seen. 
Q. And then you started across f 
A. Yes. 
Q. vVhen did you: start f Did you start ·when he was corn-
ing up? "\Vas he still coming· when you sta rtecl across f 
A. Yes. 
page 96 ~ Q. Still coming: when you started to cross '1 He 
was coming· then towards you from your left, as 
you were going west and he was coming north on Second; 
is that rightf 
A. Yes, that is rip;ht. 
Q. Now, I believe you said in ans,vor to a question from 
Mr. Ru<ld-he asked vou what was the first time vou saw 
Mr. Berry's car, and ·1 think you said that while );Ou were 
either-while vou were down on the street or while vou were 
trying; to get {1p, that you saw the headlights of :Mr: Berry's 
car coming town rds you and you told :Mr. Sanders to stop 
him; is that l'ight f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't say thatf 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't say that? 
A. I ain't Raid that. 
Mr. "\Vicker: If Your Honor please, I would like to have 
the reporter read M 1·. Newsome 's testimony on that point-
I Irnve consulted with the reporter on that-so as to refresh 
hiH memory on that point. 
The Court: An~·v objection, l\Ir. Hucld 2 
Mr. R.ucld: That is all right. 
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Note: Previous testimony of plaintiff on direct examina-
tion read, as follows: 
page 97} "Q. Go ahead, now. Relate what happened. 
'' A. He backed off and got out and come over 
there. About that time he got out the headlights shone across 
the street; I could tell the car was moving·; I wanted to stop 
him. I didn't know what that fellow would do. I knew he 
had hit me, but just wliat he would do I didn't know. I was 
watching both. I wanted to stop that man if I could. And 
he stopped. I clidn 't know the man, never spoke to him be-
fore he come to the hospital in my life." 
By Mr. Wicker: 
Q. That is right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The first time you saw Mr. Berry's car, then, was when, 
as you testified there, after you were hit, :Mr. Sanders had 
gotten out; you say Mr . .Sanders was helping you and you 
saw the headlights of this car which turned out to be Mr. 
Berry's car comhlg across the street 1 
A. Yes-I don't know-
:Mr. Rudd: If Your Honor please~ 
A. (Conthmed) I don't know about that being the first 
time I saw the car or not. 
Q. You don't know 1 
A. It might have been him coming up to Franklin Street 
when I firRt started across t.he street; I don't know; 
·page 98 ~ I couldn't say. I wouldn't attempt to say. 
Q. You don't know f 
A. Because I don't know. 
lh,. the Court ! 
·o. Which car are you talking about now, Mr. Newsome? 
A. Talking about l\Jr. Beny's car. I don't know for cer-
tain wl1ether be was-that was him just coming up, or whether 
tl1c1 man was still standing- over there-
Q. All rig-ht. 
A. -or if he had gone around. 
The Court: Is there anyt.liing you want to say, n[r. Rudd? 
1\fr. Rudd: I just want to point out to Mr. Wicker tha.t 
~s I nnclen;tood tlie evidence read by the stenographer a 
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moment ago,. Mr. Newsome did not say that that was posi-
tivelv the first time that he had seen Mr. Berry's car . 
.M;.. ·wicker: He says he doesn't know whether it was 
or not. He doesn't know whether the car that was c.oming 
up Second Street was the car that he afterwards saw after 
the accident. 
A. That is right. 
Q. You tlon 't know whether that was the one or not; that 
is correct~ 
A. I couldn't sav .. 
Q. Y ~u couldn't say f 
page 99 ~ A. No. 
Q. All right. Now, as a matter of fact, as you 
stn rted across Second Street, weren't you feeling a fainting 
spell or unconsciousness coming over there! 
A. Ko, sir, I did not. No. 
Q. You are sure of thaU 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you were struck-Were won struck f Did it 
knock you down 1 
A. Knocked my feet up from under me, sure. 
Q. And knocked you clown to the ground¥ 
A. I fell over on the fender. On top of the car. 
Q. You never did fall down on the street at all T 
A. Oh, yes, I got down. 
Q. Now, was it a hard blowf :Much force¥ 
A. It must have been pretty hard. 
Q. It must have been prett)~ hard f 
A. But I think it ca.used my strain, trying to lift the car 
and keep the cnr from getting on me. 
Q. Now, Mr. Newsome, when you had these spells that 
have made you unconscious that you have testified to, differ-
ent spells that you were unconscious, how long would you 
be unconscious 'f Different times, or sometimes a. Ion~· time '2' 
.A.. It depended altogether if I got proper treatment. '-'If thev 
would feed you-if anybody-if they are feel and 
page 100 ~ gave sugar, I would soon get on my feet all right. 
Q. If you were fed sugar! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, in these spells, after you would regain conscious-
ness, and you were no long·er unconscious, you couldn't tell 
on those occasions l10w long you had l)een unconscious, could 
yout 
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A. Yes, I could tell you pretty year, yes. 
Q. You think you could always tell f 
A. Yes, I could tell you pretty near. 
Q. Could you tell whether you had been unconscious a little 
while or a long while? 
A. Yes, I could tell that. 
Q. Mr. Newsome, did you ever swear out any complaint 
ag·ainst Mr. Sanders for careless and reckless driving or 
anything· like that? 
A. No. I employed Mr. Moss and turned it over to him. I 
expected him to look after it. I didn't bother with it. Thought 
of it as little as possible. 
Q. Did you see this car that you say hit you? Did you 
see it enough to tell anything· about it, what kind of car it 
was, or anything like that? 
A. ,v ell, no. 
Q. You did nott 
A. I couldn't tell you anything about it, the car, what kind 
of a car it was. 
page 101 ~ Q. Couldn't tell f 
A. Dicln 't pay no attention to the car. I know 
it was a five-passenger car. I know that. Two seats. 
Q. You mean the car that Mr. Sanders took you in to the 
hospital in afterwards, that was a :five-passenger car¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. But I mean at the time you were bit, this time you have 
described of a car coming around and hitting you; you 
couldn't tell what kind of car it was, could you, at that time? 
A. I don't like to say. I don't understand you. 
Q. I mean, when did you first see the car, tl1e car that hit 
you, when did you first see that? 
A. Well, some man was standing at the corner when I 
started across the street. 
Q. It was standing still at the corner when you started 
across the street? 
Mr. R.udd: No, l1e didn't say that. 
Mr. ,vicker: Just a minute. Please let me have my cross 
examination. 
Q. Is that what you said or not? 
Mr. Rudd: If Your Honor please-
The Court: Let me hea1: that objection. What is the ob-
jection? 
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l\Ir. Rudd: Go ahead. 
pag·e 102 r A. Yes, he was standing at the corner. 
Q. And that was the first time that you saw 
the car that you say hit you? 
A. No, that car standing a.t the corner when I started to 
cross the street, whether he is the one that hit me, I don't 
know that. 
Q. Whether he was the one that hit you, you don't. know 
that 1 The car that \\'as standing at the corned 
By the Court : 
Q. The car that you are speaking of now that was stand-
ing· at the corner, that you have just been speaking of to 
Mr. ·wicker, was that on Franklin Street? 
A. That was oyer on Franklin Street. 
Q. All right. And at what. corner was it standing? 
A. On the west corner. 
Q. The corner west? 
A. Yv est corner. vVest. 
Q. By "west" do you mean the west side of Second Street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right. 
A. Tba t is what I mean, the west side. 
By Mr. ·wicker: 
Q. And that was facing east at the time? 
A. Yes. ·whether it was two there I coulcln 't say; it might 
have been two. 
page 103 ~ Q. It might have been two there, you couldn't 
say? 
A. I wouldn't sav. 
Q. All right. Timnk you . 
.Bv the Court : 
·Q. \Vben did you next see the car then, if you did see it 
again, that hit you, wlrntever car it was? 
A. The one that hit me? 
Q. Yes. You said you saw a car or maybe two cars on 
IBlranklin Street, on the west side of Second Street, headed 
east. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you said yon saw this when you started across Sec-
oucl Street. 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, when did you next see the car, whatever ear it 
was, that hit you? 
A. That it actually hit me; it was nearly on me; I couldn't 
get out of the way of it. I tried to go on top. 
Q. All right. 
A. In the act of hitting me, Judge. I got to the middle of 
the street, across the middle of the street ; I looked to the 
right, towards Broad Street, or Grace Street, to see if there 
was anything coming· down the other side, because I was 
crossing, in the middle of the street, clear of the east side 
of Second Street, which oug·ht to have been safe for a man 
drivinl}, any way except coming on the right side; 
page 104} and I looked that way, and while I was looking 
I couldn't see nothing at all. About when I looked 
this car was hitting- me; I tried to g·o on top of it and throwed 
my feet around to keep it from getting on me. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 105} BEECHER E. STALLARD, 
a witness introduced on behalf of the plaintiff, 
being· first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Rudd: 
Q. You are Mr. Beecher E. Stallard, a. practicing attorney 
at the bar in Richmond, Mr. Stallard? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Stallard, did you represent the Memorial Hospital 
in a collection of a medical hill against Mr. Newsome? 
A. Y cs, I did. 
Q. ·wm you state to the Court and jury, please, sit, what 
the amount of that bill was, 
A. The full amount of the bill, which ran from November 
22nd, 1939, until April 23rd, 1940, was $683.15. Mr. Newsome 
paid on that four separate payments which amounted to 
$357.85. That was tlie balance clue to the hospital which I 
took judgment for: $325.30. 
Q. So tl1at-
A. At the pre8ent time he owes the Medical College of Vir .. 
tdnia-
-· Q. How much'? 
A. -$325.30. 
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Q. •For which you have-1 
A. Taken judgment. 
page 106 ~ By the Court: 
Q. The Medical College of Virginia and the 
:Memorial Hospital are the same thing t , 
A. .. The- Medical Colleg·e of Virginia is a State institution-
Q. That is what I said, and it is only one hill t A. Only one bill. It operates the Memorial Hospital. with 
the Medical College of Virginia. 
Bv :Mr. Rudd: 
., Q. Mr. Stallard, let me ask you this while you are on the 
stand: Are you familiar with the vicinity at Second and 
J!,ranklin 1. 
A. Yes, sir, I practice law within about a block and a half 
there. 
Q. I see. Will you please tell the Court and jury whether 
that is predominantly a business district 01· a residence dis-
trict? 
A. It has been an old residential district, but I would say 
at this time that it is strictly a business distriet. 
CROS1S ~XAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Wicker: 
·Q. Mr. Stallard, you mentioned that judgment for $325.00~ 
I believe that the matter was taken up with you all with the 
idea that if an. agreement could be reached you all would be 
willing to take-what was it; was it $200.00--? 
:Mr. R,udd. Now, if Your Honor please, I don't 
page 107 ~ know that that is material. 
Tbe Court: TI1e objection is sustained. 
Mr. Rudd: Tl1e judgment is a legal debt against Mr. New-
~ome for the full amount. 
Mr. \Vicker: That is wbat I asked vou before we came into 
Court, whether you had any objection, and I didn't under-
stand you-
The Court: .Anything further from Mr. Stallard? 
· l\Ir. Rudd: No, sir. 
vVitne~s stood aside. 
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Mr. Rudd: That is the case for the plaintiff. 
The Court: The plaintiff rests. 
Mr. Rudd: I want to file this statement that Mr. Stallard 
has testified from. 
Note: .Statement in question marked "Plaintiff's E,xhibit 
No. 3" and filed in evidence. 
page 108 ~ PTFFS. EX. NO. 3. 
F'orm 17-4-26-40-10:M. Richmond, Va., April 23, 1940 
BILL PAYABLE WHEN PRESENTED 
l\Ir. Lucius B. Neusome 
2008 Powhatan Street 
To THE MEDICAL COLLEGE OF VIRGINIA, HOSPITAL 
DIVISION Dr. 
Services To Self 
10 Room and Board From Nov. 22 to Dec. 2, 1939 
Rate R.00 
143 Room and Board (From Dec. 2 to Apr. 23, 1940 
R.ate 3.75 
4 Private Nurses Board Night From Dec. 14 to 
Dec. 17, 1939 Rate .70 
incl. 
Private Nurses Board From to Rate 
Private Nurses Board From to Rate 
Pre~criptions 
Delivery Room Service 
R.outine Laboratory 
Special Laboratory 4.00 2.00 2.00 
Operating Room Service 5.00 15.00 
X-rav Examination 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Dressings 
Emerg·ency Room Service 
Physiotherapy Treatments 
Basal Metabolism or Electrocardiogram 
l\fisce11a.neous Crutches 
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TH:US BILL DOES NOT INCLUDE THE PHYSlCIAN'S 
OR SURGEON'S FE,E 
page 109 ~ Mr. "'\:Vicker: If Your Honor please, would you 
be good enough to excuse the jury for a few min-
utes I 
The ·Court: All right, sir. You gentlemen come into my 
office. You gentlemen of the jury can move around. 
Note : At this point the Court and counsel retired to 
chambers. 
page 110 ~ IN CHAMBERS. 
The Court: All right, sir. 
Mr. ·wicker:· Now, if Your Honor please, I want to make 
a motion to strike the evidence in this case. I base that mo-
tion on the plaintiff's own testimony taken in the light of the 
testimony of the two eyewitnesses at the scene. A.nd the tes-
timony that I refer to is, first, tl1e testimony of the two eye-
witnesses as to Mr. Sandel's. Your Honor will recall that 
each one testifipd he saw this car, which turned out to be the 
car driv<m by Mr. Sanders, coming east on Franklin Street 
while they were south of :B,ranklin facing north on Second, 
waiting- for the light to turn; that the car of Mr. Sanders 
came right on do,vn Franklin, was up Franklin a little ways 
when they first saw it, and that it came on down Franklin, 
and just before the lig·ht turned it swung around into Second, 
making a left turn into Second Street, and suddenly stopped, 
and he g·ot out. 
No,v, the testimony of the plaintiff is that the first time 
that he actually saw the cnr which he says hit him he is sure 
of is when the car actually was hitting him, and was rig·ht 
on him, either hitting- him-I couldn't understand whether 
he said hitting· him or just about hitting· him, and he climbed 
up or tried to climb up on it. He testified specifically that he 
saw one car, possibly there might have been an-
page 111 ~ other one, he could not say whether it was one or 
maybe two; he knows he saw one car; as he 
Btarted crossing- the crosswalk, and saw that car when it was. 
sfanding still on Franklin Street, the car facing east. H(~ 
further says that 110 can not say whether or not that was the 
ra r, or either of them, that hit him. 
Kow·, in view, of course, of the well known fact that the 
plaintiff's caso can not rise above his own testimony, it seems 
to the defendant's counsel that his own testimony, taken along 
with the testimony of his own witnesses that there was no 
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traffic whatsoever., no other cars whatsoever at the time, 
makes it very clear that any finding· ag·ainst the defendant in 
this case would be based on mere conjecture and surmise, 
and directly in the face of the plaintiff's own conflict with his 
own witnesses, they saying that .Mr. Sauders' car came on 
down at 15 to 20 miles an hour and swung right around; the 
plaintiff saying that he saw this car standing over there, and 
he did not know which car hit him; which makes it just as 
likely, to say the least, that the car which actually hit the 
plaintiff was one of the cars, either the one or one of the two, 
whichever was the case, that was standing at the corner, 
and that car actually hit him and went on, leaving him lying 
there in the street, Mr. Sanders coming on then later and 
swinging around, seeing him there, seeing· the man there in 
the street, stopping, going over to help him. That 
page 112 ~ is particularly so because we have here a man who 
admits his record that he was subject to spells 
of unconsciousness; denies that he ever fainted, but I don't 
know what difference there is. He lapsed into unconscious-
ness when bis sugar got low in his blood, sometimes a long 
period of time, sometimes a short time. 
Those things being true, with his own testimony, it seems 
that there is an absolute failure or lack of identification, and 
his impression of Mr. Sanders, the man that carried him to 
the hospital, is really the only testimony that we have. He 
savs that the man who hit him was tl1e man that carried him 
to· the hospital. And Your Honor will probably recall that 
tbe plaintiff also testified he felt sul'e that this was the car 
tlmt hit him because there had been no other cars around 
there. That was the testimony he gave when he was telling 
his conversation in the hospital when Lieutenant Bosquet 
was there, and when Mr. Sanders came down, that there were 
no other cars there, and that therefore :Mr. Sanders' car was 
hound to have been, was "oblig·ed ", I think the language was; 
his car was obliged to have been the car that hit him. 
Now, it is a well known fact, of course, that a man becom-
ing unconscious-I think the Court will almost take judicial 
11otice of the fact that a man becoming unconscious, wl1en he 
resumes consciousness, it comes back to him, in 
pag·e 113 } the average case he has no idea how long he has 
been out. If he is given ether, many a man given 
ether, operated on, hours later comes to and is of the impres-
sion that he never has been given ether and inquires when 
his operation is g·oing to start. A man who has fainted or 
lost consciousne8s might very easily have the impression when 
11e comes back to consciousness that, having been hit by an-
other car, it had just occurred that minute, just that second 
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oefore. So, if this was a man who was not g,iven to those 
spells, it might be different; there might be some loophole. 
Reiterating, on his own testimony, it was very much in con-
Hict with itself; some parts of it in conflict with others, where 
he first states there was no other traffic at all1 and when he-
stated that he was waiting, when the light turned, and he: 
started across ,vhen it tumed green-he stated first that there 
was no other traffic; now he states that there was one, or 
possibly two cars over there, standing still, facing in the op-
posite direction; and he further states that he does not know 
whether one of those two was the one that hit him or not. 
Now,. the testimony of his own witnesses that he hm~ 
brou~ht in and vouched for is that i\Ir. Sanders' car,. as I say,. 
didn't come up until that green had come on and had almost 
gone off, just befo1·e it changed. Now1 the plain.tiff admits,. 
therefore, that he does not know but what it was. 
page 114 ~ some other car that actually hit him rather than 
the Sande1·s car. 
Mr. Rudd:- If Your Honor please, I think this is certainly 
a case for the jury. There is no evidence whatsoever that 
there was any spell of unconsciousness, or any other spell at 
all. The positive testimony of the plaintiff is that he waited 
to cross nntil the light was with him; that he proceeded on 
ncross the eastem side of Second Street looking for traffic: 
from the left; that after lie had crossed half of the street he 
looked to the right, as he should Irnve done; and that after 
looking to the right he heard something suddenly to tI1e left,, 
and he looked, and there a car was on top of Itim. He states 
positively that the car that hit him was the car that took him 
to the hospital, the defendant 1s car. Not only that, but we 
have the evidence of tbe two Berrvs. Both of them testified 
positively that there wasn't anybody lying in tlle street when 
they drove up tfo~re. That is their positive statement I took 
down; they said they didn 'f see J1im. Jnst like-thev clidn 't 
see anybody walking-- · 
Mr. "\Vicker: I thoug:Ilt they aiso said that if tberc had 
been somebody th<?re thev would Irnve seen him. 
Mr. Rudd: . That is tlle statement that I got. So we have 
p:nt their testimony, their positive statement that there wasn't 
anybody or anything lying in tl1e street when tlley 
page 115 ~ stopped t}:iere. They say tliat this car of the de-
fendant came from the west at a speed of 20 to 
25 miles an hour and made a sudden left turn there, and came 
fo a sudden stop, and when they went around there they found 
:Mr. Newsome leaning· up ag·ainst the car. Mr. Newsome was 
in a place ,,~here he had a rigllt to he in the exercise of due 
care. Under those circumHtances I thin..k tile law is elem· 
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that the case should go to the jury. A case very much like 
this one is the case of McQuown v. Phaup, 172 Va. 419, which 
happened at Davis Avenue and Broad Street, where the Court 
makes some statements very pertinent in our case here. 
The Court: No use to get it, Mr. Rudd. This matter has 
some grave factors in it, but I am going to overrule the mo-
tion. 
Mr. Wicker: I note an exception there. 
Note: At this point Court and counsel returned to the 
courtroom. 
pag·e 116 ~ F. S. "WAKE~.,IELD, . 
a witness introduced on behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By .Mr. ,Vicker: 
Q. You are Officer F. S. Wakefield t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Wakefield, did you and Officer Alexander receive a 
call on the night of November 22nd, 1939, with reg·ard to an 
injury, an accident in which Mr . .Newsome here was injured 
tmd was at the Memorial Hospital¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is your memory clear on that, or do you care to look at 
a copy of the report that you and Mr. Alexander turned in 
that night¥ 
Mr. Rudd: Now-
.A. I think it is clear to me, sir. 
Q. All right. ..Will you state, please- Did you see this gen-
tleman here, Mr. Sanders, that night? 
A. Yes, sir, at the :Memorial Hospital. 
Q. At the Memorial Hospital. Do you know bow long it 
was after the accidenU ,vho summoned you, do you know, 
to Memorial Hospital f 
A. We only got a call by radio. I don't know, 
page 117 ~ sir. 
· Q. When you went to Memorial Hospital, just 
tell whom you talked to, please1 first; not what was said un-
less Mr. Sanders was present. 
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A. I talked to the injured man. Then I talked to :Mr. San-
ders. 
Q. Was l\Ir. Sanders' automobile in the vicinity¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was it "I 
A. In front of the Memorial Hospital. 
Q. In front of the Memorial Hospital, and did .you make 
an examination of his car f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. For what purpose 1 
A. To determine if he had collided with this person. 
Q ... What did you find? 
A. It had .been raining that night; of course the automo-
bile was wet, and the rain stood up on it, but on the left front 
fender it was slick, as though it had been wiped off, and Mr. 
Sanders stated to me there that-
Mr. Rudd: Now, I object to any statement. 
By the Court : 
Q. Was Mr. Newsome lll'esent at the time Mr. Sanders made 
that statement to vou f 
A. No, sir. · 
l\Ir. "\:\Ticker: If he ob.iects to the-
The Court: Do you object to that part of his 
page 118 ~ testimony, Mr. Rudd 1 
Mr. Rudel: I don't know, if Your Honor please, 
what the witness is going to answer, hut it seems to me that 
unless l\Ir. Newsome was there-
The Court: He started out and said: '' Mr. Sanders 
f::aid-'' He got that far, and you said "Objection", and I 
am asking are you objecting now to any further answer 011 
that line. 
l\f r. Rudd: Yes, sir. 
The Court: All right. I am going to let the jury walk 
out, and I will hear wlrnt it was. 
Note: Jury retires from the courtroom. 
The Court: Now, complete the answer. ''Mr. Sanders 
said-'' 
A. -that this slick place on his left front fender was due 
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to the fact that when he picked the man up he leaned him 
against this fender. 
Q. You said the rain had been wiped off there, or it looked 
like the raindrops were not-? 
A. Were not sitting up on that particular part. It was just 
as though it had been wiped off:, sir. 
Mr. Rudd: That is a self-serving declaration, if Your 
Honor please, made in the presence of the other party to this 
action, and I think it is clearly inadmissible. 
page 119 } The Court: The objection is sustained. 
Mr. Wicker: All right. While the jury is out 
I am g·oing to ask the next question and see if you have. any 
objection. · · 
Mr. Rudd : All right. 
Q. I propose to ask the of fleer: Did you find anything 
broken or dented or marked on Mr. Sanders' automobile to 
indicate that it had been in a collision f 
A. No, sir. 
1\fr. Wicker: D_o you have any objection to that? 
1\Ir. Rudd: I think the question should be: Tell the jury 
what marks, if any, you found on the car. 
Mr. Wicker: My reason for that question is-
The Court: You can leave the question in that form except 
i:he conclusion, "to indicate tlmt it had been in collision". You 
can ask if he found any marks on the car at all. I don't want 
you to go so far as to let the jury think that it elicits this 
man's opinion as to whether it had been in collision or not. 
You can ask him if he found any marks or any dents of any 
de:--;cription, or anything· like that. Anything further? 
Mr. "\Vicker : I have one fm-ther question. 
page 120 } The Court: All right. Leave them out. You 
are going to ask another one! 
l\f r. ·wicker: One further thing. 
The Court: I rule that Mr. ·wakefield can sav that he found 
a rubbed place, and :Mr. Sanders told him ho;v it got there. 
That does not mean tllat Mr. Sanders can not tell the jury 
l1irnself how it got there; it can not come to the jury second-
hand~ because it can eome direct from that party. 
Bv Mr. Wicker: 
0 Q. 1\fr. ·wakefield, have you had some years of experience 
in investigating accidents before this f 
A. Yes, sir. 
l 10 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
F. B. Wakefield. 
Q. An automobile of this type, a Ford, if it struck a man 
the size of' .Mr. Newsome a hard enough blow to break his 
leg, what kind of marks would be lefU 
A. It would be an opinion, too, sir. 
Bv the Uourt: 
"Q. Have you had enoug·h experience witl1 automobiles strik-
ing human beings or striking other objects to know how much 
power it takes to dent them or leave any mark 1 
A. Yes, sir, I think I have, sir. 
'11he Court: Gentlemen, if he gets out of the realm of what 
is universal and common knowledge, that is where 
page 121 ~ he can give an opinion. He said he had experi-
ence as to whether a human being would leave a 
mark on that or not. I think it would he admissible. 
Mr. Rudd: His answe1· was that he wasn't going to be able 
to tell-
The Court: I am not interested in that. I am only inter-
ested as to whether he qualifies to express an opinion. Are 
you gentlemen ready to take the witncss1 or does Mr. ,Vicker 
still-f 
Mr. Rudd: You want to go ahead and let him answer that! 
The Court can decide what is admissible and what is not. 
l\ir. Wicke1·: Oh, 110. 
Mr. I-tudd: If Your Honor please, before the jury comes 
back, I would like to ask another question and get the Court's 
ruling on it~ If it is not a fact he bas known of cases· where 
an automobile has struck a large man and broken his leg and 
yet not shown any marks on iU 
The Court: I will let you do that if Mr. ,Vicker asks him 
and be says an impact at such and such a speed will leave 
a mark on the automobile, that he knows that from experi-
ence that that type of radiator or fender would 
page 122 ~ bend, you can ask him whether it can not happen, 
though, without damage, and he will have to an-
swer according to his knowledge. 
l\Ir. Rudd : All right, sir. 
Note : At this point the jury was recalled to the courtroom. 
By direction of the Court the reporter read to the jury that 
portion of l\fr. Wicker's question ruled by the Court to be ad-
missible, as follows : 
''Q. Did you find anything broken or dented or marked on 
l\fr. Sanders' automobile!'' 
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Q. Mr. Wakefield, is it your duty in those cases you inves-
tigate, especially where someone is alleged to have been in-
jured as a result of some movement of traffic, to lodge a com-
plaint, that is, a warrant for careless and reckless driving·, 
or for whatever other offense the evidence may indicate has 
taken place, if any has taken place? Isn't that correcU 
lVIr. Rudd: If Your .Honor please, I do not think that that 
is material. 
The Court : Objection sustained. 
:Mr. ·wicker: vVas the objection sustained t 
The Court: The objection is sustained. I will 
page 123 ~ let him answer in so far as his duty is concerned 
as to making a full and complete investigation, 
but whether he must lodge a complaint or not is not material 
to the isRue in this case. It is material as to how far he is dili-
gent in undertaking to find out everything that has happened, 
hut not what action he thereafter takes. 
Mr. Wicker: All rig·ht, sir. That will be all. 
Mr. Rudd: No questions. 
Mr. Wicker: I might just eliminate this other witness. 
Bv .Mr. Wicker: 
· Q. Vv as Officer Alexander with you when you examined 
the automobile 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Wicker: Will you agree, in order to save us getting 
Officer Alexander, that his testimony would be the same as 
}fr. W a.kefield 's? 
Mr. Rudd: Yes, sir. 
The Court: It is agreed between counsel that Officer Alex-
ander, who is in attendance, but who is in Law and Equity 
Court Part II, being the companion officer with l\fr. Wake-
field when he made his investigation in this mat-
page 124 ~ ter, would testify to the same matters, and his tes-
timonv would be the same as Officer vVakefield '8 
testimony. That is a~rreed, g·entlemen, that you consider that 
the other officer has testified, and his testimony is similar to 
:\:fr. vVakefiekl's. 
"Witness stood aside. 
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a witness introduced on behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly swom, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Ry Mr. Poole: 
Q . .Miss .Morrison, will you state your full name and ad-
dress, 1>lease "? 
A. Marv Eleanor Morrison. 
Q. You "will have to speak rather loudly in order to let the 
jury hear you, with the street cars going by; you will have to 
::;peak rather loudly to them. Mary Eleanor l\forrison? 
A. That is right. 
Q. What is your address~/ 
A. 109 East },ranklin. 
Q. 109 East }.,_ranklhH Miss Morrison, on November 22nd, 
19:39. at a.bout ten o'clock, were you riding in a car which waH 
operated by l\Ir. Sanders 1 
A. I was. 
Q. Miss Morrison, will you tell us as fully a8 you ean ex-
actly what occurred approximately ten or fifteen minute~ 
after you left your home; in other words, starting on your 
wayt 
A. Well, it was about ten o'clock when we left our homc-
Q. A little bit louder, please. All right. 
page 126 ~ A. And as we were leaving the house, au<l 
tumed the corner, well, the lig·ht was green, ns 
I noticed, and as we turned the corner I noticed that lie 
stopped very suddenly. I didn't know· why-. And it was so 
suddenly that I bumped my head on the windshield. 
Q. I don't think these gentlemen can hear you. Can you 
heftr, gentlemen? 
A .Juror: Not so clearly. 
Note= Last answer read by· the reporter. 
q. Now, ~Iiss Jforrison, 110w far is 109 JijlH,t. Franklin 
Street from the intersection of Second m1cl Franklin? 
A. Just H little over half a block. 
Q. About half a lJlock ! 
A. ,Just about. 
Q. We11, wlwu you came from your home, wlicre was l\fr .. 
Sm1ders' car nt that time! 
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.A. In front of my home. 
Q. In front of your home 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You both got in the car tog·ether 1 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Rudd: I obj0ct. That is leading. 
Mr. Poole: I bng your pardon. 
Q. Well, did Mr. Sanders assist you in the cad 
A. I don't remember. 
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car at that time 1 
A. Why, yes. You mean, after we turned-? 
Q. Now, :Miss Morrison, in approaching that intersection 
at Second and F·rank1in, could you tell us whether the light 
there was red or green or ambed I think she said green. 
The Court: She ~mid it was green. 
Q. Now, Miss l\forrison, can you ten us approximately how 
fast you think Mr. Sanders was driving at that time? 
A. Well, J couldn't tell you definitely, but it coulcln 't have 
been very fast, because he was still in second gear. 
Q. I see. Could yon tell us approximately how fast he was 
going when he madl' his left turn going north on Second 
Street? 
A. No, I coulcln 't. 
A Juror: I can't bear. 
The Court: Unless y~u can·raise your voice- . 
Mr. Poole: lf Your Honor please, may we put the wit~ 
lle8S chair over here? · 
The Court: No, I will let it stay where it is. 
Q. You will lul\·e to speak a little bit louder, l\fiss :Morri-
son. 
Note: Last question and answer read hy the reporter. 
Q. Now, Miss l\forrison, were you looking ahead at the time 
)Ir. Sanders was makinp; his left turn there at Second and 
},ranldin? 
page 128 ~ A. I was. 
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Mr. Poole : Can you hear her nowt 
A Juror: That is all right. 
Q. While Mr. Sanders was making that left turn, did you 
see any man at or near that intersection-J 
1vfr. Rudd: If Your Honor please, I object to that. She 
siated that he came to a stop and she clidn 't know why. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
Q. Will you answer the question! 
A. Repeat the question, please. 
Note: Last question before objection read by the reporter. 
A. I didn 't see anyone. 
Q. 1\1.iss Morrison, did you see any other automobiles at or 
near that intersection¥ 
A. As well as I remember, I did not. 
Q. I see. Now, .Miss Morrison, when ~fr. Sanders stopped 
his car, you say you put your hand up over your face? 
A. Well, that was a motion to protect myself because-
after I bumped my head. 
Q. I see. Miss Morrison, did you see any object on the 
north side of this intersection approxinrntely in the center of 
Second Street at the time Mr. Sanders stopped his car 1 You 
will have to talk a little loudly with the street car 
page 129 ~ going by. 
. A. No, I did not. 
Q. I see. WelJ, Miss :Morrison, wlien was the first time 
you learned why Mr. Sanders stopped his automobile as he 
didY 
A. When was the first time 1 
Q. Yes. 
A. When I saw him bending over tu assist in picking up 
something, I didn't kno\V what, and I got out to see what wm; 
wrong. 
Q. I see. You menu you got out of the car 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you g·ot out of the car, Miss Morrison, what did 
you see1 
A. Well, I had to gu around behind the car, and I saw this 
man sitting in a heap in the middle of the street, approxi-
rnn.tely. 
Q. Talk a little bit louder, please. Now·, 'Miss Morrison, 
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you say yon saw the mun was sitting in a l1eap in the middle 
of the street f 
A. ,f ust about, as well as I remember. 
Q. Now, how far was he from the left side of the automo-
bile 1 Can you tell us that f 
A. I would say approximately a foot or niorc. 
Q. A foot or more·? 
A. Yes. 
page 130 ~ Q. Now, you say that Mr. Sandc1·s was trying· 
to help him up, assist him-? 
I\f r. Rudd: I object to that. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
Q. I "Withdraw the question. Miss Morrison, will you tell 
ns what Mr. Sanders wa.s doing at that time? 
A. Well. it seems he was trying to find out whnt was wrong, 
I rying: to assist tlle man to get up, and he didn't realize until 
then tbat--
1\fr. R.udd: I object to that, what he realized. I don't 
think that is evidence. 
The Court: Let her answer. I will either strike it out or-
Finish vour answer. "He didn't realize-" ·what was the 
rest of h that you were going- to say? 
Note: Last question and answer read by the reporter. 
A. He didn't reafo;e until be had l1elped him up that any-
thing was wrong· with him, I suppose. 
1\fr. Rudd: You snppose that f Did I get your answer 
rig·ht, that you ended it up-1 
Mr. PoolP.: Let her answer the question and then make 
yom· ohjection if you wish. 
Note: Last answer read. 
A. vV ell, if anything was wrong with him-
Mr. Rudd: If Your Honor please, I think-
pnge l :n ~ Tlw Court: Objection sustained. The latter 
part of tlmt answer, gentlemen, in which the 
young lady dt·mn;; her conclusions as to wl1Bt Mr. Sanders 
mig·ht have realized; all that part of the answer is stricken. 
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That he was lifting him up, trying to assist him, that is all 
right, and is left in for your consideration. 
Bv Mr. Poole: 
·Q. Now, .Miss :,Iorrison, did you feel any jolt as if the car 
might have come in coutact with any objecU 
A. No. 
Q. Speak loudly if you can. 
A. No, I did not. It was only the sudden stop. 
Q. Just the sudden stop t 
A. That is right. 
Q. :Miss Morrison, <lid you hear any conversation between 
Mr. Sanders and the man ,vho was sitting in a heap in the 
middle of th~ street? 
A. No, I didn't hear anything, because the windows were 
up. 
Q. Now, l\Iiss :Morrison, what happened, what other activi-
ties transpired at the intersection at that time'? Can you 
t.ell me anything about what else happened 0? 
A. Well, then n car came up shortly, and Mr. Sanders asked 
this gentleman to help him assist this man into our car. And 
so we got in and I got in the back seat and WC' 
pag-e 132 ~ drove .. off. 
Mr. Poole ('I.10 the jury): Can you heal' it, gentlemen? 
A Juror: Mighty faint. 
Q. Where did you drive to then, Miss Morrison t 
A.. We chove to the Retreat for the Sick. "'\Ve asked him 
where he wanted to go, but we couldn't get a very clear answer 
at all. 
Q. I sec. Did :i\lr. Sanders ask him who hit him, or was 
there any convm·i:mtion about how the man g·ot in the middle 
of the street·? 
Mr. Rudd: Now, if Your Honor please, I object to that. 
That is leading-. I think the proper question is to ask this 
witness wlwt convergation was had. 
The CouJ't: Objection sustained. 
Q. :Miss l\I 01Tison, was there anything said by anyone in 
Hie car on the way to the hospital about how the man got in 
Uw middle of the street? 
l\fr. Rudel: Now, if Your Honor please, I think that is also 
objectionable. 
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The Court: Objection overruled . 
.Mr. Rudd: }i~xccptiou noted. 
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Q. Now, speak loud enough for the jury to hear you, please. 
A. All rig-ht. Will you repeat that question t 
Q. Was there anything said by anyone in the 
page 133 }- car about how the man got in the middle of the 
strcett 
A. ·why, I don't remember. 
Q. You didn't have any conversation at all? 
A. No, not to speak of. 
Q. Miss :Morrison, this is the gentleman that you took to 
the hospital, is he not'! 
A. Yes, sir. 
(.J. Did he at any time· say anything about how he got in 
the mid<lle of the street? 
A. No, not in my presence. 
Q. I see. Did he in your presence say anything about Mr .. 
Sanders' car striking him ·t 
A. No, he did noi. Mr. Sanders did not strike him. 
Q. I see. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Rudd: 
·Q. Miss :Morrison, do you drive a car! 
A. No, I clo not. 
Q. Neve1· have drinm one? 
A. We11, just s1ightly. 
Q. You have dri vcn slightly? 
A. Yes, just a little, but I don't-
Q. What kind of a ear was this that Mr. Sanders was driv-
ing that night f 
A. It wns a Ford. 
page 134 } Q. IPord? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell us the model, the year ·f 
A. 1939, I believe. I am not sure. 
Q. 1939? It is w1rnt is called a V-8'! 
A. I suppose. 
Q. I see. Have you ever driven that particular car? 
A. I have not. 
Q. Never have! 
A. Never havP.. 
Q. Is that car an old model gear-shift car, or does it have 
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a shift under the steering wheel like the ne,v models have f 
A. It has the old model shift. 
Q. A.n old one, with the staff that goes down into the middle 
of the floor board¥ 
A. That is right. 
Q. Now, 109 East Franklin Street, where you say you 
started out from, is on which side of li,ranklin Street! 
A. It is on the south side of Franklin. 
Q. On the south side of Franklin t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I believe you stated that is ahout half way between 
Second and Fil-st streets t 
A. Approximately. 
Q. Now, do you know, can you tell when a car 
page 135 } is in first gear, and when it is in second gear, and 
when it is in high 1 
A. Yes, I can. 
Q. You have driven enough to know t.he difference f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Aud you tell us that that car was in second gear? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Had the car gotten into high at all f Had :i\fr. Sanders 
put that car into high at all from the time you started out 
until the time that this accident happened f 
A. No, he had not, as far as I remember. 
Q. He had been running in first and second all the way; 
is that right? 
.A. That is right. 
Q. Now, about what speed was that car g·oing when it en-
tered that intersection f . 
A. I would sav about ten or twelve miles an hour. 
Q. Ten or twelve miles an hour? 
A. Yes, approximate]y. 
Q. And I believe you sfated that the windows were up? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So Mr. Sanders didn't give any left-hand signal, ·did 
he? 
A. ']~here was no traffic. 
Q. Well, he didn't give nny left-hand signal, did he? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. How could he have given a left-hand signal 
page lB6 ~ if the windows were up f . -
A. He could have turned it down. 
Q. You just Rtatecl that window was up; is tllat correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. So as a matter of fact Mr. Sanders did not make any 
left-hand signal, did he f 
A. "Tell, I suppose-I don't know. 
Q. But he couldn't have given a signal with the window 
up, could he ¥ 
A. I suppose you are right. 
Q. And the window was up, wasn't iU 
A. Yes. 
Q. He didn't blow his horn, did he¥ 
A. Not that I kno,v of. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember ·Y 
A. No. 
Q. Now, you didn't see that accident at all, did you Y 
A. 'l,here was no accident. 
A Juror: What was thaU 
N otc: Last answer read. 
Q. Is that your answer¥ 
A. What was your question t 
Q. I asked you if it was not a fact that you clidn 't see the 
accident. 
A. I didn't see anything. 
page 1:37 ~ A Juror: Louder, please. 
A. I didn't see anything. 
Q. Was there any frost or fog on the inside of your wind-
shield¥ 
A. I don't l'emem ber. I don't think so. 
Q. That was a kind of a misty, fog·gy night, wasn't it? 
A. Perhaps. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that it was a misty, foggy nig·hU 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. And isn't it a fact that there was a little mist and fog 
on the interior of your windshield? 
A. It could have· been if we lrnd the heater on. 
Q. Was the windshield wiper working! 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember very much about this, do you, l\Iiss 
J\[orrison t 
A. Oh, yes, I do. But some minor details-
Q. I Ree. You don't recall any conversation in the car f You 
rlon 't recall hearing- or seeing- any conversation between Mr. 
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Sanders and Mr. Newsome up until the time when :Mr. San-
ders said: '' Help me put him in the car" f Is that the first 
thing you heard )l 
A. That is rig·ht. 
Q. And that is the only conversation you heard between 
them1 
A. Just about. 
Q. Did you hea.r l\fr. Newsome say: "vVatch 
page .138 ~ my leg""! 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Yon did not 't 
A. No. 
Q. You don't remember, either, any conversation in the 
car all the way up to the Retreat Hospital t 
A. Except asking· him what hospital he wanted to go to. 
Q . .Mr. Sanders asked him that 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did he say? 
A. He said that he wanted to go to the Retreat for the 
Sick. 
Q. I sec. Then you nll drove up to the Retreat for the 
Sick1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, when you got to the Retreat, where did you pal'k? 
A. ·we parked-
A Juror: "\Ve can't hear a word over here. 
The Court: I am not going to ask you to speak any lou<lol', 
but unless you do so I am going to fine yon for not doing so. 
This is a matter of importance to both sides; otherwise we• 
,vould not be here trying it. You arc a witness, and there is 
certain testimony to be told to the jury. The jury must hea 1· 
it. Now, I must require that you answer the questions in a 
tone of Yo ice that will carry to the jury. 
Q. Now, just tell us, Miss Morrison, where you 
pag-e 139 ~ parked when you g·ot to the Retreat Hospital. 
A. \Ve parked at the side entrance. 
Q. That is on the side towards l\Iulhcny ! 
A. I don't know the street. 
Q. The Retreat Hospital, if I am right, is that the corner 
of Grove Avenue and Mulberry! 
A. I don't know where it is·. 
Q. But it is at a corner°? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Harry \V. Sanders v. Lucius Newsome 
.1.11,iss Mary l!Jleanor llforr-ison. 
121 
Q. And the main entrance is on Grove Avenue, but there is 
au entrance on· Mulberry Streett 
A. Well, the side entrance. 
Q. As I understand your testimony, you drove around to 
the night entrance on Mulberry Street, the Mulberry Street 
entrance, and stopped there f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you stop on the side of the street next to the hos .. 
pital or across the street! 
A. Next to the hospital. 
Q. Next to the hospital ~1 And then what happened f 
A. Mr. Sanders and I got out and ·went inside. 
Q. Both of you went in1 
.A. Both of us went in. 
Q. And what happened inside t 
A. We went up to the Superintendent's desk 
page 140 ~ and told her that v?e had a man out there, that 
someone had hit, and we asked her a bout the case, 
and she went out with him and falked to the gentleman, but. 
couldn't get anything very distinct out of him to understand. 
I was in the hospital while they were talking to him. 
Q. Now, after you and .Mr. Sunders came out of the hos .. 
pital, you walked down to the corner, didn't you t You and 
i\Ir. Sanders left Mr. Newsome iu the car and then you and 
Mr. Sanders walked down to the comer; is that righH 
A. Vie came out of the hospital and got into the car. 
Q. Didn't you, before you went into the car, walk down, 
you with Mr. Sanders, to the corner a moment, and then come 
hack to the car? 
A. T don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember that? 
.A .. No, sir. 
Q. You wouldn't deny that you did it, would you t 
A. We were on the side street, nnd they had a side entrance, 
~o we Game straig;ht down there. 
Q. \'Vhat I am getting- at is this: Tsn 't it a fad that before 
you got back in the car, you and :i\Ir. Sanders walked down 
to the corner and stood there a moment talking, and then 
eame back and p;ot in tl1e car and drove clown to :Memorial J? 
A. No, I don't remember. 
Q. You don't remember thaH 
page 141 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. You wouldn't say that that didn't happen, 
would you? 
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The Court: Objection sustained. You have been over that. 
Q. Now, on the way down-what made you decide to go 
down to Memorial Hospital f 
A. Well, on the way down Grace Street, we were coming 
down Grace Street, we still didn't know where to take him, 
and he was so vague in the way he was talking, we couldn't 
understand where he wanted to go, and we had Heveral hos-
pitals on Grace Street, but neither one of them was the one 
where he wanted to go; and it being closer to the Memorial, 
we were getting closer all the time, we decided to take him 
there. 
Q. So you took him on down to the Memorial Hospital t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that is all you know about iU 
A. That is all I know. 
Witness stood aside. 
HARRY ,\r ... SA.NDERS1 page 142} 
follows: 
the defendant, being first duly sworn, testified as 
DIBEC'r EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. ·wicker: 
Q. Now1 Mr. Sanders, in answering the questions please just look toward the jury and speak loud enough so that the 
Court and the jury can hear you without any difficulty. 
A. All dght1 sh. Q. You are the defendant in this case f 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is your full name and where are you employed, 
Mr. Sanders f 
A. Harry W. Sanders. I am employed at the Joseph W. 
Bliley Funeral Home at Third and l\Ia rs ball streets. 
Q. Spea~ a litt~e more slowly, please; not quite so rapidly . 
.A. All right, sn-. 
Q. On this nig·ht that this case is about. )"OU were driving 
an automobile; do you own that carf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \:Vhat kind of car w·as itf 
A. It was a Ford coach, 19:39 model Forcl. 
Q. 1.939 Ford? 
A. Ford. 
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page 143 t A. Green. 
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Q. Now, will you tell the Court and the jury, 
please, just what occurred from the time you started out with 
Miss Morrison from her home until you stopped. 
A. All rig·ht, sir. Gentlemen, it was1 about ten or ten-thirty 
on November 22nd, and the car was parked on the south side 
of East Franklin Street near the residence at 109 East ,Frank-
lin. We had just been to Broad .Street Station to carry some 
friends to the train. ,-,..,re ·Came back down and sat in the car 
for a moment, and then we went right on from there. I 
started up the motor and went right--pulled off from the curb 
very slowly, just about between-a little over a half a block, 
approximately half a block from the traffic lig·ht at Second 
and Franklin. I pulled off from the cnrb in low g·ear, very 
cautiously, as I usually do. There were no cars behind me 
at all. I have a side view mirror on my ear, on the left-hand 
8ide, where the driver sits, and the gfass was practically up, 
-maybe about an inch to keep any moisture of any kind ac-
cumulating, any moisture which gathers inside of the g-lass. 
The approach was a normal one, as you usually come to a 
corner. I was still in second g·ear. The light was green 
with me, and I passed directly under the light, and my car 
started to make, the turn; it was no objects in the 
page 144 ~ walk that I could see. ·when I made the turn, 
when I got nearer, coming up into Franklin 
Street, two lig·hts were going from right to left. ·when I got 
past, about in the crosswalk, just immediately I saw a heap 
sitting· there, from my side, through the side glass, which was 
flat on the ground. It was another car sitting at the lig·ht ou 
the right, coming north on Second Street. As anyone would 
naturally do when you see an object in the road, you stamp 
on your brakes. My car didn't touch Mr. Newsome. I didn't 
hit the man, and no parts of the car came in contact with l\Ir. 
Newsome. When I stopped, my front wheel hub cap was not 
quite-approximately the center of where this person was 
standing-sitting; he was about a. foot and a half to two feet 
from my car. I immediately jerked up my emer~·ency brake 
and hopped out and went over and shook the man. First I 
clidn 't know what it was. It wa.s all crouched over jn that 
fashion, something like, his legs out, his head over like that. 
It. was a black overcoat, and was just a little pile there in the 
street. And my car was a foot and a half or two feet from 
him, not touching him in any manner, in any shape, and hacl 
not touched him. I g·oes over and shakes the man. I have seen 
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ambulance patients and I know all about them, because I 
have been in the business a good while, possibly nine or ten 
years, and I thought possibly someone had passed 
page 145 ~ out there, passing along, and had an attack or 
something. I shook and shook and couldn't get 
anything out of him. He was very limited in conversation; 
the only thing I got was probably a. groan. I started pulling 
him up and assisting· him up. I was overbalanced and fell 
lmck against my fender, and he turned, slipped over on the 
fen de 1: too. A bout that time Mr. Berry had stopped along 
tlwre, in frout of the car; we were both resting on my fender, 
which we hncl fallen back on. Mr. Berry said: '' Put him in 
my car." I said : "Well, I have my car. I will take him. 
It is nearest.'' So he and his son assisted me around to the 
door and placed Mr. Newsome in my front seat, beside me, 
and Miss :Morrison sat in the back. I pulled away at normal 
speed. I still had not obtained his name or anything; couldn't 
get it. In fact, when we get a,--when an occurrence like that 
happens, like in ambulance service, we always try to g·et the 
person to the: hospital as soon as possible. I didn't know he 
had a broken leg until we picked him up. His legs were-I 
could tell it when I stm·ted pushing· him up; his legs were out 
ir1 front of him. He was lmck here, and we were resting 011 
the car. 
After he was sitting in the car we proceeded on clown and 
I started down Grace Street toward Memorial Hospital. I 
couldn't get anv hospital out of him; I didn't know what to 
think, an<l I knew Memorial wai,; verv well 
page 146 ~ equipped, and they lia.ve a lot of doctors and all 
there. So I thought I would carrv him on down 
there, which was approximately the nearest place and it was 
convenient. So I was talking to him all the time; I says· 
"w· ell, I think I will carry you to the Memorial." He says: 
'' ljh-uh; no,'' thn t way. I liad been talking- to him an the 
time trying to ohtain his name. I says: "I was just trying 
to gTant you a favor, picking· you up." He seemed to be verr 
n1mreciative at that time. Finally Im said something about 
'' Virginia Hospital.'' I didn't know anythinµ; about anv 
Virg'inia Hospital. After I said something about Memoric.11 
Hospital he Haid ''Virginia Hospital." I ·didn't know anv-
thin~· nbout it. if he bi1d known it. I had to stop the car to 
hear him mumble it; I turned around after p;oinp; down to 
Seventh Street, turned around came on hack on Franklin, 
shnted to ca 1TY him to the Retreat, which he neve1· mentioned. 
At that time he had no sense of directions, which was west 
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nnd which was east, or where the location of any hospital 
,vas. So I carried him to the Retreat. I pulled up at Mul-
berry Street, at that side, at the ambulance entrance, where 
you usually carry patients in. I saw the Superintendent. 
Miss Morrison and I went in, because I didn't know what-
the man seemed to be· in a coma and delirious ; I wasn't going 
to leave her in the car with him in there. And I told the 
lady at the desk-she got the Superintendent and 
page 147 ~ I told them what had happened and so forth, about 
me picking up the man. She says: ''If you will 
~ign the- bill-'' I says : I can't sign the bill, I don't know 
anything about it. I was just doing the man a favor, as a 
good Samaritan." She says: "I can't take him in here. 
You carry him to the Memorial.'' I says : '',Suppose you 
come out and talk with him,'' and she went out there, and 
she tried to talk to Mr. Newsome at the time; she couldn't 
very· well get anything out of him. 180 we finally found what 
his name was, whati his name was at tha.t time. And she was 
verv courteous. I says: "I don't know wlmt to do." And 
d1/ says: "I suggest you carry him to the ·Memorial,?' and 
lie would speak up when we mentioned the Memorial and 
didn't want to go to the Memorial. So we came back, left 
1\fulberry Street, came on over to Grace, the road by St. 
Luke's Hospital, St. Elizabeth's Hospital, and Grace Hospital. 
on the way back to Memorial. And when I got in front of 
n hospital I says : '' This hospital?'' He would look around 
and say: "No," "uh-uh", something· like that. Couldn't 
p:et anything out of him. So I carried him to tlle Memorial 
Hospital. I drove to the emergency entrance, as the officers 
stated; my car was sitting- there when they came; it hadn't 
l)een moved. I got a. couple of internes to come out and get 
him out of my car. Thev came out and I assisted him on a 
stretcher, out" of the car. vVe go into the hospital; 
page 148 ~ we come back out; told the nurse what happened, 
and so forth. And he savR: "You were the one 
tlrnt hit me.'' That is the first time 1;c accused me of it. Be-
fore that 11e ,vas very· appreciative. 
0. Verv what f 
A. Appreciative. And that is the first time it came through 
llis mind that I bad hit him, that. he had intimated I had hit 
l1im. And we approxirnatelv had him in the car a.n hom·, or 
an hour and a half, liad elapsed. It was possibly almost 
twelve at that time, a quarter of twelve. Carried him to the 
]10spita.l and smv t.lie nurse. and talking- to her all that time 
:md trying to learn who hit him, and so forth; about him, and 
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how he happened to be there. .A.t that time I asked the nurse 
to call the officers to come and examine my car. They called 
the officers and I waited outside at my car, and when they 
came in I told them who I was and the whole story, of how 
I picked him· up, and how I assisted in bringing him down 
there. And at that time the officers looked at my car. Yon 
gentlemen have heard l\ir. \Vakefield tell about the marks on 
the car. They in turn made a report· at headquarters. 
Q. You said there were marks, on the car;l 
A. No. liJxamination of it showed there were no marks. 
Q. No marks? 
A. Dents, abrasions, broken glass, or anything. 
page 14-9 ~ But it was a slick surf ace on the left fender, see, 
as the Officer said a while ago, us he started to 
state, but he was overruled, about the slick surface; the rain 
wouldn't stand up on the fender. That is the spot where I 
and 1\1.r. N ewsorne had leaned against the fender and 
brushed it off, but there was no abrasion. The headlights 
of the 1939 Ford were in the fender-
Mr. Rudd: If Your Honor please, I think it. is going- into 
argument. 
The Court: You can tell how the headlig·hts were in all 
right condition . 
.A.. Yes~ sir; 110 broken g-Iass, scratclws or abrasions of mi;r 
kind. 
Tlw Court: .A.11 rigllt .. 
A. }iverythiug· was very satisfactory at that time, and he 
told m0 to go ahead, not to worry about it. That fa the onlY 
thing I knew until later, the detectives came after me, an~I 
it started. 
Q. Now, Mr. Sanders, I want to ask you to make a couple 
of points clear. ,viien you saw Mr. N cwsome in the street, 
sitting or lying· in the street there, did you see him out of 
vmu windshield? Out of vour window or out of vour wind-
shield f • ' 
A. Out of my side window; I was looking at an angle, see, 
just before I-
page 150 ~ Q. At an angle to your left? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Indicating· to your left? 
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A. Yes, sir, making the turn, it was on my left. Miss Mor-
rison or anyone else sitting on this seat couldn't have seen 
it, as the object was on the ground. 
Q. Was there any traffic visible coming behind you, coming· 
towards you, or in your line of travel that would cause you 
to put out your hand or to sound your horn when you started 
to make your turn Y _ 
A. No, sir. As I stated, I had a side view mirror on my 
side; you look in the mirror to see traffic behind you. There 
was no traffic behind me. I had not met a car, but there was 
one standing on my right on :Second Street. 
Q. On your right, 
A. On my right, yes, headed north on Second Street, which 
I later found out was Mr. Berry, who assisted me in putting· 
Mr. Newsome in the car. 
Q. Now, you said that a.fter you stopped and got out-
that your car had not struck Mr. Newsome, and he was then 
about a foot and a half or so from your car, away from your 
carY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And opposite the hub cap. By the way, do you mean in 
front of it, to the left of your car, or in what rela-
page 151 ~ tion to your car; which direction Y 
A. Well, Mr. Newsome was on my left. This 
is the front wheel of my car, rig·ht here (indicating); and 
he was sitting right in the crosswalk, about a foot and a half 
from it. 
Q. For the record, for the sake of the record and the jury, 
you mean a foot and a half west of your car? 
A. West of my car. 
Q. Your car was facing then in what direction f 
A. Fac.ing north, on Second Street. 
Q. And you can say that you are positive that your car 
did not hit the man Y 
A. Definitely positive. 
Q. Definitely. When you say you immediately jammed on 
your brake, what kind of a stop did you make? 
A. A very sudden stop. The car was only three months 
old. and it was in perfect. shape. It didn't have to go any 
distance to stop because I wasn't driving fast. I was still 
in second gear, as I stated. Possibly I didn't go but just two 
or three feet; a short distance; about half the length of the 
car; maybe not tha.t. 
Q. Two or three feet? 
A.. Yes, two or three feet. 
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ci. Now how about Miss :Morrison on that stop? Did the 
' sudden stop have any relation to Miss Morrison, 
page 152 ~, or did she have any relation·to the sudden stop! 
A. Oh, yes. It was so sudden that-she was 
sitting· on the driver's seat, right side, and she banged her 
head on the windshield. 
Q. Didn't injure her f 
A. No, just stunned, possibly, for a moment or so. 
Q. Mr. Sanders, you said a couple of times that the man, 
Mr. Newsome. while he was riding with you there, seemed 
very appreciative. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Explain a little what you mean by "appreciative". 
A. Well, I talked with him, and couldn't get anything out 
of him. I asked him what hospital, and so forth, and I says: 
''Well, I am trying to help you.'' He says : '' I know you 
are. I .appreciate that a lot." I says : "I can't ride you 
all nig·ht or anything, I want to g·et you to a hospital." And 
he .says: "Well, all right, take me to Virgfoia", and l never 
heard of Virginia Hospital. I never heard of it. I clidn 't 
know where it was. I asked him the location, but couldn't 
get anything out of him other than something about he didn't 
know. Pointed out in the ·west End. 
Q. Now, let me ask you: You heard his testimony f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you hear him testify that when you said something 
to him about doing him a favor that he replied: 
pag-e 158 ~ '' The Devil you say. Yon belong· to take me to 
the hos pita]'' f 
A. No, sir: he 1ie,~cr did say that much, sir; di<ln 't say any-
thing· at all. As I stated, the first time that he ever intimated 
or evt~r accused me of striking· him was in the 1\ifemorial Hos-
pital, the time after we put him on the stretcher and he had 
been in tl1erc about five minutes, and I was outside there, 
and one of the orderlies came out there and said sometbing 
about it, and I asked him to call the police to examine mv ca'i· 
and ]ct him talk it over witl1 them and make, a positive identi-
fication tfoit no accident happened with that car, that I had 
1rnt struck 1\l r. Newsome. 
Q. No-w, you heard ·the testimony of Lieutenant Bos<Juet 
that-when lie came to you and asked you to g-o down with 
him to see Mr. Ncrw~ome at tl1e hospital h-./o or three days 
afterwards-
A. Yes, Rir. 
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Q. That you went down, and that Mr. Newsome, there in 
bed, said that you were the one that hit him; that if yon 
were the one that brought him to the hospital, then you were 
the one that hit him, you were obliged to be the one; no other 
car there; something like that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that you didn't argue with him or say anything7 
·what have you to say about that? 
A. Well, I always have respect for age, and 
page 154 ~ not only that, anyone sick in the hospital-it 
wasn't a time to argue or talk with him at that 
time at all. The best thing was to go al1ead and leave him 
as he was. 
Q. Mr. Sanders, Lieutenant Bosquet testified to question-: 
ing· you some several days after you picked this gentleman 
up and took him to the hospital, and testified just to one 
statement, which was that at one time you said if you hit him 
you didn't know anything about it. I think that is a .correct 
quotation: "If he hit him be didn't know anything about 
it.'' What have you to say a.bout that? 
A. Well, I don't like to argue with officers or anyone else 
pertaining to the law, because he, like other detectives, tries 
to put pressure on you : '' So you hit him,'' and so forth, 
when I know definitely I didii't touch the man with my car, 
didn't come in contact with him. I wouldn't argue it. I told 
him that. .And he said Mr. Berry saw me l~it him. I said: 
''I will go with you, and let's get Mr. Berry and let him state 
it again to me.'' So we in turn go over to Gamble's Hill 
Park, where Mr. Berry is employed, and find him, and Mr. 
Berrv in fact stated in front of the detective that he did not 
say that. 
Q. \Vhat was your statement, then? How did it come in 
about if you hit him you didn't know anything about it T 
A. I don't remember saying· tlrnt. I am positive I didn't 
say it. 
pag-e 155 ~ Q. You wouldn't deny tllat, of coui~se; if Lieu-
tenant Bosquet says you said it, you wouldn't 
deny that? 
Mr. Rudd: Suppose you let him deny whether he said it 
or not. I understood he did deny it. 
Q. I say, you don't deny that you said that? What did you 
mean by the statement-! 
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Mr. Rudd: I understood that he did deny that he said it. 
Q. What did you mean by the statement to Lieutenant 
Bosquet that if you hit him you didn't know anything about 
iU 
Mr. Rudd: Now, if Your Honor please, I <lon 't think-
Just a moment. I think he ought to ask-I don't understand, 
if he asked this witness if he admitted saying that-
The CoUl't: Now, ask first if be said that. 
By the Court : 
Q. Did you say that: "If I hit him I didn't know anything 
about it¥'' 
A. Well, not at the time, no, sir. I may have said this: 
They were positively identifying· and said that Mr. Berry 
saw me hit him; I said-
Q. Who told you that t 
A. Lieutenant Bosquet or somebody else up there; t11ey 
came up there to question me about it, see 1 So he asked me-
he said: ''You must have hit him; he was there.'' 
page 156 ~ I said: '' If I did, I didn't know anything about 
it." That was just an expression. He said: 
''Well, this other man has positive proof that you hit him.'> 
I said: "Let's go over and get him, which I know that 1 
didn't hit him. n · 
Q. So when you went over and questioned him, then it 
turned out, you say, that l\ir. Berry said, just like he told 
here in Court, that he did not really see Mr. Newsome llit? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court : 
Q. Did the officers, Wakefield and Alexander, come imme-
diately to the Memorial Hospital and examine your car while 
it was there! 
A. Yes, sir. The car had not been moved. It was sitting 
right at the entrance to the emc~gency room. 
Q. Diel they talk with l\fr. Newsome while tl1ey were there! 
A. Yes, sir, he went in to see Mr. Newsome. 
Q. All right. 
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By Mr. Rudd: 
Q. Mr. Sanders, where were you going that nigntf 
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A. Well, we were driving· over on Broad Street to get a 
Coca-Cola. 
Q. You were going over to Broad Street? 
A. That is right. 
Q. "'\Veren 't you in something of a hurry "l 
page 157 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q . .You remember seeing 1'fr. Berry's car, do 
you, standing at Second, sout]1 of Franklin f 
A. At the time I saw it I clicln 't know it was his car, but I 
learned later from him that that was his car that was parked 
n t Second and Franklin. 
Q. Now, your windows were up, were they f 
A. No, sir, the driver's window was cracked about tliat 
much. 
Q. 1So :Miss Morrison is incorrect when she says that the 
window was up f 
A. They were approximately up, I mean, cracked, like that, 
iust to keep the residue of anything· from forming on the 
inside. 
Q. Hadn't it already started to form upon it, a little fog 
on iU 
A. Well~ just as I stated, we had been to the Broad Street 
Station and had stopped the car, and in that length of time 
I had wiped all of that off the windshield, t11e side, where I 
could see good. 
Q. You wiped it off f 
A. Yes. ·· 
Q .• Just before you started f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Just before you pulled away from 109 East Franklin 
Streett 
A. Ye~. It wasn't enough to notice. It was 
page 158 ~ just a sliglJt. amount. 
Q. How long· liad you remained stationary at 
109 East Franklin Street? 
A. Oh, approximately five minutes. 
Q. About :five minutes¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Just talking? 
A. Just sat., yes, sir. 
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Q. And in that time a little fog had collected on your wind-
shield? 
A. No fog had collected on the windshield, no, sir. 
Q. Didn't you say you had wiped it off 1 
A. No, just the side glass where I was sitting near. 
Q. You mean the side window? 
A. Yes, the side window. 
Q. None in front, though? 
A. Oh. some had collected on the side window. My vision 
in front ·was perfectly clear as it could be. 
Q. Now: when you got to the interse-ction there to make a 
left turn, did you make a left-hand signal! 
A. No. sir. 
Q. Did you sound your horn f 
A. No. sir. 
Q. Vl ere your lights in good condition? 
A. Yes, sir, burning bright. 
page 159 ~ Q. Did you look to see whether the way was 
clear to make a left turn there before you started 
acrossf 
A. Yes, sir. I looked over to my left there until my lights 
got there. That drug· store, that is, about between ten and 
ten-thirty-the lights were dim in the drug store; the streets 
were shady; I didn't see anything until just before I got to 
this object, which I saw out of the side, left g-Iass, on the 
driver's side. I immediately jammed on my brakes and 
stopped in the position that I told you. 
Q. You didn't sec 1\fr. NewRome, then, until you got right 
there on top of him? 
A. I didn't see l\fr. Newsome at all. I saw an object in 
tlie street before I got to t11e object, which later turned out 
to he Mr. Newsome. 
Q. You clidn 't see that object until you got right up on 
ion of it, did you Y 
A. vVell. yes, sir, I saw-made a quick stop when I saw it; 
nrnrle a quick stop. It was all l1eaped up in one pile. 
Q. But :vou didn't sec him until you got right up by him; 
iR that right? 
A. No, sir. not right up by him. 1 hnd-I saw him in t1d-
va11ce possibly approximately from here to tlmt table before 
I stopped. 
Q. v\Then you g·ot as close as from where you are to the 
fable; you never saw 11im until you got that close to him, did 
yonf 
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page 160 } A. Sir t 
Q . .You never saw him until you- got as close 
as that to him? 
A. From here to the table f 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, that is about how far I went; the car rolled prob-
ably-necessarily before you put your foot on the brake, ana 
probably-you stop suddenly, and probably the car went that 
far. 
Q. How far was he from the front of your car when you 
first saw him f 
A. How far was he from the front of my car when I first 
saw him? 
Q. Yes, sir. 
A. I didn't see him until-the object which later turned 
out to be him was sitting in the crosswalk. He never came 
in contact with the front of my car at all. 
Q. Won't you answer my question, please, Mr. Sanders 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Rudd: Will you read the question¥ 
Note: Question read : '' Q. How fa.r was he from the 
front of your car when you first saw him?" 
A. He wasn't in front of my car at all. He was over to 
my left when I was making the turn; it was approximately, 
well, I would say-I would say from here to the other end of 
tllat table. 
The Court: About ten feeU 
page 161 } Q. About ten feet before you saw him? 
A. Something- like that, yes, sir. 
Q. And if you had kept on going; you would have run over 
him, wouldn't vou? 
A. No, sir. I was going left, to the rip;ht of him. I stopped. 
vVhen I stopped the car he waR a foot and a half or two feet 
from my wheel. 
Q. And you were ma.king a left-hand turn 1 
A. That is rig·ht, yes, sir. 
Q. Wouldn't your left rear wheel have hit him if you had 
kept on going 1 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. How fast were you driving, Mr. Sanders! 
A. I was in second gear. About ten to twelve miles an 
hour. 
Q. Now, how soon did tl1e Berry car come across theret 
A. Vlell, the light was green, and I reckon it was approxi-
mately-he had to wait for the amber to turn on and then 
he had to get set, ready to go; I would judge probably about 
30 or 35 seconds. 
Q. vVhy <licln 't you make some explanation to either Mr. 
Berry or his son as to your finding Mr.Newsome in the street! 
A. At the time that l\fr. Berry assisted me in picking him 
np I didn't know of any injury. Not only that, I wasn't 
Hable for it. It wasn't my business to make any explanation 
to anyone. I was just acting as a good Samaritan, 
page 162 ~ and instead of standing there I got him to the 
hospital as early as possible. 
Q. So that is why you made no explanation at all to i\fr. 
Berry about finding the man in the street T 
A. I didn't know Mr. Berry and I didn't have to be in con-
versation with him. My car was sitting there and in the 
meantime some other cars bad driven up, and I pulled on 
off after they got him loaded. I often go out to get ambu-
lance patients, and we never talk to anyone in the accident, 
anything· like that, at the time. My only thought was to get 
him to the hospital and make him as comfortable as possible, 
after I found out that he happened to have a leg injury. 
Q. Mr. Sanders, why didn't you tell Lieutenant Bosquet 
that you did not llit him, Mr. Newsome? 
A. Well, Lieutenant Bosquet, as I told you before, the 
whole conversation when he came up there, he says: '' I am 
going to put a charge of careless and reckless driving against. 
you,'' trying to mak(l me admit that I hit him, and, gentle-
men, which I didn't do. I said: "If it is anything else-
I. don :t want to go to Court, never have been in court, any 
v10lahon of the law at all. I want to go over and get this 
straig·l1tened out." He says: '' Mr. Berry saw you llit him." 
I savs: "Who is Mr. Berrv?" I didn't know who Mr. Berrv 
,, was at tliat time, and I still didn't until we wei{t 
page 163 ~ over to see Mr. Berry at Gamble's Hill Park. 
Q. What did you and Miss Morrison talk about 
when you walked up to the corner and left Mr. Newsome in 
the car at tl1e Retreat for the Sick Hospital 1 
A. "\Ve didn't walk up to the c.orner at all, sir. The onlv 
time that we walked was when we g·ot out of the car and w·c 
went in tl1e hospital to see the Superintendent. 
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Q. Then ]\fr. Newsome is wrong when he says you did? 
A. YeR~ sir. 
RE-DIRECT ~JXAMINATION. 
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By Mr. Wicker: 
Q. Just one quest.ion that I had overlooked: l\fr. Sanders, 
was there any charge ever brought against you for careless 
and reckless driving or anything else in connection with this 
accident to Mr. Newsome? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. That is all. 
A. Gentlemen of the jury, all I have to say is-
Q. Wait just a minute-
Mr. Rudd: Let's see what it is. 
A. Gentlemen, all I have to say is-
Th~ Com·t: No argument; that is objectiona.ble. If it has 
any factual relation to the accident and does not draw any 
conclusions, you can tell that, anything· that happened, if you 
want to. 
page 164 }- A. As you would do, and as I would do, that 
saw anyone in the street; you would have stopped 
nnd picked t]1em up. If I hadn't stopped, Mr. Berry would 
have said that I was a hit-and-run driver, and as I stated, I 
got accused of hitting the gentleman, with all the loss of 
time and expense that I }rnve g·one through. 
The Court: That is stricken out. He can state he saw 
llim in the street and picked him up because if he had seen 
him and gone off he might have been accused of llit-anct-run. 
He has a right to say tl1at; but the question of expenses and 
Joss of time is not. in issue before the jury. 
A. All right, sir. 
"'Witness stood aside. 
Mr. Wicker: The defendant rests. 
The Court: The defendant rests. 
Note: At this point the Court and counsel retired to cham-
bers for consideration of instructions. 
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Mr. vVicker: I move again to strike the evidence on the 
grounds previously set forth. 
The Court: The motion is overruled. 
Mr. ,Vicker: I note an exception for the reasons hereto-
fore stated. 
Tbe Court : Mr. Rudd tendered in evidence a 
page 165 ~ card. Mr. Wicker objected to its admission. Upon 
the Court's advising counsel that the Court was 
going to state wl1y it was sustaining· Mr. Wicker's objection 
to the introduction of the card, Mr. Wicker withdrew his ob-
jection. So the matter stands before the Court upon :Mr. 
Rudd's motion to introduce the card into evidence and Mr. 
Wicker's statement to the Court that he has no objection to 
its being introduced in evidence; so the card is therefore in-
troduced in evidence. 
'''WILLIS D. MILLER, Judge.'' 
Note: Card in question marked ''Exhibit A" and filed in 
evidence. 
The Court further certifies that it has been stipulated and 
agreed by counsel for both plaintiff and defendant that tho 
Police Report Card introduced as "Exhibit A", and referret1 
to on pag·es 147-148 of said stenographic transcript, need not 
be copied into the l'ecord but shall be availa hle and mav be 
used in argument in the Supreme Court of Appeals of ·vir-
gfoia as prescribed by law. 
R.. HUGH RUDD, p. q., 
,JOHN J. 'WICKER, ,JR., p. d. 
Teste: this 5th day of .June, 1941, after due notice to plain-
tiff's attorney as required by law: 
,WILLIS D. :MILLER, ,Judge. 
pag;c 166 ~ Virginia: 
In the Law· and }J<1uity Court of the City of Richmond. 
Lucius Newsome 
v. 
Harry W. Sanders 
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The Court hereby certifies that the instructions granted, 
the instructions refused, and the instructions granted in modi-
fied form, and the objections and comments of counsel in 
connection therewith, are shown by the attached stenographie 
transc.ript beginning with line 12 on page 146 and ending 
with all of page 147, and further identified with the signature, 
"VVilliR D. Miller, Judge". 
page 167 ~ Mr. ,vicker: My objection to Plaintiff's In-
struction No. l is that it is a finding instruction 
and makes the def end ant liable so long as just two facts oc-
cur: one, that the plaintiff be without neglig;enc.e on his 
part; second, that defendant's automobile hit him. That 
ignores the fact that there lias got to be more than that; he 
l1as got to p.rove that it hit him through negligence on the 
part of the defendant. 
Note: The following- was subsequently dictated for inclu-
sion in the record at this point: 
Mr. Wicker: The defendant by counsel objects to the ac-
tion of the Court in granting· Instruction No. 2-A on behalf 
of the plaintiff ( this really being an amended form of Plain-
tiff's Instruction No. l, which plaintiff's counsel 
page 168 ~ withdrew upon the @:ranting; of Instruction No. 
'2-A). The evidence in this case is not sufficient, 
nor is it clear enough to warrant the @:iving of any instruc-
tion wl1atever, indicating that the plaintiff was entitled to 
the rig-ht of way at tlw inten,ection of Second and Franklin 
streets. In the first place there is a trnffic light there, and 
the testimony shows that the light was working· at the time, 
and consPqurntly that lig·ht regulated traffic. In tl1e next place 
there is absolutelv no testimonv wlrnteve1.· to show that the 
plaintiff entered 'the intersection p1for to the automobile 
which he says collided with him. °111 the next place the evi-
dence shows that at the time the defendant's automobile en-
tered the intersection the plaintiff was not walking· across 
the street intersection and that the nlaintiff at that time had 
already been injured. Consequently, no question of right 
of way enters into tllis case. Fm·thrrmore, this instruction 
is especially harmful from the defendant's standpoint be-
erinse it puts the Court. in the position of assuming- before 
tlrn jnry that the defendant was in fact the operator of the 
1rntomobile which struck the plaintiff (if any automobile 
actually did Rfrike him), and it further assumes tJiat the de-
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fendant was guilty of not yielding a right of way, which it 
further assumes the plaintiff was entitled to. In other words, 
the instruction is based entirely upon erroneous assumptions 
which are not supported by the testimony in the 
page 169 ~ case. 
· Objection is also made to the inclusion in the 
"dmnag·e instruction" (Instruction No. 4) of any reference 
to mental suffering. So far as counsel is able to recall, there 
is nhsolutcly no testimony whatever indicating any sort of 
mental anguish, but merely physical suffering-. The record 
i8 devoid of any indication that the plaintiff was, because of 
the accident, thrown out of employment, or that he suffered 
any impairment of earning capacity. In fact, the record does 
not indicate that be had any earning capacity whatever, but 
on the contrary the plaintiff's own admissions as to hi:-; 
previous physical condition prove very conclusively that he 
waR not in position to do any work, and in fact really bad 
no husiliess to be walking out on the street, especially at 
night, alone and unattended. The record shows that the 
plarntiff had no one whatever dependent upon him for sup-
port. Under all the circumstances, there is no foundation 
whatever for finding· that there was any sort of mental suf-
fering, and I do not believe that it can have any other effect 
other than unduly to increase the amount of any verdict the 
jury may find. 
Counsel for the defendant also objects to the action of the 
Court in refusing- to give Instruction E, offered by the defend-
ant, to acquaint the jury with the legal obligations and rights 
of the defendant, if the jury believed that the 
page 170 ~ defendant was confronted with a certain emer-
gency without fault on his part. The Court takes 
the position that since the defendant denies striking the plain-
tiff. there is no need for any "emergency" instruction. How-
ever. defendant's counsel takes the position that, according 
to the undisputed testimony, defendant was actually con-
fronted with a certai11 emergency when he saw the plaintiff 
lyin~: in the middle of the street in dangerous proximitv to 
the defendant's moving automobile, and that accordingly th<.~ 
:jury should have been instrncted as to the recognized shlncl-
ard of conduct wllich the1·enpon applied to the defendant. 
Mr. ·wicker: The Court has gone to that Instruction No. 
3, w]1icb we do not object to. And instruction No. 4, we do 
not object to. I think the way they were finally amended 
there was no objection. 
The Court : ''Two'' here refers to '' 2-A'' 
page 171 ~ which is given in lieu of it. ' 
Mr. Rudd: We object and except to the changes 
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ma.de by the Court in Instructions Nos. 2, 3 and 4. V{e object 
also to the giving of Instruction ·F. That is objected to. vVe 
object to the ref ere nee to the preponderance of the evidence. 
Tl1e Court: Is that the only thing you object to in thP. 
giving of that instruction f 
Mr. Rudd: The over-emphasis. 
:.M"r. Wicker: Counsel for the defendant replies that this 
is the only instruction which defines preponderance, although 
the other instructions mention preponderance of the evidence 
:·mveral times, and it is highly important tlrnt it be defined. 
~Phe Court: 'l'he objection of counsel for the plaintiff to 
Instruction No. 3 does not cover the following words stricken 
out of Instruction No. 3, which striking of said words from 
the said Instruction was consented to by counsel for the 
plaiutiff; said words being·: '' and ba.ving· the right of way.'' 
Note; After the Court had read its instructions to the 
jur~, tht: Court made the following statement to the jury: 
Tlw Court: Gentlemen, there is a card that had been of-
fered in evidence, and one counsel raised some 
page 172 ~ objection, and some discussion arose about it. 
The. Court excluded it. La.ter, in conference with 
counsel. neither counsel objects to its admission in evidence, 
:md it is introduced in evidence before you for such value 
as you gentlemen attach to it. (Referring to Exhibit A.) 
page 173 ~ INST RUCTIONS.. 
Note: Instruction No. 1 withdrawn by counsel for the 
plaintiff. Instruction No. 2-A substituted as an amendment 
of Instruction No. 2 offered on bel1alf of the plaintiff. 
Instruction No. 2-A. 
The Court instructs the jury that the law provides the 
drivel' of. any vehicle upon the highway within a business 
or residence district shall yield t]1e right of way to a person 
crossh1g such l1ighway within any clearly marked crosswalk 
or any pedestrian crossing included in the prolon!?;ation of 
the ]atcral boundar~v Jines of tlle adjacent side,,ralk at the 
end of a block, and if you believe in this case that the phlin-
tiff was crossing· at such a place and was crossing· with the 
traffic sig·na.l lig·ht at that p<;>int, then he had the right to 
expect that defendant would yield him the right of wa.y and 
would either cl1ange his course, slow down or come to a com-
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plet.e stop, if necessary, to permit him, the said plaintiff, to 
safely and expeditiously negotiate the crossing. 
And if you further believe from the evidence that the de-
fendant neg·ligently failed to yield the plaintiff the rig·ht of 
wav and tllat as a proximate result thereof the plaintiff was 
struck by the defendant's car and injured while he, the plain-
tiff, was in the exercise of ordinary care on his part, then 
you should find your verdict for the plaintiff. 
(Granted.) 
l)ag·e 174 ~ lnstriiction No. 3. 
Tl1e Court instructs the jury that where the defendant 
relies on the defense of contributory neglig·ence, then in this 
connection you a re instructed that the burden of proving 
contributory neglig-ence is on the defendant. Contributory 
ne~ligence means failure on the part of the plaintiff to ex-
ercise reasonable care for his own safety under all facts and 
circumstances of the case. This does not mean that the plain-
tiff in undertaking to cross Second Street on the night in 
question. was supposed to maintain a continuous lookout for 
traffic from every direction but tl1at he exercise that degree 
of care for llis own safetv that would be exercised bv a rea-
f-:onahly prudent person under the same or similar ·circum-
stances. 
( Granted as amended.) 
pa~:e 175 ~ Instrndion No. 4. 
The (fond instructs the jurv that if you believe from the 
0viclence in this case plaintiff is entitled to recover then in 
fhdng- l1is dttma~·es, you Rball take into consideration the pain, 
the sufferimr. both mental and physical, whicl1 be has under-
!,?'one; tlrn nnture and extent of his injury and its continuance. 
if permanent; P._ncl his disability, if any, resulting from said 
injury and his necessary expenses for medical and hospital 
nttention ~ and yon may find such verdict for the plaintiff 
r1s ·will. in t1te opinion of the jury, be a fair and just com-
lH?nsRtion for the injury, not to exceed the amount sued fo1·. 
(Grm1tecl as amended.) 
l)a,g·e 176 ~ Instruction A. 
Tlie Con l't instructs the jury that you must not allow a.nv 
Rvrnpathy you may feel to influence you or your verdict iii 
any mamier. The verdict of the jurv must be based solely 
upon the evidence in the case and all reasonable inferences 
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f mm proven facts and the instructions of the Court; and 
must not be based, in whole or in part, upon sympathy, specu .. 
lation, conjecture or surmise. 
(Granted.) 
page 177} Instruction B. 
The ·Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was guilty 
of any neg·ligence proximately causing or efficiently con .. 
tributing to cause his accident, in whole or in part, then he 
is not entitled to recover regardless of the negligence, if any, 
of the defendant. And this is true even when the negligence 
of one party is much gTeater than that of the other party. 
(Granted.) 
}JUg'e ] 78 ~ lnstritction C. 
Tho Court instructs the jury that in order to hold the de .. 
fondant liable in this case the burden of proof is upon the 
plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) 
that the plaintiff was struck and injured by au automobile, 
and (2) that the automobile which struck and injured him 
was bc.•ing operated by the defendant, and (3) that the de-
fendant in such operation failed to exercise reasonable care, 
and ( 4) that such failure proximately caused the accident. 
Accordingly, unless you believe that every one of the fore-
~;oing four essential facts has been proven by the preponder-
ance of the evidence, then you must find for the defendant. 
( Granted as amended.) 
page 179} Instruct-ion D. 
The Court instructs the jury that even thoug·h you may 
lJelieve from the preponderance of the evidence that the plain-
tiff was injured without ne~;ligencc on his part, nevertheless, 
this alone would not be sufficient to justify a verdict for the 
T)laintiff since the law does not undertake to hold some one 
liable for every accident. 
Accordingly; if you believe from the preponderance of the 
evidence that. the defendant was, at the time of the accident 
exercising the same care as the averag·e reasonable driver, 
acting- prudently under the same or similar circumstances, 
and that the accident in this case was without negligence on 
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defendant's part, then your verdict should be for the de-
fendant. 
( Granted as amended.) 
page 180 ~ : Instruction E. 
The Court instructs the jury that if yon believe from the 
evidence that the defendant, without negligence on his part) 
was confronted with a sudden emergency, the law did not 
require him to exercise that degree of care, judg·ment, or 
discretion which would be required of him under ordinary 
circumstances and normal conditions. 
And, in such case, even though you might believe that by 
some other course of conduct, the defendant might have 
avoided the accident in this emergency, nevertheless, if you 
be]ieve tl1at his actions were those of the average reasonable 
driver, under the same or similar circumstances, then you 
should find your verdict for the defendant. 
(Refused.) 
page 181 ~ I nstr'llction F. 
The Court instrncts the jury that '' Prepond~rance of the 
evidence'' does not necessarily mean the great number of 
witnesses since the jury is the sole judge of the credibility 
and reasonableness of the testimony of the various witnesses. 
And if, after weig·bing the evidence upon the whole case, the 
jury is of opinion that the evidence is evenly balanced oi1 
each side, then the plaintiff has not sustained the burden of 
proof, and, in that event, your verdict should be for the de-
fendant. 
(Grantecl as amended.) 
·wrLLIS D. MILLER, .Judge. 
page 182 ~ The Comt fmther certifies that the motion to 
set aside the verdict of the jury and enter judg-
ment for defendant and the g-rounds of said motion are 
shown by pages 158 and 159 and 160 of said stenographic 
transcript., and further identified with the signature ''Vlillis 
D. Miller, J udg·e." ._ 
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Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
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GROUNDS OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SE'r ASIDE 
VERDICT. ETC. 
The defendant, by counsel, moves the Court to set aside 
the verdict of the jury in this case and to enter up judgment 
for the defendant l1e1·ein upon the following· grounds: 
(1) That the verdict of the jury is contrary to the law 
and the evidence; 
(~) That revc•rsible l~rror was committed in granting In-
struction No. 2-A, sinrc this instruction assumed without any 
S!lpporiing- evidence that the defendant drove into the inter-
section while the plaintiff was lawfully crossing the same, and 
because it assumed without any supporting evidence that 
the defendant failed to yield the right of way to the plain-
tiff; 
(3) The Court erred in overruling the defendant's motion 
to strike the evidence; 
( 4) At least one essential element, necessary to support 
a verdict in accordance with Instruction C, was not proven 
hy preponderauce of t]ie evidence, to-wit: '' That the auto-
mobile which struck and injured him" (the plaintiff) "was 
being operated by the defendant;'' in fact the 
page 184 ~ preponderance of the evidence showed that tlw 
defendant's automobile did not strike and injure 
the plaintiff; 
( 5) There was no reliable evidence identifying the defcn<l-
nnt '8 automobile as the ca1· whicl1 the plaintiff claimed had 
Rtruck him. The plaintiff's own testimony clearly showed 
that his assertion that the defendant's automobile had struck 
him was merelv a conclusion of the plaintiff's mind. Fur-
thermore, the pl::tintiff in his own testimony admitted that the 
automobile which struck him mig·ht have been another car 
rather than the one operated by the defendant; 
(6) 'I'he physical facts as shown by p]aintiff's testimony 
and that of his witnesses, plus matters of common knowl-
cdg·e, of which the Court takes judicial notice, sl1ow clearly 
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that the defendant must have received the injury (either 
from another automobile or from a fall) at a time previous 
to the time when defendant's automobile first entered the 
intersection. 
(7) The plaintiff's own testimony, plus the physical facts, 
showed that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
in attempting to cross the street in his condition and in the 
manner in which he attempted to cross the same; 
(8) The Court erred to the prejudice of the defendant by 
admitting- into evidence, over the objection of defendant, tes-
timony by Police Detective Bosquet as to his opinion and per-
sonal conclusion, formed several days subsequent 
page 185 ~ to the accident, that the plaintiff had been struck 
and injured by the defendant. 
(9) The amount of the verdict was excessive. 
WILLIS D. MILLER, .Judge. 
Teste: this 5th day of June, 1941, after due notice to plain-
tiff's attorney as required by law: 
WILLIS D. MILLER, .Judge. 
page 186 ~ I, Luther Libby, Clerk of the Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Ricl1mond, do hereby certify 
that the fo1·eg·oing· is a true transcript of so much of the rec-
ord as was agreed between counsel for the plaintiff and de-
fendant should be copied in the above entitled case (bemg-
the entire record except Exhibit A-Police Report Carel) 
wherein Lucius N ewsomc is complainant and Harry vV. San-
ders defendant, and that the defendant has executed a sus-
pending bond conditioned as required for a su,persedcas bond 
in the penalty of Four Thommncl Dollars, with surety deemed 
sufficient, and tlmt the plaintiff' had due notice of the inten-
tion of the defendant to apply for such transcript. 
·witness my hand this 23rd day of June, 19'41. 
LUTHER LIBBY, Clerk. 
Fee for record $42.50. 
A Copy-Teste: 
l\L B. ·w ATTS, C. C. 
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